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Abstract
The field of device-independent quantum information processing con-
cerns itself with devising and analysing protocols, such as quantum key
distribution and quantum tomography, without referring to the quality
of the physical devices utilised to execute the protocols. Instead, the
analysis is based on the observed correlations that arise during a repeated
interaction with the devices and, in particular, their ability to violate
the so called Bell inequalities.
Since the analysis of device-independent protocols holds irrespectively of
the underlying physical device, it implies that any device can be used
to execute the protocols: If the apparatus is of poor quality, the users
of the protocol will detect it and abort; otherwise, they will accomplish
their goal. This strong statement comes at a price — the analysis of
device-independent protocols is, a priori, extremely challenging. Having
good techniques at hand is thus crucial.
The thesis presents an approach that can be taken to simplify the analysis
of device-independent information processing protocols. The idea is the
following: Instead of analysing the most general device leading to the
observed correlations, one should first analyse a significantly simpler
device that, in each interaction with the user, behaves in an identical
way, independently of all other interactions. We call such a device an
independently and identically distributed (IID) device. As the next step,
special techniques are used to prove that, without loss of generality, the
analysis of the IID device implies similar results for the most general
device. Such techniques reduce the problem of analysing the general
scenario to that of analysing an IID one and, hence, we term them
reductions to IID.
We present two mathematical techniques that can be used as reduc-
tions to IID in the device-independent setting: de Finetti reductions
for correlations and the entropy accumulation theorem. Each technique
is accompanied by a showcase-application that exemplifies the reduc-
tion’s usage and benefits. Specifically, we use our de Finetti reduction
to prove a non-signalling (super-quantum) parallel repetition theorem,
belonging to a family of theorems discussed in theoretical computer
science. The entropy accumulation theorem is used to prove the security
of device-independent quantum cryptographic protocols.
Performing the analysis via a reduction to IID instead of directly analysing
the most general scenarios leads to simpler proofs and significant quan-
titive improvements, matching the tight results proven when analysing
IID devices. In particular, our analysis of device-independent quantum
key distribution protocols produces essentially optimal key rates and
noise tolerance, crucial for all future experimental implementations of
device-independent cryptography.

Zusammenfassung
Die geräteunabhängige Quanteninformationsverarbeitung beschäftigt sich
mit der Entwicklung und Analyse von Protokollen, wie z.B. dem Quan-
tenschlüsselaustausch oder der Quantentomographie, welche unabhängig
von der Qualität der eingesetzten physikalischen Geräte ist. Stattdessen
basiert die Analyse auf beobachteten Korrelationen, die durch wieder-
holte Wechselwirkung mit den Geräten entstehen, insbesondere ihrer
Fähigkeit Bellsche Ungleichungen zu verletzen.
Da die Analyse geräteunabhängiger Protokolle unabhängig von den
eingesetzten Geräten ist, können beliebige Geräte benutzt werden um die
Protokolle auszuführen: Weist das genutzte Gerät eine schlechte Qualität
auf, detektiert das Protokoll dies und bricht ab. Ansonsten wird das
Protokoll erfolgreich sein. Diese starke Aussage hat jedoch ihren Preis:
die Analyse geräteunabhängiger Protokolle ist extrem herausfordernd.
Deswegen sind gute Methoden für deren Analyse essentiell.
Diese Dissertation stellt eine Herangehensweise zur Vereinfachung der
Analyse geräteunabhängiger Protokolle vor, basierend auf folgender
Idee: Statt die allgemeinsten Geräte zu analysieren, welche zu den
beobachteten Korrelationen führen, wird zunächst ein deutlich einfacheres
Gerät analysiert, das sich in jeder Wechselwirkung mit dem Benutzer
identisch verhält, unabhängig von allen anderen Wechselwirkungen. Wir
nennen solch ein Gerät ein identisch und unabhängig verteiltes (IID)
Gerät. Dann werden spezielle mathematische Methoden benutzt um zu
zeigen, dass diese einfachere Analyse ähnliche Ergebnisse wie die Analyse
der allgemeinsten Geräte liefert. Solche Methoden reduzieren die Analyse
des allgemeinen Problems auf die des IID-Problems. Daher bezeichnen
wir sie als Reduktionen auf das IID-Problem.
Wir präsentieren zwei Reduktionen auf das IID-Problem: de Finetti
Reduktionen für Korrelationen sowie den Entropieanhäufungssatz. Beide
Methoden werden durch Beispielanwendungen illustriert. Spezifisch be-
nutzen wir die de Finetti Reduktion um einen sogenannten“non-signalling
parallel repetition”-Satz zu beweisen, welcher zu einer Familie von Sätzen
gehört, die in der theoretischen Informatik diskutiert werden. Der En-
tropieanhäufungssatz wird benutzt um die Sicherheit von geräteunab-
hängigen Quantenkryptografieprotokollen zu beweisen.
Indem man die Analyse durch Reduktionen auf den IID Fall durchführt,
anstelle einer Analyse der allgemeinsten Szenarien, erhält man einfachere
Beweise und signifikante quantitative Verbesserungen, welche mit den
strengen Resultaten für IID Geräte übereinstimmen. Insbesondere führt
unsere Analyse von geräteunabhängigen Protokollen für Quantenschlüsse-
laustausch zu annähernd optimalen Schlüsselraten und Fehlertoleranzen,
welche essentiell für alle zukünftigen experimentellen Implementierungen
von geräteunabhängiger Kryptographie sind.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Device-independent information processing
The study of quantum information unveils new possibilities for remarkable forms
of computation, communication, and cryptography by investigating different ways
of manipulating quantum states. Crucially, the analysis of quantum information
processing tasks must be based, in one way or another, on the actual physical
processes used to implement the considered task; the physical processes must be
inherently quantum as otherwise no advantage can be gained compared to classical
information processing. In most applications, the starting point of the analysis is
an explicit and exact characterisation of the quantum apparatus, or device, used to
implement the task of interest.
As an example, consider the task of quantum key distribution (QKD). In a
QKD protocol, the goal of the honest parties, called Alice and Bob, is to create
a shared key, unknown to everybody else but them. The protocol is intrinsically
quantum: To execute it Alice and Bob hold entangled quantum states in their
laboratories and perform quantum operations, or measurements, on the quantum
states. Informally, proving the security of a QKD protocol amounts to showing that
no adversary can hold (significant) information about the produced key. To prove
security one usually needs to have a complete description of the quantum devices,
i.e., the quantum states and measurements, used by Alice and Bob. For example,
the security proof of the celebrated BB84 protocol [Bennett and Brassard, 1984]
builds on the assumptions that Alice and Bob hold two-qubit states and are able to
measure them in a specific way. When these assumptions are dropped, the protocol
is no longer secure [Pironio et al., 2009]. Thus, if Alice and Bob wish to use their
quantum devices in order to implement a QKD protocol they need to first make
sure that the device is performing the exact operations described by the protocol.
Unfortunately, in practice we are unable to fully characterise the physical devices
used in quantum information processing tasks. Even the most skilled experimentalist
will recognise that a fully characterised, always stable, large-scale quantum device
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that implements a QKD protocol is extremely hard to build. If the honest users’
device is different from the device analysed in the accompanying security proof,
security is no longer guaranteed and imperfections can be exploited to attack the
protocol.
Noise and imperfections cannot be completely avoided when implementing quan-
tum information processing tasks. Furthermore, imperfections being imperfections,
one also cannot expect to perfectly characterise them. That is, we cannot say for sure
what exactly is about to go wrong in the quantum devices: Maybe the measurements
are not well-calibrated, perhaps some noise introduces correlations between particles
which are intended to be independent, or interaction with the environment may
possibly lead to decoherence. Even the advent of fault-tolerant computation, if
achievable one day, cannot resolve all types of errors if no promise is given regarding
the number of errors and their, possibly adversarial, nature. Once we come to terms
with the above, a natural question arises:
Can quantum information processing tasks be accomplished by utilising
uncharacterised, perhaps even adversarial, physical devices?
An adversarial, or malicious, device is one implemented by a hostile party
interested in, e.g., breaking the cryptographic protocol being executed. Clearly, this
is an extreme scenario to consider. Note, however, that even if the manufacturer of
the device is to be trusted, he may still be incompetent — the physical apparatus
will be subject to uncharacterised imperfections even though the manufacturer is
honest and has good intentions.
The field of device-independent information processing addresses the above
question. In the device-independent framework we treat the physical devices, on
which a minimal set of constraints is enforced,1 as black boxes — Alice and Bob
hold a box and can interact with it classically (as explained below) to execute the
considered protocol, but they cannot open it to assess its internal workings.2 They
have no knowledge regarding the physical apparatus and do not trust that it works
as alleged by the manufacturer of the device.
What can Alice and Bob do with the black box? They can interact with it by
pushing buttons, each associated with some classical input (e.g., a bit) and record
the classical outputs produced by the box in response to pressing its buttons. Thus,
the only information available to Alice and Bob is the observed classical data created
during their interaction with the black box. (Hence the name “device-independent”).
Since the device is not to be trusted, the classical information collected by Alice
and Bob during the interaction with the box must allow them, somehow, to test the
possibly faulty or malicious device and decide whether using it, e.g., to create their
1Clearly, one cannot perform any cryptographic task if the device includes a transmitter that
just sends all the information to the adversary. Few minimal assumptions regarding the device will
be needed; see Section 3.3. Depending on the considered task, some of the assumptions can be
enforced in practice while others may require some minimal level of trust.
2Notice that even if Alice and Bob did have some information about the physical apparatus,
the device-independent framework does not allow them to take advantage of this information in the
analysis. For example, Alice and Bob may be able to distinguish a device that uses the polarisation
of a photon to encode a qubit from one based on superconducting qubits (even the author is able
to do that). Yet, this information is not to be used when treating the device as a black box.
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keys by executing a QKD protocol, poses any security risk. A protocol or task is
said to be device-independent if it guarantees that by interacting with the device
according to the specified steps the parties will either abort, if they detect a fault,
or accomplish the desired task (with high probability).
The possibility of device-independent information processing is quite surprising.
Indeed, restricting ourselves to classical physics and classical information, it is
impossible to derive device-independent statements.3 The most important ingredients
for device-independent protocols are the existence of Bell inequalities and quantum
“non-local” correlations that violate them [Bell, 1964]. These two facts are far from
trivial and play a fundamental role in quantum theory. In the context of device-
independent information processing, a Bell inequality acts as a “test for quantumness”
that allows the users of the device to verify that their device is “doing something
quantum” and cannot be simulated by classical means. This “quantumness”, of a
specific form discussed below, is what allows us to, e.g., prove security of a QKD
protocol.
A Bell inequality can be thought of as a multi-player game, also called a non-local
game, played by the parties using the device they share. A non-local game goes as
follows. A referee asks each of the (cooperating) parties a question chosen according
to a given probability distribution. The parties need to supply answers which fulfil
a pre-determined requirement according to which the referee accepts or rejects the
answers. In order to do so, they can agree on a strategy beforehand, but once the
game begins communication between the parties is not allowed. If the referee accepts
their answers the players win. The goal of the parties is, naturally, to maximise
their winning probability in the game.
Different devices held by the parties implement different strategies for the game
and may lead to different winning probabilities. In the device-independent setting
we are interested in games that have a special “feature” — there exists a quantum
device which achieves a winning probability in the game that is greater than all
classical, local, devices. If the honest parties learn, by interacting with the device,
that their device can win the game with probability higher than that of all classical
devices, they conclude it cannot be explained by classical physics alone.4
Crucially, the winning probability in the game does not merely indicate that the
device is doing something quantum but how non-classical it is. Relations are known
between the probability of winning some non-local games and various other quantities.
Some examples for quantities of interest are the entropy produced by the device,
the amount of entanglement consumed to play the game, or the distance (under
an appropriate distance measure) of the device from a specific fully characterised
quantum device. Such relations lie at the heart of any analysis of device-independent
information processing tasks.
Although above we only mentioned device-independent QKD as an example for
a device-independent task, the framework of device-independence does not only
concern the more-than-average paranoid cryptographers. The framework fits any
3Consider for example the case of device-independent QKD. Classical devices can always be
pre-programmed by the adversary to output a fixed key of her choice.
4We postpone the formal and more technical discussion to a later point; an enthusiastic reader
may jump ahead to Section 3.2.
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scenario in which, a priori, we do not want to assume anything about the utilised
devices and their underlying physical nature. To reassure the reader, we give three
additional examples.
Bell inequalities were originally introduced in the context of the foundations
of quantum mechanics in order to resolve the EPR paradox [Einstein et al., 1935].
When trying to test quantum theory against an alternative classical world that admits
a “local hidden variable model” (or, in other words, falsify all classical explanations
of a behaviour of a physical system), one cannot assume that quantum theory holds
to begin with and must treat the device as a black box without assuming to know
its internal workings.
A second example is that of blind tomography, also termed self-testing. Assume a
quantum state is being produced in some experimental setting. Quantum tomography
is the process of estimating which state is being created by performing measurements
on copies of the state and collecting the statistics [Paris and Řeháček, 2004]. To
get a meaningful estimation, a certain set of measurements needs to be used,
depending on the dimension of the state. In other words, in order to estimate
and characterise the quantum state, we must be able to first characterise the
measurement devices. Blind quantum tomography refers to the process in which the
measurements are also unknown. In such a case, nothing but the observed statistics
can be used [Mayers and Yao, 1998, Bancal et al., 2015].
Another interesting example is that of verification of computation — given a
device claimed to be a quantum computer, how can human beings, who cannot
perform quantum computations by themselves, verify that this is indeed the case?
There are different ways of addressing this question, but in all cases we would like
to make statements without presuming that the considered devices are performing
any particular quantum operations (see, e.g., [Reichardt et al., 2013]).
The device-independent framework becomes relevant whenever one wishes to
make concrete statements without referring to the underlying physical nature of
the utilised devices and the types of imperfections or errors that may occur. The
derived statements are extremely strong. Device-independent security, for example,
is regarded as the gold standard for quantum cryptography, since attacks exploiting
the mismatch between security proof and implementation are no longer an issue.
Making such strong statements comes at a price. The analysis of device-independent
tasks is, a priori, extremely challenging: We treat the devices as black boxes and
thus the proofs need to account for an almost arbitrary, even adversarial, behaviour
of the devices. Having good techniques for the analysis at hand is therefore crucial.
This is further discussed in the following section.
1.1.2 Reductions to IID
In the device-independent setting one does not have a description of the specific
device used in the considered task and, hence, must analyse the behaviour of arbitrary
devices. For example, when proving security of cryptographic protocols we clearly
need to consider any possible device that the adversary may prepare. Unfortunately,
analysing the behaviour of arbitrary devices can be wearying at best and infeasible
at worst. Let us start by explaining why this is the case.
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As mentioned above, the ability to achieve device-independent information
processing tasks is based on the existence of non-local games and quantum strategies
to play them that can beat any classical strategy. To perform complex tasks, such
as device-independent cryptography, employing the device to play a single non-
local game is clearly not enough; we cannot conclude any meaningful information
regarding the device by asking it to produce outputs only for a single game. To
put quantum information to work we must consider protocols in which the device is
used to play many non-local games. This way, the parties executing the protocol
can collect statistics and test their device. If the device does not pass the test the
parties abort the protocol (see Protocol 1.1 below for an example).
The reason for the difficulty of the analysis lies in the fact that one needs to
examine the overall behaviour of the device during the entire execution of the
protocol, consisting of playing many games with the device, instead of its behaviour
in a single game. As the device is uncharacterised its actions when playing one game
may depend on other games.
In general, there are two families of devices able to play many games that one
can consider — parallel and sequential devices. A parallel device is one which can
be used to play all the games at once. That is, the parties executing the protocol
are instructed to give all the inputs, for all the games, to the device and only then
the device produces the outputs for all the games. In such a case, the actions of the
device in one game may depend on all other games.
A sequential device, on the other hand, is used to play the games one after the
other, i.e., the parties give the device the first inputs and wait for its outputs and only
then proceed to play the next game. In between the games, some communication
may be allowed between the parties and the different components of the device.
In the case of a sequential device, the behaviour of the device in one game may
depend on all previous games as well as communication taking place during the time
between the games.5 In both cases, the input-output behaviour of the devices gets
quite complicated.
One common assumption introduced to simplify the analysis of device-independent
information processing tasks is the so called “independent and identically dis-
tributed” (IID) assumption. As the name suggests, a device is said to be an
IID device if it plays each of the games independently of the others and utilises the
same strategy for all games. An IID device is a special case of both parallel and
sequential devices and, since it is highly structured, analysing its behaviour can be
significantly simpler than analysing the more general devices; see Figure 1.1.
The IID assumption heavily restricts the structure of the device. It is therefore
not clear at all that analysing device-independent information processing tasks under
the IID assumption is sufficient. Returning to the example of device-independent
cryptography, an adversary who can prepare arbitrary devices (let it be sequential or
parallel) may be strictly stronger, i.e., can get more information about the outputs
of the honest parties, than an adversary restricted to IID devices. Thus, simplifying
the analysis by using the IID assumption comes at the cost of weakening the final
statement.
The main question addressed in this thesis is the following:
5The formal definitions of parallel and sequential devices are given in Chapter 6.
6 1. Introduction
Figure 1.1: The relation between the different sets of devices. The intersection of the
sets of sequential and parallel devices includes the set of IID devices. The analysis
of IID devices, i.e., that done under the IID assumption, is rather simple.
Can the analysis of device-independent information processing tasks be
reduced to that performed under the IID assumption?
The term reduction is widely used in theoretical computer science and is meant
to describe the process of showing that one problem is as hard/easy as another.
In our case, we ask whether analysing general devices is as easy as analysing IID
devices or, in other words, does an analysis performed under the IID assumption
imply results concerning general devices (i.e., statements which are not restricted
to the IID case). A priori, it is not at all obvious that this is the case; clearly, not
all devices are IID devices. A positive answer to the above question means that
even though there exist devices that cannot be described as IID ones, it is sometimes
possible to restrict the attention solely to IID devices and the rest will follow.
The idea of applying a reduction to IID as a proof technique was conceived6
in [Christandl et al., 2007], following which a concrete reduction relevant for appli-
cations was developed in [Renner, 2008] and used to reduce the security proof of
QKD protocols to that done under the IID assumption.7 As such, [Renner, 2008]
acts as the first example for a proof using a reduction to IID.
Analysing information processing tasks via a reduction to IID has several signifi-
cant advantages. Analysing IID devices is relatively easy and almost always intuitive.
Thus, having tools that allow us to extend the analysis to the general case greatly
simplifies proofs.8 The simplicity, in turn, allows for clear and modular statements
6Perhaps surprisingly, as far as the author is aware the idea of a “reduction to IID” does not
appear or used in classical information processing and cryptography.
7In the context of QKD, security under the IID assumption is called security against collective
attacks.
8The reductions themselves are not necessarily simple, but that is fine. They are technical tools
that are only proved once and can then be used to simplify many other proofs. The researcher
using the reduction does not need to reprove anything.
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as well as quantitively strong results.9
The importance of quantitively strong results is obvious, especially when dis-
cussing quantum information processing tasks: If we wish to benefit from the new
possibilities brought by the study of quantum information, we must be able to
implement the protocols in practice. Without strong quantitive bounds on, e.g., key
rates and tolerable noise levels, we cannot take the device-independent field from
theory to practice. Clarity and modularity should also not be dismissed. Science is
not a “one-man’s job”; clarity and modularity are crucial when advancing science as
a community. Indeed, complex and fine-tuned proofs are hard to verify, adapt to
other cases of interest, and quantitively improve.
Another advantage of reducing a general analysis to IID is that it allows us to
separate the wheat from the chaff. The essence of the arguments used in proofs of
information processing tasks almost always enter the game in the analysis of the IID
case. Proofs that address the most general scenarios directly (i.e., not via a reduction
to IID) are at risk of obscuring the “physics” by more technical mathematical steps.
When using a reduction to IID this is (mostly) not the case — the essence, or the
interesting part, lies in the analysis of IID devices while the technicalities are pushed
into the reduction itself.
With the above advantages, the development and application of reductions
to IID flourished in quantum information processing. Yet, the benefits did not
reach the subfield of device-independent quantum information processing. The
reason was clear — all the techniques used as reductions to IID had to make
assumptions regarding the investigated system, which are too restrictive when
studying uncharacterised devices.
As we will show in the thesis, reductions to IID can also be developed and
employed in device-independent quantum information processing. We present two
techniques that can be used as reductions to IID, accompanied by two showcase-
applications that illustrate how the reductions can be used and their benefits in
terms of the derived theorems. The following section presents the content of the
thesis in more detail.
1.2 Content of the thesis
The goal of the thesis is to explain how reductions to IID can be performed in the
context of device-independent information processing. To this end, after explaining
the different mathematical objects that one needs to consider and their relevance,
we discuss the IID assumption and its implications in the device-independent setting.
We then present two techniques, or tools, that can be used as reductions to IID in
the analysis of device-independent information processing tasks, one relevant for
parallel devices and the other for sequential ones.
To better comprehend the topic and exemplify the usage of the two reductions,
we consider two applications as showcases, namely, parallel repetition of non-local
9This is in agreement with Occam’s razor; while there is no notion of the “right proof” out of
several possible proofs (assuming they are all mathematically correct), the simplest proof usually
turns out to be the most useful and insightful one.
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Figure 1.2: Reductions to IID in device-independent information processing. de
Finetti reductions can be used to reduce the study of parallel devices to IID device
(see Chapters 8 and 10), while the entropy accumulation theorem can be used when
dealing with sequential devices (Chapters 9 and 11).
games and device-independent cryptography. These are studied in detail throughout
the chapters of the thesis, while taking the perspective of reductions to IID.
1.2.1 Reductions
Two types of reductions are presented. The reductions are applicable in different
scenarios and give statements of different forms; see Figure 1.2.
de Finetti reduction for correlations
The first reduction, the topic of Chapter 8, is called “de Finetti reduction for
correlations” and was developed in [Arnon-Friedman and Renner, 2015]. The de
Finetti reduction is relevant for the analysis of permutation invariant parallel devices.
Permutation invariance is an inherent symmetry in many information processing
tasks, device-independent tasks among them. Thus, analysing permutation invariant
devices is of special interest.
In short, in our context, a de Finetti reduction is a theorem that relates any
permutation invariant parallel device to a special type of device, termed de Finetti
device, which behaves as a convex combination of IID devices (see Chapter 8 for the
formal definitions). The given relation acts as a reduction to IID when considering
tasks admitting a permutation invariance symmetry and in which a parallel device
needs to be analysed. Our showcase of parallel repetition of non-local games fits
this description and thus can benefit from our de Finetti reduction.
Various quantum de Finetti theorems were know prior to our work and were
successfully used to substantially simplify the analysis of many quantum information
tasks. However, they cannot be applied in the device-independent setting, since they
make many assumptions regarding the permutation invariant quantum states being
analysed and therefore cannot accommodate uncharacterised devices. The unique
property of the reduction presented in Chapter 8 is that, apart from permutation
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invariance, it makes no assumptions whatsoever regarding the systems of interest and
is therefore applicable in the analysis of device-independent information processing.
For pedagogical reasons, we choose to present in the thesis a de Finetti reduction
which is relevant to the case of bipartite devices, i.e., devices which are shared
between two parties, Alice and Bob. The statements can be extended to any number
of parties, as shown in [Arnon-Friedman and Renner, 2015]; the proofs of the general
case do not include fundamental insights on top of those used in the bipartite case
but require somewhat heavy notation. We therefore omit the more general theorems
and proofs (while supplying the full analysis of the bipartite case in Chapter 8), with
the hope of making the content more inviting for readers unfamiliar with the topic.
Apart from presenting the reduction and the possible ways of using it, Chapter 8
also includes a discussion of ways in which it may be possible to extend or modify
the reduction (to be more specific, we mainly present impossibility results). This
content does not appear in detail in other published papers and can be relevant for
future studies of the topic.
Entropy accumulation theorem
The second reduction to IID that can be used in the device-independent setting
is the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) [Dupuis et al., 2016] and is the topic
of Chapter 9. The EAT can be seen as an extension of the entropic formula-
tion of the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) [Holenstein and Renner, 2011,
Tomamichel et al., 2009], applicable only under the IID assumption, to more general
sequential processes.
The AEP, presented in Chapter 7, basically asserts that when considering IID
random variables, the smooth min- and max-entropies of the random variables
converge to their von Neumann (or Shannon, in the classical case) entropy, as
the number of copies of the random variable increases. The AEP is of great
importance when analysing, both classical and quantum, information processing
tasks under the IID assumption: It explains why the von Neumann entropy is so
important in information theory — the smooth entropies, which describe operational
tasks, converge to the von Neumann entropy when considering a large number of
independent repetitions of the relevant task.10
Moving on from the IID setting, the EAT considers a certain class of quantum
sequential processes. That is, in our context, it is relevant when studying sequential
devices.11 Similarly to the AEP, when applicable, the EAT allows one to bound
the total amount of the smooth min- and max-entropies using the same bound on
the von Neumann entropy calculated for the IID analysis, i.e., the one used when
applying the AEP. In this sense, the EAT can be seen as a reduction to IID — with
the aid of the EAT the analysis done under the IID assumption using the AEP can
be extended to the one relevant for sequential devices.
10A commonly used example is that of “data compression”. There, one would like to encode an
n bit string using less bits. If we allow for some small error when decoding the data, the smooth
max-entropy roughly describes the number of bits needed. However, for a large enough number of
independent repetitions, less bits suffice and the exact amount is governed by the Shannon entropy.
11To be more precise, some requirements regarding the process, or protocol, in which the
sequential device is to be used must hold. This is explained in details in Chapter 9.
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The proof of the EAT is not presented in the thesis (and should not be at-
tributed to the author). We focus on motivating, presenting, and explaining the
EAT in the form relevant for device-independent quantum information process-
ing [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2018] (as well as quantum cryptography in general),
so it can be later used in our showcase of device-independent cryptography. The
pedagogical presentation of the EAT given in Chapter 9 does not appear in full
in any other published material and we hope that it will make the theorem more
broadly accessible.
Before presenting our showcases, let us remark that both of the reductions
mentioned above are not “black box” reductions, in the sense that one cannot simply
say that if a problem is solved under the IID assumption then it is solved in the
general case. In particular, one should be familiar with the exact statements of the
reductions (though not with their proofs) as well as the analysis of the considered
task under the IID assumption in order to apply the reductions (or even just check
whether they are applicable or not). When discussing the reductions in Chapters 8
and 9, we explicitly explain in what sense the presented tools count as reductions to
IID techniques.
1.2.2 Showcases
We use two showcases throughout the thesis in order to exemplify the approach of
reductions to IID and the more technical usage of the presented reductions. The
showcase of parallel repetition of non-local games uses the de Finetti reduction
technique while the showcase of device-independent cryptography builds on the EAT.
As mentioned in Section 1.1.2 above, we believe that analysing device-independent
tasks using a reduction to IID has its benefits. The derived theorems are, arguably,
more intuitive and insightful and, in addition, give strong quantitive results.
We shortly discuss below each of our showcases. We present informal theorems
describing the results proven for the showcases. The informal theorems shed light
on the fundamental nature and strength of the approach of reductions to IID.
Non-signalling parallel repetition
Our first showcase is that of non-signalling parallel repetition. Chap-
ter 10 presents our formal statements and proofs, which previously appeared
in [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b]. As before, we focus in the thesis on the bi-
partite case for pedagogical reasons; [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b] includes the
general analysis, which is valid for any number of parties playing the game.
Non-local games, as mentioned in Section 1.1.1, are games played by several
cooperating parties, also called players. A referee asks each of the players a question
chosen according to a given probability distribution. The players need to supply
answers which fulfil a pre-determined requirement according to which the referee
accepts or rejects the answers. In order to do so, they can agree on a strategy
beforehand, but once the game begins communication between the parties is no
longer allowed. If the referee accepts their answers the players win.
In the language used so far, we can think of a device as implementing a strategy
for the game. Depending on the field of interest, one can consider classical, quantum,
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or non-signalling devices, the latter referring to devices on which the only restriction
is that they do not allow the players to communicate. We focus below on the case
of non-signalling strategies, or devices.
One of the most interesting questions regarding non-local games is the question
of parallel repetition. Given a non-local game with optimal winning probability 1−α
using non-signalling strategies, we are interested in analysing the optimal winning
probability of a non-signalling strategy in the repeated, or threshold, game. A
threshold game is a game in which the referee asks the players to play n ∈ N
instances of the non-local game, all at once, and the players’ goal is to win more
than 1− α+ β fraction of the games, for β > 0 a parameter of the threshold game.
The parallel repetition question concerns itself with upper-bounding the optimal
winning probability in the threshold game, as the number of games n increases.12
One trivial strategy that the players can use in the threshold game is a strategy
employing a non-signalling IID device. That is, they simply answer each of the n
questions independently using the optimal non-signalling device used to play a single
game. Using an IID device, the fraction of successful answers is highly concentrated
around 1−α and the probability to win more than a 1−α+β fraction of the games
decreases exponentially fast with nβ2, as follows from the optimal formulation of
the Chernoff bound.
However, since the players receive from the referee all the questions to the n
instances of the non-local game at once, an IID device is not the most general
device that they can use. Instead, they can use any non-signalling parallel device to
implement their strategy. As parallel devices are strictly more general than IID ones,
using parallel devices in fact allows them to win the threshold game with higher
probability than in the IID case.13 Still, one may ask how the winning probability
behaves for a sufficiently large number of repetitions n and, especially, whether it
decreases in a similar fashion as for IID strategies.
To answer the above question, we wish to reduce the study of strategies employing
parallel devices to those using IID devices. A crucial observation that allows us to
do so is that the threshold game itself admits a permutation invariance symmetry
(i.e., the order of questions-answers tuples does not matter; see Chapter 10 for the
details) and, therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that the optimal
strategy is also permutation invariant. Now that we can restrict our attention to
permutation invariant parallel devices, de Finetti reductions become handy and can
be used as a tool for reduction to IID.
In Chapter 10 we consider the case of non-signalling strategies for complete-
support games. A complete-support game is one in which all possible combinations
of questions being sent to the players have some non-zero probability of being asked
by the referee. We prove the following via a reduction to IID:
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Given a game with optimal non-signalling winning prob-
ability 1− α, for any β > 0, the probability to win more than a fraction 1− α+ β
12This is actually a generalisation of the more commonly known parallel repetition question, in
which one wishes to upper-bound the probability of winning all the n games.
13When first encountering the question of parallel repetition it may seem surprising that the
players can do better using a parallel device, but this is indeed the case; see Section 4.1.2 a concrete
example.
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of n games played in parallel using a non-signalling strategy is exponentially small
in nβ2, as in the IID case.
Perhaps surprisingly, while the parallel repetition question is a well-investigated
one, an exponential decrease that matches the IID case, as far as we are aware, was
not known prior to our work (also not for classical or quantum strategies). In the
context of reductions to IID, however, achieving the same behaviour as in the IID
case is not unexpected.
To prove Theorem 1.1 we first prove another statement that has a “reduction to
IID flavour” and is perhaps of more fundamental nature. To present it, however, we
need to first set some notation.14
As mentioned above, we focus on two-player games, i.e., games played by Alice
and Bob (and the referee). A parallel device used for the threshold game can
be described using a conditional probability distribution PAB|XY , where A =
A1, . . . , An is the random variable describing Alice’s answers in the threshold game
(Ai being her answer in the i’th game) and, similarly, B = B1, . . . , Bn describes
Bob’s answers, and X = X1, . . . , Xn and Y = Y1, . . . , Yn are Alice’s and Bob’s
questions, respectively.
When we say that a parallel device is non-signalling, we mean that it cannot be
used as means of communication between the parties. The behaviour of the device
in one game, however, may depend on the other games.15 Mathematically, this
means that, while the marginals PA|X and PB|Y are proper conditional probability
distributions, objects such as PA1|X1 are not well-defined.
During the threshold game, the device used by the players produces the observed
data in the n games: a = a1, . . . , an, b = b1, . . . , bn, x = x1, . . . , xn, and y =
y1, . . . , yn. These are distributed according to Q⊗nXY PAB|XY , where QXY denotes
the distribution used by the referee to choose the questions in a single non-local
game. Q⊗nXY is then the IID distribution according to which the questions are chosen
in the threshold game.
The observed data a, b,x,y can be used to calculate frequencies and define a
“frequencies’ conditional probability distribution”, which we denote by Ofreq(a,b,x,y)ABXY ,
as:
O
freq(a,b,x,y)
ABXY (a˜b˜x˜y˜) =
∣∣∣ {i : (ai, bi, xi, yi) = (a˜, b˜, x˜, y˜)} ∣∣∣
n
and define
O
freq(a,b,x,y)
AB|XY =
O
freq(a,b,x,y)
ABXY
QXY
. (1.1)
14We are jumping ahead now with the aim of being able to explain Theorem 1.2 to readers who
are already somewhat familiar with device-independent information processing and non-signalling
systems. For a reader unfamiliar with these topics, the mathematical statements may seem puzzling
without further explanations. We will get back to the discussed theorem in Chapter 10, after
giving all the preparatory information throughout the thesis. A reader unfamiliar with the used
terminology can therefore skip the current discussion without the risk of missing out.
15In other words, the local strategy of each player does require “communication between the
games”: In order to (locally) answer the i’th question received from the referee, the player needs to
know his j’th question (with i 6= j).
1.2 Content of the thesis 13
O
freq(a,b,x,y)
AB|XY can be seen as a (not necessarily physical) device, or a strategy,
for a single game. Starting with IID devices, which can be written in the form
of16 PAB|XY = O⊗nAB|XY , it holds that if the device OAB|XY is non-signalling
then PAB|XY is non-signalling and vice versa. This also implies that, for sufficiently
large n, Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY is non-signalling with high probability.
For a non-IID, but non-signalling, device PAB|XY , however, it is not clear at all
that Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY should be non-signalling as well. Using a reduction to IID, the
following theorem is proven:
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Let PAB|XY be a non-signalling permutation invariant
parallel device and Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY as in Equation (1.1). Then, for sufficiently large n,
O
freq(a,b,x,y)
AB|XY is close to a non-signalling device with high probability. In particular,
this means that the observed data produced by a non-signalling permutation invariant
parallel device can be seen as if, with high probability, it was sampled using an IID
device O⊗nAB|XY in which every single device OAB|XY is close to a non-signalling
one.
Theorem 1.1 follows directly from Theorem 1.2 by noting that the number of
games won in a given use of the device can be directly read from Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY and
that if Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY is close to a non-signalling device then its winning probability
cannot be too far from the optimal non-signalling winning probability 1− α.
Device-independent quantum cryptography
Chapter 11 is devoted to the analysis of our second showcase — device-
independent cryptography. The chapter’s content previously appeared
in [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016c]. The most challenging cryptographic task in
which device-independent security has been considered is device-independent QKD
(DIQKD); we will use this task as our main example. In DIQKD the goal of the
honest parties, called Alice and Bob, is to create a shared key, unknown to everybody
else but them. To execute the protocol they hold a device consisting of two parts:
Each part belongs to one of the parties and is kept in their laboratories. Ideally, the
device performs measurements on some entangled quantum states it contains.
The basic structure of a DIQKD protocol is presented as Protocol 1.1. The
protocol consists of playing n non-local games, one after the other, with the given
untrusted device and calculating the average winning probability from the observed
data (i.e., Alice and Bob’s inputs and outputs). If the average winning probability is
below the expected winning probability ωexp defined by the protocol, Alice and Bob
conclude that something is wrong and abort the protocol. Otherwise, they apply
classical post-processing steps that allow them to create identical and uniformly
distributed keys. (The full description of the considered DIQKD protocol is presented
and discussed in the following chapters).
16An IID device is illustrated in the bottom of Figure 1.2. We can then think of each
copy OAB|XY as describing a single copy of the smaller boxes in the figure, while PAB|XY =
O⊗n
AB|XY described the device including all the copies together.
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Protocol 1.1 Device-independent quantum key distribution protocol (simplified
example)
Given: A device for Alice and Bob that can play the chosen Bell game repeatedly
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-3:
2: Alice and Bob choose Xi, Yi at random.
3: They input Xi, Yi to the device and record the outputs Ai, Bi.
4: Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob estimate the average winning proba-
bility in the game from the observed data. If it is below the expected winning
probability, ωexp, they abort.
5: Classical post processing: Alice and Bob apply an error correction protocol
and a privacy amplification protocol (both classical) on their raw data A and B.
The central task when proving security of DIQKD consists in bounding the
information that an adversary, called Eve, may obtain about Alice’s raw data A =
A1, . . . , An used to create the final key (see Protocol 1.1). More concretely, one needs
to establishing a lower bound on the smooth conditional min-entropy Hεmin(A|E),
where E is Eve’s quantum system, which can be initially correlated to the device used
by Alice and Bob in the protocol and ε > 0 is one of the security parameters of the
protocol (see Section 4.2). The quantity Hεmin(A|E) determines the maximal length
of the secret key that can be created by the protocol. Hence, proving security amounts
to lower-bounding Hεmin(A|E). Evaluating the smooth min-entropy Hεmin(A|E) of
a large system is often difficult, especially in the device-independent setting where
Alice and Bob are using an uncharacterised device, which may also be manufactured
by Eve.
The IID assumption is commonly used in order to simplify the calculation
of Hεmin(A|E). In the IID case we can assume that Alice and Bob use an IID device
to execute the protocol and, hence, each Ai is produced independently of all other
outputs. Furthermore, one can assume that Eve’s quantum information also takes
the IID form E = E1, . . . , En, where each Ei holds information only regarding Ai.
Then, the AEP, briefly mentioned above, can be used to calculate an upper-bound
on Hεmin(A|E) and, by this, prove security.
The most general adversarial device to consider is, clearly, not an IID one.
Due to the sequential nature of the protocol, the relevant devices to consider are
sequential devices. As sequential devices are more complex than IID ones, secu-
rity proofs for DIQKD that proved security by addressing the most general device
directly, e.g., [Reichardt et al., 2013, Vazirani and Vidick, 2014], had to use tech-
niques which are far more complicated than the ones used for security proofs under
the IID assumption, e.g., in [Pironio et al., 2009]. Consequently, the derived security
statements were of limited relevance for practical experimental implementations;
they are applicable only in an unrealistic regime of parameters, e.g., small amount
of tolerable noise and large number of signals.
We take the approach of reductions to IID in order to prove the security of our
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DIQKD protocol. In particular, we leverage the sequential nature of the protocol, as
well as the specific way in which classical statistics are collected by Alice and Bob,
to prove its security by reducing the analysis of sequential devices to that of IID
devices using the EAT. The resulting theorem can be informally stated as follows:
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). Security of DIQKD in the most general case follows from
security under the IID assumption. Moreover, the dependence of the key rate on the
number of rounds of the protocol, n, is the same as the one in the IID case, up to
terms that scale like 1/
√
n.
On the fundamental level, the theorem establishes the a priori surprising fact
that general quantum adversaries are no stronger than an adversary restricted to
preparing IID devices. As mentioned in Section 1.1.2, this does not mean that the
most general device that an adversary can prepare is an IID device. Instead, it
means that the adversary (at least asymptotically) does not benefit form preparing
more complex devices.
On the quantitive level, taking the path of a reduction to IID results in a proof
with several advantages. In particular, it allows us to give simple and modular
security proofs of DIQKD (as well as other device-independent protocols) and to
extend tight results known for DIQKD under the IID assumption to the most general
setting, thus deriving essentially optimal key rates and noise tolerance. This is
crucial for experimental implementations of device-independent protocols. Our
quantitive results have been applied to the analysis of the first experimental imple-
mentation of a protocol for randomness generation in the fully device-independent
framework [Liu et al., 2017].
1.3 How to read the thesis
We review the structure of the thesis. Depending on the reader’s main interest and
prior knowledge, different chapters of the thesis may or may not be relevant.
Chapters 2 and 3 give preliminary information. Chapter 2 presents general
introductory information and notation. We remark that in most parts of the thesis,
general intuition is sufficient and the exact mathematical definitions are not that
important in order to understand the essence. Therefore, even a reader unfamiliar
with, e.g., the quantum formalism or the mathematical definitions of the various
entropies, may skip Chapter 2 in the first reading and get back to the relevant
definitions appearing in it only when wishing to get a better understanding of the
complete technical details.
Chapter 3 deals with basic information and terminology related to device-
independent information processing. Readers who are unfamiliar with, e.g., non-
locality, should first of all read this chapter. Readers already familiar with some
device-independent tasks may skip the chapter and come back to it if needed.
Chapter 4 acts as an introduction to our showcases; no theorems or proofs are
given there. Thus, readers who are familiar with the question of parallel repetition
and the task of DIQKD may pass over this chapter.
Chapters 5 and 6 concern themselves with the mathematical objects that we
consider in the thesis — the “black boxes” that model the different types of devices.
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Reader’s interest Recommended sections
Reductions to IID All chapters
Parallel repetition 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 7.3.1, 8, 10
Device-independent cryptography 4.2, 5, 6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3.2, 9, 11
Table 1.1: Reading suggestion according to the reader’s main interest.
Chapter 5 defines what we call a “single-round box”, which is, in a sense, a device
that can be used to play only a single non-local game. The single-round box acts as
an abstract object that allows us to study the fundamental aspects of non-locality,
without needing to deal with complex protocols. As we will see, it captures the
“physics” of the problem at hand. Hence, studying single-round boxes is the first
step in any analysis of device-information processing task. In Chapter 6, we formally
define parallel and sequential boxes, which give the mathematical model for parallel
and sequential devices, and discuss the relations between them.
After setting the stage, we are ready to start discussing the method of reductions
to IID. The first step in this direction is done in Chapter 7, where we discuss the IID
assumption and see how it can be used to simplify the analysis of device-independent
tasks and, in particular, our showcases. This chapter also presents the asymptotic
equipartition property, which acts as a valuable mathematical tool when working
under the IID assumption.
The tools used as reductions, i.e., the de Finetti reduction and the entropy
accumulation theorem, are the topics of Chapters 8 and 9, respectively. Chapters 10
and 11 are devoted to the analysis of our showcases via a reduction to IID.
Clearly, many open questions and directions for future works arise. We discuss
open questions specific for our showcases within the relevant chapters. In addition,
the thesis ends with an outlook in Chapter 12 including questions that, in order to
answer, require further development of the toolkit of reductions to IID.
A reader interested in the topic of reductions to IID in general is recommended
to read the thesis from the beginning to the end, following the order of the chapters.
On the other hand, a reader who is mainly interested in one of the showcases may
focus only on the sections relevant for the showcase of interest. To assist such readers,
we list in Table 1.1 the relevant sections (in the order in which they should be read)
for each of the showcases.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries: basics and
notation
2.1 General notation
The relevant notation for sets and vectors is summarised below.
• N, R, and C are the sets of natural, real, and complex numbers, respectively.
• [a, b] denotes the closed set of real numbers a ≤ x ≤ b.
• [n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• When an object xi is defined for all i ∈ [n], {xi}i∈[n] denotes the set {x1, x2, . . . , xn}.
• Other sets are mostly denoted by calligraphic letters, e.g., S.
• S ⊆ P means that S is a subset of P . S ⊂ P means that S is a proper subset
of P.
• S \ P = {s : s ∈ S ∧ s /∈ P} stands for the difference between the two sets.
• S ×P = {(s, p) : s ∈ S ∧ p ∈ P} is the multiplication of the sets. Furthermore,
S × S is denoted by S2 and Sn is defined analogously for any n.
• For sets S,P we denote by Hom(S,P) the set of all homomorphisms from S
to P. The set of all endomorphisms is denoted by End(S), i.e., End(S) =
Hom(S,S).
• Vectors (of different objects) are marked in bold. For example, we use x =
x1, x2, . . . , xn.
• Let f : S → R be a function over some set S ⊂ Rn. The infinity norm of the
gradient of f is defined as
‖∇f‖∞ = sup
{
∂
∂si
f(s) : s ∈ S, i ∈ [n]
}
.
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We use the following general notation.
• ∧, ∨, and ¬ denote the logical and, or, and negation, respectively.
• ⊕ denotes the XOR operation.
• We denote by log the logarithm in base 2.
• ( nk1,...,km) is the multinomial coefficient, i.e., ( nk1,...,km) = n!k1!...,km! , where ! is
the factorial operation.
• A function f : N→ R is called negligible if for every positive polynomial p(·),
there exists an n0 such that for all n > n0, f(n) < 1p(n) . In the thesis, in
all cases where the term negligible is used f(n) decreases exponentially fast
with n.
2.2 Probability distributions and random variables
We use both probability distributions and random variables (RV) and interchange
the two when convenient. Specifically,
• Capital letters, e.g., X, denote RV. When implicit, a RV X takes values from
the set denoted by the same letter, i.e., X .
• PX denotes the probability distribution corresponding to the RV X. To
distinguish different probability distributions we sometimes replace P by other
letters, such as O and Q.
• PX(x) is the probability that X = x.
• When a probability distribution is used without a need of referring to the event
space etc., we simply use {pi}i∈I for some I (usually clear from the context
or irrelevant) while keeping in mind that pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I and
∑
i pi = 1.
• When discussing more complex events Ω ⊆ X over X , we use Prx∼X [Ω]
to denote the probability of the event Ω when sampling according to PX .
When it is clear from the context according to which probability distribution
the sampling is done we may drop the subscript and write only Pr [Ω]. For
example, when applying Chernoff-type bounds, we use standard notation such
as Pr [
∑
iXi > t] instead of PX1...Xn [
∑
ai > t].
• The expectation value E[X] of X is given by E[X] = ∑x∈X xPX(x).
When considering two RVs X and Y , jointly distributed according to PXY , the
marginal PX is defined via
PX(x) =
∑
y
PXY (x, y) .
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The conditional distribution of X given Y = y, given by
∀x, PX|Y=y(x) = PXY (x, y)
PY (y)
. (2.1)
We mostly use PX|Y (x|y) to denote PX|Y=y(x) and the shorthand notation PX|Y =
PXY /PY instead that of Equation (2.1).
Throughout the thesis, we use the following operations on probability distribu-
tions:
• For any q ∈ [0, 1], PX , and RX , the convex combination SX = qPX +(1−q)RX
is defined via
∀x, SX(x) = qPX(x) + (1− q)RX(x) .
• For any n ∈ N and PX , P⊗nX denoted the probability distribution over Xn
defined via
∀x, P⊗nX (x) =
∏
i
PX(xi) ,
where x = x1, x2, . . . , xn.
2.2.1 Independent and identical random variables
Consider two RV X and Y defined over X and Y respectively. We say that the two
are independent if and only if for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y, PXY (x, y) = PX(x) · PY (y).
For X = Y, we say that X and Y are identical if and only if PX = Py.
A sequence of RVsX = X1, X2, . . . , Xn, each over X are said to be independently
and identically distributed (IID) RVs if and only if they are all independent and
identical to one another.
2.2.2 Concentration inequalities
When considering IID RVs, concentration inequalities are of special importance.
Roughly speaking, concentration inequalities give bounds on how fast the observed
frequencies converge to the expected value when sampling IID RVs. The formal
statements relevant for the thesis are given below.
Lemma 2.1 (Hoeffding’s inequality). Consider a RV X defined over X = {0, 1}
and let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be a sequence of n identical and independent copies of X.
Then,
Pr
[∑
i
Xi − nE[X] ≥ tn
]
≤ exp (−2nt2)
and
Pr
[∣∣∣∑
i
Xi − nE[X]
∣∣∣ ≥ tn] ≤ 2 exp (−2nt2) .
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Sanov’s inequality can be seen as a concentration inequality for conditional
probability distributions, in the following sense. Let OA|X be a conditional probability
distribution over A and X , QX be a probability distribution over X and denote
OAX = QXOA|X . Fix n ∈ N. Consider a scenario in which we sample a = a1, . . . , an
and x = x1, . . . , xn using O⊗nAX and estimate OA|X from the sample by calculating
O
freq(a,x)
AX defined by
O
freq(a,x)
AX (a˜x˜) =
∣∣∣ {i : (ai, xi) = (a˜, x˜)} ∣∣∣
n
and define
O
freq(a,x)
A|X =
O
freq(a,x)
AX
QX
. (2.2)
Lemma 2.2 (Sanov’s inequality). For every OAX and n,
Prax∼O⊗nAX
[∣∣Ofreq(a,x)A|X −OA|X ∣∣1 > ] ≤ δ(n, )
where Ofreq(a,x)A|X is as in Equation (2.2), δ(n, ) = (n+ 1)
|A|·|X |−1e−n
2/2, and∣∣Ofreq(a,x)A|X −OA|X ∣∣1 = ∑
x˜
QX(x˜)
∑
a˜
∣∣Ofreq(a,x)A|X (a˜|x˜)−OA|X(a˜|x˜)∣∣ .
2.3 Quantum formalism
The basic notation used in the thesis related to the quantum formalism is listed
below. We remark, however, that understanding what is meant by a “state” and
“measurements” on the intuitive level will almost always suffice in order to understand
the essence of the thesis. The exact definitions below are given for the sake of
completeness. Clearly, they do not cover all concepts and definitions employed in
quantum physics and quantum information theory. Readers who are not familiar
with the topics and would like to get a more comprehensive understanding are
directed to [Nielsen and Chuang, 2002].
We use the Dirac notation: |ψ〉 denotes a column vector while 〈ψ| is a row vector.
〈φ|ψ〉 and |φ〉 〈ψ| denote inner and outer products of the two vectors, respectively.
2.3.1 Operators
We use the following standard notation and definitions.
• The identity matrix, or operator, of dimension d is denoted by Id. Alternatively,
instead of indicating the dimension, we use, e.g., IX to denote the identity
operator acting in a specific space associated to X (see below). When the
space or dimension is clear from the context we simply write I.
• A Hermitian, or self-adjoint, operator A is an operator satisfying A = A†.
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• A unitary operator A is an operator satisfying AA† = A†A = I.
• The trace of a square matrix A, i.e., the sum of the elements on the main
diagonal of A, is denoted by Tr(A).
• A  0, for A Hermitian, means that the eigenvalues of A are non-negative.
A  B stands for A−B  0.
• The 1-norm is defined as ‖A‖1 = Tr|A| = Tr
√
A†A, where A† denotes the
conjugate transpose of A.
• For a diagonal matrix A with eigenvalues {ai}i, log(A) is the diagonal matrix
with eigenvalues {log(ai)}i.
2.3.2 Hilbert spaces
The postulates of quantum mechanics tell us that all quantum states “belong” to
a complex vector space called a Hilbert space. All quantum states and operations
will be defined with respect to the considered Hilbert spaces. We give the formal
definitions below.
Definition 2.3 (Hilbert space). A Hilbert space H is a complex vector space, i.e.,
|ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈H and λ1, λ2 ∈ C → λ1 |ψ〉+ λ2 |φ〉 ∈H
such that for all |ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈H , there exists 〈φ|ψ〉 ∈ C for which
1. it is linear in |ψ〉: 〈φ|λ1ψ1 + λ2ψ2〉 = λ1〈φ|ψ1〉+ λ2〈φ|ψ2〉 ,
2. 〈φ|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|φ〉, where the bar denotes the complex conjugate ,
3. for all |ψ〉 ∈H , 〈ψ|ψ〉 ≥ 0 and 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 0↔ |ψ〉 = 0.
The norm of a vector |ψ〉 is defined as ‖ |ψ〉 ‖1 =
√〈ψ|ψ〉.
Definition 2.4 (Orthonormal basis). An orthonormal basis of H is a set of vectors
{|φi〉}i∈I such that
• 〈φi|φj〉 = δij for all i, j ∈ I and
• 〈ψ|φi〉 = 0 for all i ∈ I → ψ = 0 .
We will usually consider Hilbert spaces of finite dimensions, meaning I is a set
with a finite amount of elements.
Definition 2.5 (Projector). Let H be a Hilbert space and H ′ a subspace of H
with {|φi〉}i∈I′ an orthonormal basis of H ′. The projector of H onto H ′ is the
operator
PH ′ =
∑
i∈I′
|φi〉 〈φi| .
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Given HA and HB , the tensor product Hilbert space HA ⊗HB is defined such
that for |ψ〉 ∈HA and |φ〉 ∈HB , it associates a vector |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ∈HA ⊗HB with
the property that
1. c · (|ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) = (c · |ψ〉)⊗ |φ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ (c · |φ〉)
2. (|ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉)⊗ |φ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ |φ〉+ |ψ2〉 ⊗ |φ〉
3. |ψ〉 ⊗ (|φ1〉+ |φ2〉) = |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ1〉+ |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ2〉
for all c ∈ C, |ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 ∈HA and |φ1〉 , |φ2〉 ∈HB .
2.3.3 Quantum states
Pure and mixed states
There are two “types” of quantum states one can consider — pure and mixed states.
A pure quantum state is associated with a vector belonging to an Hilbert
space, |ψ〉 ∈H , with normalisation ‖ |ψ〉 ‖1 = 1.
Instead of working only with vectors, we can define quantum states as matrices,
or operators.
Definition 2.6 (Density operator). A density operator, or simply a quantum
state, ρ ∈ End(H ) is a Hermitian positive operator with trace 1. That is,
ρ = ρ† ; ρ  0 ; Tr(ρ) = 1 .
For a given Hilbert space H , we denote by S(H ) the set of all density operators
defined over H .
Any pure state |ψ〉 ∈H can be written as a density operator ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ∈ S(H ).
Density operators can describe more general states, called mixed quantum states,
which can be thought of as a convex combination of pure states:
ρ =
∑
i
pi |ψi〉 〈ψi| .
Note, however, that different convex combinations can result in the same mixed
state ρ and, thus, ρ does not pin-down a specific decomposition to pure states.
A qubit is a quantum state belonging to S(H ) for a two-dimensional Hilbert
space H . The basis states are denoted by |0〉 and |1〉.
Composite systems
One can consider quantum states over tensor products of Hilbert spaces. Such
states are called multipartite states. For example, a bipartite state is a quantum
state ρAB ∈ S(HA ⊗HB) for some Hilbert spaces HA and HB . The state ρAB can
describe a state shared between two parties, Alice and Bob. The most important
thing to notice in the context of the thesis is that given a bipartite state ρAB, its
marginals are also quantum states; these are called the reduced density operators.
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Definition 2.7 (Reduced density operators). Given ρAB ∈ S(HA⊗HB), its reduced
density operator over HA is given by
ρA = TrB (ρAB) =
∑
i
(IA ⊗ 〈φi|) ρAB (IA ⊗ |φi〉)
where {|φi〉}i is a basis of HB , and similarly for ρB .
Thinking of ρAB as shared between Alice and Bob, Alice’s local state is then ρA
while Bob’s local state is ρB .
Given a state ρA we can consider its purification.
Definition 2.8 (Purification). The purification of a state ρA ∈ S(HA) is a pure
bipartite state ρAB ∈ S(HA ⊗HB) for which TrB(ρAB) = ρA.
Note that by applying a unitary on B the state on A is not being modified and
the overall state remains pure. Thus, after the unitary operation, we are still holding
a purification. In this sense, we usually say that all purifications are equivalent up
to the application of a unitary on the purifying system B.
Classical systems
A classical system, defined by a RV A with probability distribution PA, can be
represented by the density operator
ρA =
∑
a∈A
PA(a) |a〉 〈a| ,
where {|a〉}a is an orthonormal basis of a Hilbert space HA.
One example of a classical system that is of common use is the state associated
with the uniform distribution Um over {0, 1}m. This distribution can be written as
the state ρUm =
1
m Im, called the completely mixed state on m qubits.
A classical-quantum state is a bipartite state in which one register is classical
and the other is quantum. Formally,
Definition 2.9 (Classical-quantum state). A classical-quantum state ρAE ∈ S(HA⊗
HE), classical on A, is a state of the form
ρAE =
∑
a
PA(a) |a〉 〈a| ⊗ ρaE ,
where {|a〉}a is an orthonormal basis of the Hilbert space HA and, for all a ∈ A,
ρaE ∈ S(HE).
Given a classical-quantum state ρAE as above, we can consider the quantum state
arising from conditioning on an event defined over A. For example, conditioning
on the event A = a, the quantum state is ρaE . Conditioning can also be done when
considering more complicated events. For Ω some event over A, the state conditioned
on Ω is
ρAE|Ω =
1
Pr[Ω]
∑
a∈Ω
PA|Ω(a)⊗ ρaE ,
where Pr[Ω] =
∑
a∈Ω PA(a) is the probability of Ω according to ρAE and PA|Ω(a) =
Pr[A = a ∧Ω]/Pr[Ω] is the probability of a given Ω.
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Entanglement
Given a bipartite state ρAB ∈ S(HA ⊗HB), shared between two parties, one can
study the type of correlations that appear between the two parties. A state is said
to be separable if it can be written as
ρAB =
∑
i
pi ρ
i
A ⊗ ρiB (2.3)
for some probabilities pi, ρiA ∈ S(HA), and ρiB ∈ S(HB). That is, a separable state
is a convex combination of tensor product states. Using the above we notice that
a pure state |ψ〉AB is separable if and only if it is a tensor product of two pure
states |ψ〉AB = |ψA〉 ⊗ |ψB〉.
Not all quantum states are separable. A bipartite state ρAB ∈ S(HA ⊗HB) is
said to be entangled if it cannot be written in the form of Equation (2.3). Such
states exhibit correlations which cannot be explained by classical means.
Of specific interest to us are maximally entangled states of two qubits, also called
Bell states, denoted by
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) , |Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) ,
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) , |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) .
Here, |00〉 stands for |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB, with HA and HB two-dimensional
Hilbert spaces. |01〉, |10〉, and |11〉 are similarly defined.
2.3.4 Quantum operations
Unitary evolution
The evolution of a closed, or isolated, quantum system is described by unitary
operations. By “a closed system” we mean that the transformation of the system of
interest is independent of the “rest of the world”, or the environment. We have:
• For any unitary U , U evolves a pure state |ψ1〉 ∈H to a pure state |ψ2〉 ∈H
according to |ψ2〉 = U |ψ1〉.
• More generally, for mixed states, starting with ρ1 ∈ S(H ) we have ρ2 =
Uρ1U† ∈ S(H ).
• For a bipartite state ρ1AB, we can evolve each subsystem locally by ρ2AB =
(UA ⊗ UB)ρ1AB(U†A ⊗ U†B).
• As unitary operations are reversible (UU† = U†U = I), the evolution of closed
systems is always reversible.
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Quantum measurements
To describe a quantum measurement one can use the so called Kraus operators.
Definition 2.10 (Kraus operators). A set of Kraus operators {Ki}i∈I is a set of
operators such that
∑
i∈I K
†
iKi = I.
Definition 2.11 (Quantum measurement: Kraus representation). Given a state ρ
and a set of Kraus operator {Ki}i∈I describing a measurement, the outcome of the
measurement on ρ is a RV I, defined over the set I, where each outcome i ∈ I is
associated with the operator Ki. The probability of observing the outcome i when
measuring ρ with {Ki}i is given by
Pr(i) = Tr(KiρK
†
i ) .
The post-measurement state is given by
ρi =
KiρK
†
i
Tr(KiρK
†
i )
.
We can further identify an operator Mi = K
†
iKi and work with it, instead of the
Kraus operators, to ease notation in some cases. These operators, called positive
operator valued measures (POVMs), can then be used to describe the relevant
measurements.
Definition 2.12 (Positive operator valued measure). A positive operator val-
ued measure (POVM) is a set of positive Hermitian operators {Mi}i∈I such that∑
i∈IMi = I.
Definition 2.13 (Quantum measurement: POVM representation). Given a state ρ
and a POVM {Mi}i∈I describing a measurement, the outcome of the measurement
on ρ is a RV I, defined over the set I, where each outcome i ∈ I is associated with
the operator Mi. The probability of observing the outcome i when measuring ρ with
{Mi}i is given by
Pr(i) = Tr(Miρ) .
Given a POVM {Mi}i∈I there are many different decomposition to Kraus opera-
tors. While the specific decomposition is not relevant for knowing the measurement
statistics, they are needed in order to describe the post-measurement state.
In most of the scenarios considered in this thesis we will only be interested with
the observed measurements statistics and therefore we will use POVMs to describe a
measurement. When there will be a need to consider the post-measurement state we
will switch to Kraus operators. Which form on quantum measurement is being used
is usually clear from the context and hence we simply call all of them measurement
operators.
The Pauli operators, denoted by σx, σy, and σz, are an example for measurement
operators for qubits:
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
; σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
; σz =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. (2.4)
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Quantum channels
Quantum channels, or maps, are functions describing the evolution of quantum states.
In order for a map E to describe a real physical process, transferring one quantum
state ρ ∈ S(HA) to another E(ρ) ∈ S(HB),1 it must fulfil certain conditions.
Specifically, it must be completely positive and trace preserving (CPTP).
Definition 2.14 (Quantum channel). A linear map E ∈ Hom(S(HA),S(HB)) is a
quantum channel if it is:
1. Completely positive (CP): for any ρAR ∈ S(HA ⊗HR) with ρAR  0,
(E ⊗ IR)(ρAR)  0 ,
where HR is any additional Hilbert space and IR is the identity map on that
Hilbert space.
2. Trace preserving (TP): for any ρ ∈ S(HA), Tr (E(ρ)) = Tr(ρ).
2.4 Distance measures
The trace distance of two states is given by ∆(ρ, τ) = 12‖ρ− τ‖1. Operationally, the
trace distance quantifies the distinguishing advantage when trying to distinguish ρ
from τ . Consider a situation in which either the state ρ or the state τ are chosen
uniformly at random and given to someone who has no information as to which
state was chosen and needs to output a guess. The probability of succeeding in this
task depends on how far ρ and τ are from one another via
Pr[correct guess] =
1
2
(
1 +
1
2
‖ρ− τ‖1
)
=
1
2
+∆(ρ, τ) .
We will be interested below in the so called purified distance. The purified
distance involves sub-normalised states, i.e., states with Tr(ρ) ≤ 1. For this, one
first needs to extend the definition of the trace distance to describe also the distance
between two sub-normalised states.
Definition 2.15 (Generalised trace distance). The trace distance between two
sub-normalised states ρ and τ is given by
∆(ρ, τ) =
1
2
‖ρ− τ‖1 + 1
2
|Tr(ρ− τ)| .
Another important measure of distance (though not a metric) is the fidelity. The
fidelity of two quantum states is given by F (ρ, τ) =
(
Tr|√ρ√τ |)2. The fidelity is
related to the trace distance by
1−
√
F (ρ, τ) ≤ ∆(ρ, τ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, τ)
Here, again, we can define the fidelity between two sub-normalised states.
1Note that HB may be different than HA. For a unitary evolution, discussed before, this was
not the case.
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Definition 2.16 (Generalised fidelity). The fidelity between two sub-normalised
states ρ and τ is given by
F (ρ, τ) =
(
Tr|√ρ√τ |+
√
(1− Tr(ρ))(1− Tr(τ))
)2
.
The last distance measure that will be of importance for us is the purified
distance [Tomamichel et al., 2010a]. This measure will be used to define the smooth
entropies below and will always be considered with sub-normalised states.
Definition 2.17 (Purified distance). The purified distance between two sub-normalised
states ρ and τ is given by
P (ρ, τ) =
√
1− F (ρ, τ) .
2.5 Entropies
2.5.1 Shannon and von Neumann Entropy
Definition 2.18 (Shannon entropy). Given RVs A and B defined over A and B,
respectively, the Shannon entropy of A is given by
H(A) = −
∑
a∈A
PA(a) log (PA(a)) .
The conditional Shannon entropy of A given B is defined to be
H(A|B) = H(AB)−H(B) =
∑
b∈B
PB(b)H(A|b) .
In the case of a RV defined over {0, 1} with PA(0) = p the Shannon entropy is
reduced to the so called “binary entropy” h(p) = −p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p).
The von Neumann entropy is the extension of the Shannon entropy to quantum
states.
Definition 2.19 (von Neumann entropy). Given a quantum state ρAB ∈ S(HA ⊗
HB), the von Neumann entropy of A is given by
H(A)ρ = −Tr (ρ log ρ) .
The conditional von Neumann entropy of A given B is defined to
H(A|B)ρ = H(AB)ρ −H(B)ρ .
When the state on which the entropy is evaluated is clear from the context we
drop the subscript and write, e.g., H(A|B).
Definition 2.20 (Mutual information). For a quantum state ρABC , the conditional
mutual information between A and B conditioned C is given by
I(A : B|C)ρ = H(A|C)ρ +H(B|C)ρ −H(AB|C)ρ
= H(A|C)ρ −H(A|BC)ρ .
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There are other equivalent ways of defining Markov chains for quantum
states [Hayden et al., 2004], but for our purposes this definition suffices.
The conditional mutual information fulfils the following properties:
1. Strong subadditivity: I(A : B|C)ρ ≥ 0 for any ρ.
2. Data processing: for any quantum channels E : S(HA) → S(HA′) and F :
S(HB)→ S(HB′),
I(A : B|C)ρ ≥ I(A′ : B′|C)ρ′ ,
where ρ′A′B′C = E ⊗ F ⊗ IC(ρABC).
3. I(A : B|C) = 0 if and only if A and B are independent given C, i.e., PAB|C =
PA|C · PB|C .
Definition 2.21. A tripartite quantum state ρABC is said to fulfil the Markov chain
condition A↔ C ↔ B if I(A : B|C) = 0.
2.5.2 Min- and max-entropies
We will work with the smooth min- and max-entropies, formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.22 (Smooth conditional entropies). For any ε ∈ [0, 1] the ε-smooth
conditional min- and max-entropy of a state ρAB are given by
Hεmin(A|B)ρAB = log inf
σAB∈Bε(ρAB)
inf
τB
‖σ 12ABτ
− 12
B ‖2∞
Hεmax(A|B)ρAB = log inf
σAB∈Bε(ρAB)
sup
τB
‖σ 12ABτ
− 12
B ‖21 ,
for Bε(ρAB) the set of sub-normalised states σAB with P (ρAB , σAB) ≤ ε, where P
is the purified distance as in Definition 2.17.
In practice, we will not need the fully general definitions above (which are stated
for completeness). When considering the min-entropy, we will be interested in
the case where the A system is classical. This leads to more intuitive definitions.
When A is classical and B is trivial, one can simply write
Hmin(A) = − log
[
max
a
PA(a)
]
.
For quantum B, the state can be written as ρAB =
∑
a pa |a〉〈a| ⊗ ρaB. Then,
the conditional min-entropy is the directly related to the guessing probability of A
given B via
Hmin(A|B) = − log pguess(A|B) ,
where pguess(A|B) is the maximum probability of guessing A given the quantum
system B:
pguess(A|B) = max{MaB}a
∣∣∣∑
a
paTr(M
a
Bρ
a
E)
∣∣∣ ,
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and the maximisation is performed over all POVMs {MaB}a on B. The smooth
conditional min-entropy can be written by maximising the min-entropy over all close
sub-normalised states, i.e.,
Hεmin(A|B)ρAB = max
σAB∈Bε(ρAB)
Hmin(A|B)σAB .
Moving on to the max-entropy, we will mainly be interested in the case of classical
registers. In the classical case, the following holds for the max-entropy
Hmax(A) ≤ − log
[
min
a|PA(a)6=0
PA(a)
]
.
Evaluating the smooth conditional max-entropy will be done by considering a
closely related quantity, namely the classical smooth zero-entropy.
Definition 2.23 (Classical zero-entropy). For classical RVs A and B distributed
according to PAB ,
H0(A|B) = max
b
log
∣∣Supp (PA|B=b)∣∣ ,
where Supp
(
PA|B=b
)
= {a : PA|B=b (a) > 0}. The smooth version of the zero-
entropy is given by
Hε0(A|B) = min
Ω
max
b
log
∣∣Supp (PA|Ω,B=b)∣∣ ,
where the minimum ranges over all events Ω with probability at least 1− ε.
Finally, we remark that for any quantum state ρAB ,
Hmax(A|B) ≥ H(A|B) ≥ Hmin(A|B) .
The same ordering does not necessarily hold for the smooth entropies.
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries:
device-independent concepts
The goal of this chapter is to present the basic information needed while read-
ing the thesis. It is by no means a comprehensive review of the topic of device-
independent information processing. A reader completely unfamiliar with the
concepts of non-locality and device-independent protocols is encouraged to read the
survey [Brunner et al., 2014] and lecture notes [Scarani, 2013].
As explained in the introduction, the device-independent framework allows one
to examine certain properties of physical devices without referring to their internal
workings. Instead of describing a device using its hardware and actions we think
of it as a box with buttons, on which the user can press in order to give classical
inputs to device, and a display, from which the user can read the classical outputs
produced by the device. Then, the only information available to the user of the box
is the observed data, i.e., the input-output behaviour of the box.
The input-output behaviour of the box can be described mathematically using
a conditional probability distribution PO|I , where I describes the possible inputs
of the box and O the possible outputs. For example, if the box has three buttons
we can think of I as being a random variable over {0, 1, 2}. If the box displays a
bit as its output then O is a random variable over {0, 1}. PO|I then describes the,
possibly probabilistic, actions of the box. For example, a box with PO|I(0|0) = 1/2
and PO|I(1|0) = 1/2 outputs 0 or 1, each with probability 1/2, when the user presses
the button associated with the input 0.
The following sections are devoted to explaining the types of boxes that one can
consider and their properties. In Section 3.1 we define three important classes of
boxes according to their input-output behaviour. In Section 3.2 we introduce the
topic of Bell inequalities, which lies at the heart of all device-independent information
processing tasks. In Section 3.3 we formally discuss the concept of untrusted devices
and, in particular, how a possibly malicious box is modelled.
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3.1 Black boxes
In this thesis we mainly consider bipartite boxes. We think of a bipartite box as a box
with two components, each belonging to a different party – one component for Alice
and one for Bob. Crucially later on, the components are separated in space so Alice
and Bob may locate their parts of the box in different places. Both of Alice’s and
Bob’s component have buttons and a display. Alice has the possibility of supplying
an input to her component and reading the output produced by her component. Bob
has no access to Alice’s component. Similarly, Bob has the possibility of supplying
an input to his component and reading the output produced by his component, while
Alice has no access to Bob’s component.
Mathematically the bipartite nature of the box presents itself by considering con-
ditional probability distributions PAB|XY , where X and A denote Alice’s inputs and
outputs, respectively, while Y and B denote Bob’s inputs and outputs, respectively.
PAB|XY includes all the information about the input-output behaviour of the box
and the correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s outputs.
A priori, there are no restrictions on PAB|XY , i.e., it can be any conditional
probability distribution. One may restrict the type of boxes being considered by
imposing certain constraints on PAB|XY that depend on the physical theory being
studied. Specifically, we are interested in boxes that describe classical, quantum,
and non-signalling devices (as explained below). A quantum box, for example, may
exhibit correlations between Alice and Bob that cannot be created by classical
means. When considering the space of conditional probability distributions PAB|XY
the constraints imposed on the box define sets to which the different type of boxes
belong. The constraints defining the sets of interest are explained below.
3.1.1 Non-signalling boxes
When considering general conditional probability distributions PAB|XY any depen-
dence between A, B, X, and Y is allowed. In particular, even though we think of
Alice and Bob as holding two separated parts of the box, Alice’s output A may
depend on both inputs X and Y . In practice this means that in order for Alice’s
box to produce an output, following Alice’s choice of input X, the box first needs to
get Bob’s input Y as well. That is, until a signal including Bob’s input arrives to
Alice’s component, no actions will be taken by Alice’s component of the box and
Alice will need to wait.
In most cases, the above is not a desired behaviour; usually one expects the
component of one user to produce an output as a response to pressing the button
on that component alone. Mathematically this requirement is phrased using the so
called “non-signalling conditions” that imply that the marginals PA|X and PB|Y are
a well-defined conditional probability distribution. In other words, the behaviour of
Alice’s part of the box is described by PA|X , which is independent of Bob’s input Y .
Thus, Alice’s box does not need to receive Y before producing A. A box fulfilling
the non-signalling conditions between Alice and Bob is called a non-signalling box
and is defined as follows.
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Definition 3.1 (Non-signalling box). A non-signalling box is a conditional proba-
bility distribution PAB|XY for which the non-signalling conditions∑
b
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) =
∑
b
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y′) (3.1)∑
a
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) =
∑
a
PAB|XY (a, b|x′, y) (3.2)
hold for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B, x, x′ ∈ X and y, y′ ∈ Y.
Denote by PyA|X(a|x, y) =
∑
b PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) the behaviour of Alice’s part of
the box, which may a priori depend on Bob’s choice of input y. Equation (3.1) states
that PyA|X = P
y′
A|X and, hence, the conditional probability distribution describing
Alice’s part of the box is independent of Bob’s input, i.e., whether Bob inputs y
or y′. We can therefore drop the superscript and simply consider PA|X — a well
defined marginal. Similarly, Equation (3.2) implies that PB|Y is independent of
Alice’s input and faithfully describes Bob’s part of the box.
On the more fundamental level, the non-signalling conditions describe the as-
sumption that the box cannot be used to send instantaneous signals between Alice
and Bob. Alice and Bob may locate their components arbitrarily far away from
one another. If we require the two components to produce outputs right away, then
signals including information about the inputs used by the other party have no time
to get from one part of the box to the other and influence its actions. In such a
case, using the above notation, if PyA|X 6= Py
′
A|X , then Alice may conclude from her
observed statistics whether Bob used y or y′, even though this information did not
have enough time to travel from Bob to Alice. It follows that a non-signalling box is
a device that cannot be used as means of communication between Alice and Bob.
A closely related definition that will be of use later is that of a non-signalling
extension. Given Alice’s component, one can consider an extension of it to an
additional party Bob. Specifically, we will be interested in what we call a non-
signalling extension of a box, defined below.
Definition 3.2 (Non-signalling extension). A non-signalling extension of a box
PA|X is a non-signalling box PAB|XY such that for all a ∈ A, x ∈ X , and y ∈ Y,∑
b PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) = PA|X(a|x).
In words, given PA|X , PAB|XY is a non-signalling box with the “correct marginal”
on Alice’s side (while Bob’s marginal PB|Y can be arbitrary).
Before moving on we point to the simplicity of the non-signalling conditions in
Equations (3.1) and (3.2). The non-signalling conditions are linear. As a result,
the set of non-signalling boxes is a polytope. The faces of the polytope are defined
by the various non-signalling conditions as well as the positivity and normalisation
constrains fulfilled by any conditional probability distribution.
3.1.2 Quantum boxes
One can further restrict the modelled device by considering quantum boxes, i.e.,
boxes that exhibit quantum correlations. Such boxes are relevant when considering
device-independent processing tasks in which all the resources are quantum.
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Quantum correlations are correlations that can be explained within the formalism
of quantum physics. To put it differently, we think of a box as a device that “holds”
some bipartite quantum state ρQAQB , shared between Alice and Bob.1 Alice’s
component of the device performs some local quantum measurements on her marginal
state ρQA and similarly for Bob. Formally:
Definition 3.3 (Quantum box). A quantum box is a conditional probability distri-
bution PAB|XY such that there exist a bipartite state ρQAQB and sets of POVMs
for Alice and Bob {Mxa }a∈A for all x ∈ X and {Myb }b∈B for all y ∈ Y, respectively,
for which
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) = Tr (Mxa ⊗Myb ρQAQB ) ∀a, b, x, y . (3.3)
We make the following remarks regarding Definition 3.3. First, while we assume
that the bipartite box is quantum, we do not assume anything regarding its internal
workings. In particular, we only assume here that the state ρQAQB is defined over a
bipartite Hilbert space2 HQA ⊗HQB (since we consider bipartite boxes) but we do
not restrict the dimensions of HQA and HQB .
Second, the non-signalling assumption is “encoded” in the bipartite structure
of Alice and Bob’s state ρQAQB together with tensor product structure of their
measurements as in Equation (3.3). That is, the conditional probability distribu-
tion PAB|XY is by definition non-signalling. Hence, the set of quantum boxes is a
subset of the set of non-signalling boxes.
3.1.3 Classical boxes
A classical box is described by a conditional probability distribution that can be
explained in terms of shared randomness alone. That is, we think of Alice’s and
Bob’s component of the box as holding a shared random string (in contrast to a
shared quantum state). Each component decides on its output depending on its
input and the shared string. Formally:
Definition 3.4 (Classical box). A classical box is a conditional probability distri-
bution PAB|XY that can be written in the form
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) =
∫
Λ
dλPr [Λ = λ] PA|XΛ(a|xλ) · PB|Y Λ(b|yλ) , (3.4)
where Λ is the random variable describing the randomness shared by the two
components of the box.
One can assume without loss of generality that PA|XΛ and PB|Y Λ are determin-
istic. That is, for all λ, x, and a, either PA|XΛ(a|x, λ) = 0 or PA|XΛ(a|x, λ) = 1,
1We distinguish the quantum state from the correlations throughout the thesis: QA and QB
denote quantum registers belonging to Alice and Bob while A and B denote their classical outputs.
2The definition of a quantum box over a bipartite Hilbert space HQA ⊗HQB is the standard
one in the context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. When studying relativist quantum
mechanics one considers a single Hilbert space H and two commuting measurements acting on
it (instead of tensor product measurements). The two definitions coincide when restricting the
attention to finite dimensional Hilbert spaces but otherwise different in general [Slofstra, 2017].
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and similarly for Bob. This holds since we can always “push” the non-deterministic
behaviour of the components to the shared randomness λ itself. As the number of
deterministic assignments of a to each x is finite (assuming A and X are finite), it
follows that one can also express all classical boxes as
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) =
∑
λ
Pr [Λ = λ] PA|XΛ(a|xλ) · PB|Y Λ(b|yλ) ,
for λ belonging to a finite set and deterministic PA|XΛ and PB|Y Λ.
In the context of Bell inequalities, discussed below, Λ is called the “hidden
variable” that explains the correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s parts of the
box. Conditioned on the value of Λ, the two components, PA|XΛ and PB|Y Λ, are
independent of one another, as seen in Equation (3.4). Classical boxes, or correlations,
are also termed “local correlations”.3
It is easy to see that when considering scenarios with a single party, i.e.,
boxes PA|X , all conditional probability distributions can be written in the form
of Equation (3.4). Thus, all single-party boxes are classical boxes. This is not an
interesting scenario and, in particular, no device-independent information processing
task can be performed in such a case. Thus, boxes of two parties or more are always
considered.
3.1.4 Correlations’ space
Let C, Q, and NS denote the sets of classical, quantum, and non-signalling boxes,
respectively. It is easy to see that all of these sets are convex: given two classical
boxes P1AB|XY and P
2
AB|XY , the box PAB|XY = pP
1
AB|XY + (1− p)P 2AB|XY is also
classical, and similarly for quantum and non-signalling boxes. The convex sets of
classical and non-signalling boxes can be described as the convex combination of a
finite number of extremal point and hence C and NS are polytopes. This is not the
case for the quantum set Q. See Figure 3.1 for an illustration.
As clear from the definition of the various types of boxes, any classical box is also
a quantum box and any quantum box is also a non-signalling box. Furthermore, there
are examples for quantum boxes that cannot be written in the form of Equation (3.4)
and for non-signalling boxes that cannot be written in the form of Equation (3.3).
It follows that the sets fulfil the relation
C ( Q ( NS ,
as in Figure 3.1.
Bell inequalities, discussed in the next section, give us a way of separating
classical boxes from quantum ones4 — an essential tool in any device-independent
information processing task.
3Though common, this is a rather confusing and unjustified terminology. As clear from
Equation (3.3), quantum correlations are also local, in the sense that each component performs a
local operation on its part of the state.
4Separating quantum boxes from non-signalling ones is a far more complicated task; see,
e.g., [Navascués et al., 2008].
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the sets of boxes. C, Q, and NS denote the sets of classical,
quantum, and non-signalling boxes, respectively. All sets are convex, C and NS
being polytopes, and the relation C ( Q ( NS holds. Bell inequalities can be used
to separate classical boxes from quantum ones.
3.2 Bell inequalities
From now on our discussion is restricted to boxes which fulfil, at the least, the
non-signalling conditions. That is, we are considering only boxes which cannot be
used as means of communication between two seperated parties, Alice and Bob.
The polytope of classical boxes C is a strict subset of the set of quantum and
non-signalling boxes. As such, some of the affine hyperplanes defining C separate C
from Q.5 Informally, when we say that a hyperplane separates C from Q we mean
that all classical boxes are on one side of the hyperplane, while the other side can
only include quantum and non-signalling boxes.
The condition of being on “one side of the hyperplane” is written in the form of
an inequality
∀PAB|XY ∈ C,
∑
a,b,x,y
s(a, b, x, y)PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) ≤ S , (3.5)
for some given constants S and s(a, b, x, y), for all a, b, x, y.
Given a box PAB|XY , the simple form of Equation (3.5) allows us to test, by
calculating
∑
a,b,x,y s(a, b, x, y)PAB|XY (a, b|x, y), if the box cannot be a classical one.
In other words, if the inequality is violated, i.e.,∑
a,b,x,y
s(a, b, x, y)PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) > S ,
then PAB|XY cannot be written in the form of Equation (3.4).
As first noticed by [Bell, 1964], some quantum boxes, arising from measure-
ments performed on entangled states, are capable of violating inequalities as
5Other hyperplanes represent the trivial conditions of positivity of normalisation of the condi-
tional probability distributions which are relevant for all sets.
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in Equation (3.5).6 Bell suggested to use such states in an experiment, pro-
posed to test the EPR paradox [Einstein et al., 1935], that will allow us to check
whether there is some classical piece of information, that we are just unaware of
or cannot observe, that can explain the apparent “non-local” correlations exhibit
by certain quantum states. Such experiments, called today “loophole-free Bell
tests” [Hensen et al., 2015, Shalm et al., 2015, Giustina et al., 2015], have verified
the violation of Bell inequalities and by this refuted the possibility of classical
explanations of the behaviour of some entangled quantum states.
The inequalities which are fulfilled by any classical box while being violated by
some quantum boxes are called Bell inequalities; see Figure 3.1. All of the above
implies that a Bell inequality acts as a test for “quantumness” or, more precisely,
“non-classicalness” and its violation acts as a certificate for passing the test. As such,
it is crucial for any device-independent information processing task in which we need
to rule out the possibility of executing the considered task with a classical device.
3.2.1 Non-local games
Bell inequalities, as in Equation (3.5), can also be phrased as special types of games,
called non-local, or Bell, games. In a game, a referee asks Alice and Bob, the players
of the game, a question each, chosen according to a given probability distribution;
each player only sees her/his question. The players then need to supply answers
which fulfil a pre-determined requirement according to which the referee accepts or
rejects the answers. To win the game the players can agree on a strategy beforehand
but, once the game begins, communication between the players is not allowed. If
the referee accepts their answers the players win.
Formally, a game G = (X ,Y,A,B,QXY , w) is defined by sets of possible questions
X and answers A for Alice, sets of possible questions Y and answers B for Bob,
a probability distribution QXY over the questions, according to which the referee
choses the questions, and a winning condition w : A × B × X × Y → {0, 1},
where w(a, b, x, y) = 0 means that the referee rejects (a, b, x, y), i.e., the players lose,
and w(a, b, x, y) = 1 means that the players win with (a, b, x, y).
A strategy for the game is naturally described by a box PAB|XY held by the
players — the referee chooses questions (x, y) ∈ X × Y and the players need to
reply with answers (a, b) ∈ A × B. The fact that the players are not allowed
to communicate during the game means that, at the least, the box PAB|XY is
constrained by non-signalling conditions between Alice and Bob, i.e., PAB|XY
belongs to the non-signalling polytope NS.7 The winning probability of a box
PAB|XY in the game G is given by
ω
(
PAB|XY
)
=
∑
a,b,x,y
QXY (x, y)PAB|XY (a, b|x, y)w(a, b, x, y) .
6Notice that the statement that some quantum states violate Bell inequalities is independent
from the statement that classical boxes cannot violate the inequality; it could have been the
case that no box is able to violated such inequalities. This would have implied that all quantum
correlations can be written in the form of Equation (3.4) and, hence, can be described as arising
from some shared randomness, or an “hidden variable”, λ.
7Depending on the context, one can further restrict the allowed strategies by considering
classical or quantum boxes.
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When the discussed box PAB|XY is clear from the context we simple write ω to
denote its winning probability.8
In the context of device-independent information processing we interpret a Bell
inequality as a special type of game. What makes the game special is that it is
designed so that any classical box used by the players leads to a winning probability
of at most ωc < 1, while there exists a quantum box that can be used by the players
to achieve a greater winning probability, ωq > ωc. Instead of a Bell inequality as in
Equation (3.5) we have
∀PAB|XY ∈ C, ω
(
PAB|XY
) ≤ ωc . (3.6)
Violating a Bell inequality then translates to violating Equation (3.6) by winning
the respective game with probability greater than ωc. In both cases, the conclusion
is the same; if PAB|XY violates Equation (3.6) then PAB|XY /∈ C.
Before discussing an explicit example of a non-local game, one remark is in order.
Above, we thought of Alice and Bob as the ones preparing the box, according to
their strategy in the game, and the referee was asking them questions to test their
winning probability. Alternatively, we can think of Alice and Bob as holding an
uncharacterised box and they are the ones testing the box, by choosing the questions
themselves. In that case, Alice and Bob basically take the role of the referee (while
the box takes the role of Alice and Bob). (In the showcase of non-signalling parallel
repetition, in Chapter 10, we use the first terminology, while the showcase of device-
independent quantum cryptography, in Chapter 11, the second is terminology is the
more appropriate one).
3.2.2 The CHSH game
We now present an explicit non-local game that will be of use in the thesis. The
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) game [Clauser et al., 1969] is probably the
most famous non-local game. In the game, Alice’s and Bob’s inputs and outputs
are bits, a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1} and the inputs are distributed uniformly at random, i.e.,
QXY (x, y) = 1/4 for all x and y. The winning conditions is given by:
wCHSH =
{
1 and a⊕ b = x · y
0 otherwise.
(3.7)
The optimal classical box, or strategy, achieves a winning probability of 0.75. An
example for such a strategy is one in which the outputs are always (a, b) = (0, 0).
An optimal quantum strategy consists in measuring the maximally entangled state
|Φ+〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉) /√2 with the following measurements: Alice’s measurements
x = 0 and x = 1 correspond to the Pauli operators σz and σx respectively and Bob’s
measurements y = 0 and y = 1 to (σz + σx) /
√
2 and (σz − σx) /
√
2 respectively. A
box implementing the above achieves winning probability ω = 2+
√
2
4 ≈ 0.85. Perhaps
surprisingly, any box that achieves the optimal quantum winning probability (or close
8Notice the notation: w denotes a winning condition (function) while ω is the winning probability
(a number). W will be used to denote the random variable describing whether a game is won or
lost. In any case, the difference between these three objects is always clear from the text.
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to it) must be implementing a strategy identical to the above up to local isometries
(or close to such a strategy) [Popescu and Rohrlich, 1992, Mayers and Yao, 2003,
McKague et al., 2012].
The CHSH game can also phrased in the form of a Bell inequality. The most
common way of writing the CHSH inequality is as follows. Given PAB|XY , for any
pair of inputs (x, y), let
Exy =PAB|XY (0, 0|x, y) + PAB|XY (1, 1|x, y)
− PAB|XY (0, 1|x, y)− PAB|XY (1, 0|x, y)
and denote the CHSH value by
β
(
PAB|XY
)
= E00 + E01 + E10 − E11 .
The CHSH inequality reads
∀PAB|XY ∈ C, β
(
PAB|XY
) ≤ 2 .
The interesting regime is β ∈ [2, 2√2], where β = 2 is the optimal classical violation
while β = 2
√
2 is the quantum one. The relation between the winning probability
in the CHSH game and the CHSH value is given by ω = 1/2 + β/8 and we
have ω ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
.
When discussing device-independent quantum cryptography in Chapter 11,
we use a variant of the CHSH game previously used in [Pironio et al., 2009,
Vazirani and Vidick, 2014]. In this game Alice has two inputs X = {0, 1} while
Bob has three possible inputs Y = {0, 1, 2}. The output sets are A = B = {0, 1}.
The winning condition is the following:9
wCHSH =

1 x, y ∈ {0, 1} and a⊕ b = x · y
1 (x, y) = (0, 2) and a = b
1 (x, y) = (1, 2)
0 otherwise.
(3.8)
The optimal quantum strategy for this game is the same as in the standard CHSH
game, except that if Bob’s input is a y = 2 he applies the same measurement as
Alice’s measurement for input 0. Since the underlying state is maximally entangled
this ensures that their outputs always match when (x, y) = (0, 2).
Conditioned on Bob’s input not being 2, the game played is the CHSH game and
the optimal classical and quantum winning probabilities are as above.
3.3 Untrusted devices
Formally defining an untrusted device, or untrusted box, is essential when analysing
device-independent information processing tasks. The current section is devoted to
9For the inputs (x, y) = (1, 2) one can set either wCHSH = 1 or 0 (it is not relevant later on);
for completeness we choose wCHSH = 1 in this case, following previous works.
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explaining what is meant by this term and what are the assumptions regarding an
untrusted device. To understand the definition of an untrusted device, it is perhaps
best to consider a cryptographic scenario in which the device may be manufactured
by the malicious party, the adversary, and hence is not to be trusted. The same
definition of a device is used also when we do not have an explicit adversary in mind;
the device itself is still uncharacterised (in the sense explained below) but we are
free to ignore the additional subsystem given to the adversary in what follows. We
therefore employ below the terminology used in the cryptographic setting.
As before, we consider the case of two honest parties. A device D is modelled by
a bipartite box PAB|XY , shared between the honest parties, Alice and Bob, who try
to accomplish a certain task. We think of the box as being prepared by the adversary
Eve and hence we call it untrusted. Since Eve is the one manufacturing the device it
allows her, in particular, to keep an extension of Alice and Bob’s device. Formally,
we consider a non-signalling extension of PAB|XY to a tripartite box PABC|XY Z
(recall Definition 3.2): we have
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) =
∑
c
PABC|XY Z(abc|xyz) ∀a, b, x, y, z
and Eve “holds” the marginal PC|Z . Eve can use her component PC|Z as she wishes.
For example, in a cryptographic protocol, Eve can eavesdrop on all the classical
communication between the honest parties during the run of the protocol and only
later choose to use her box with input z that depends on all other information
available to her.
When considering non-signalling (super-quantum) boxes, the only constraint on
the extension PABC|XY Z is that it is non-signalling between the three parties and
that the marginal of Alice and Bob is equal to the box PAB|XY . In the quantum
case, PAB|XY describes both the state shared between Alice and Bob ρQAQB and
measurements devices used to measure ρQAQB . Eve then holds a purification10 of
Alice and Bob’s quantum state in a quantum register in her possession. The tripartite
box PABC|XY Z describes the pure state ρQAQBE together with the measurements
of Alice and Bob as well as the measurements that can be used by Eve to measure
her marginal ρE .11
Although the device is untrusted, we always assume that the following require-
ments hold.
Alice and Bob can interact with the device as expected. In any considered
scenario, the type of interaction with the device D is defined explicitly. In particular,
every protocol clearly states how the users should interact with the device utilised
to run the protocol; for example, a protocol may require the users to play n games
with the device (by pressing buttons and recording the outputs) one after the other.
10A purification ρQAQBE is the most general extension of a quantum state ρQAQB , in the sense
that it gives Eve the maximal amount of information regarding Alice and Bob’s marginal state.
Hence, in the cryptographic setting we always say that Eve holds the purifying system E, without
loss of generality — any adversary holding a system E′ which is not the purifying system E can
only be weaker than that holding E.
11We emphasise again that Eve is not required to measure her quantum state at any particular
point.
3.3 Untrusted devices 41
The different types of interactions and the resulting conditions on the untrusted
device are discussed in Chapter 6. Note that this requirement can be verified – if
the honest parties try to use the device in the specified way and the device does
not react as expected (e.g., it does not produce outputs or produces outputs from
a different alphabet) then it is clear that something is wrong. In this sense, the
requirement that it is possible to interact with the device as expected is not really
an assumption regarding the device, but rather a formality that allows us to be
explicit when talking about untrusted devices.
Communication (signalling) between the components of the device. The
communication between Alice, Bob, and Eve’s components of the device is restricted
in the following way:
1. Alice and Bob’s components of D cannot signal to Eve’s component.
2. Alice and Bob can decide when to allow communication (if any) between their
components.
3. Alice and Bob can decide when to receive communication (if any) from Eve’s
component.
The requirement given in Item 1 is necessary for device-independent cryptography ;
without it the device could directly send to Eve all the raw data it generated.
Item 2 implies that Alice and Bob’s component must be (at least) bipartite.
This is necessary to assure that the violation of the considered Bell inequality is
meaningful. In the quantum case, this requirement is identified with the “assumption”
that we can write Alice and Bob’s quantum state as a bipartite state ρQAQB and
that the measurements made in Alice’s and Bob’s components of the device are in
tensor product with one another.
Items 2 and 3 give Alice, Bob, and Eve’s components the possibility to commu-
nicate in certain stages of the protocol (see Section 4.2.5 for an explicit example).
This is not a restrictive nor necessary assumption. This possibility to communicate
is added since it is advantageous to actual implementations of certain protocols.
For instance, allowing the different components of the device to communicate in
certain stages of some protocols opens the possibility of distributing resources, such
as entanglement, “on the fly” for each round of the protocol, instead of maintaining
large quantum memories.
Other assumptions. Apart from the above description of the untrusted device,
the following list includes the standard assumptions used in device-independent
information processing tasks (in particular, device-independent cryptography):
1. The honest parties have a trusted random number generator (that can be used
to choose the inputs for playing the games, for example).
2. The honest parties have a trusted classical post-processing units to make the
necessary (classical) calculations during the considered task.
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3. There is a public, but authenticated, classical channel connecting the honest
parties (if the considered task requires that the parties communicate classically
with one another).
4. In cryptographic scenarios — the honest parties’ physical locations are secure
and can be isolated if needed (unwanted information cannot leak outside to
Eve or between their devices).
5. Depending on the considered scenario — the actions of the device can be
described within the non-signalling or quantum formalism.
In contrast to an untrusted device, we sometimes use the terminology honest
device or honest implementation. A device is said to be honest if it implements
the considered protocol by using a certain pre-specified strategy. In that case, the
actions of the device are known and fixed. See Section 4.2.4 for an example.
Chapter 4
Introduction to the showcases
4.1 Introduction to non-signalling parallel repeti-
tion
Non-local games, introduced in Section 3.2.1, are relevant in many areas of both
theoretical physics and theoretical computer science. In the context of parallel
repetition, we think of a game G as follows. A referee asks each of the cooperating
parties, also called players, a question chosen according to a given probability
distribution. The players then need to supply answers which fulfil a pre-determined
requirement according to which the referee accepts or rejects the answers. In order
to do so, they can agree on a strategy beforehand, but once the game begins
communication between the players is not allowed. If the referee accepts their
answers the players win. The goal of the players is, naturally, to maximise their
winning probability in the game.
According to the field of interest, one can analyse any non-local game under
different restrictions on the players (in addition to not being allowed to communicate).
In classical computer science the players are usually assumed to have only classical
resources, or strategies. That is, they can use only local operations and shared
randomness. In contrast, one can also consider quantum strategies: before the game
starts the players create a multipartite quantum state that can be shared among
them. When the game begins each player locally measures their own part of the
state and bases the answer on their measurement result. Another, more general,
type of strategies are those where the players can use any type of correlations that
do not allow them to communicate, i.e., non-signalling strategies.
One of the most interesting questions regarding non-local games is the question
of parallel repetition. Given a game G with optimal winning probability 1−α (using
either classical, quantum, or non-signalling strategies), we are interested in analysing
the winning probability in the repeated game, denoted by Gn. In Gn the referee gives
the players n independent tuples of questions at once, to which the players should
reply. The players win Gn if they win all of the n games. Another, more general
and natural, winning criterion is that the players answer a certain fraction 1−α+ β
of the n game instances correctly. One can then ask what is the probability that the
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players succeed in the repeated game, as the number of repetitions n increases and
whether, in particular, this probability decreases exponentially fast with n, similarly
to what happens when playing each of the games independently. While the question
of parallel repetition is easy to phrase, its answer is far from trivial (and, in fact, up
to date there is no general answer that holds for all games).
The device-independent framework fits perfectly to the study of the parallel
repetition question: We can think of a box, i.e., a conditional probability distribution,
as describing a strategy of the players. The requirement that the players are not
allowed to communicate easily translates to non-signalling conditions between the
parties holding the box. Furthermore, the claims that we wish to make regarding the
probability of winning the repeated game are oblivious of the exact description of the
strategy and hence treating the strategy as a black box makes sense. In particular,
studying the behaviour of the strategy without having an explicit description of it
is necessary in order to be able to use parallel repetition results to, e.g., analyse
experiments that aim at ruling-out local realism while performing several Bell
violation experiments in parallel or for hardness amplification [Håstad, 2001] in
complexity theory and cryptography.
We define and explain the question of parallel repetition below. Our showcase,
presented in Chapter 10, focuses on the case of non-signalling parallel repetition.
Note, however, that all statements made in the following two sections are general
and applicable to any type of strategies. (One only needs to interchange the words
non-signalling and quantum or classical).
4.1.1 Parallel repeated games
For simplicity and as in the rest of the thesis, we consider two player non-local games.
All of the statements below can be extended to an arbitrary number of players.
We define a two-player game, with the players named Alice and Bob, similarly
to a non-local game.1
Definition 4.1 (Two-player game). A two-player game G = (X ,Y,A,B,QXY , R)
is defined by:
1. A set of possible questions for each player: X for Alice and Y for Bob.
2. A probability distribution QXY over the questions, according to which the
referee choses the questions.
3. A set of possible answers for each player: A for Alice and B for Bob.
4. A winning condition R : A× B × X × Y → {0, 1}.
In the repeated game, denoted by Gn, the referee asks Alice and Bob n questions,
all at once. The questions are chosen independently for each game and the answers
are checked independently. In most works dealing with parallel repetition, the
winning condition of the repeated game is defined such that Alice and Bob win Gn
1Multi-player games and non-local games are one and the same; we define a two-player game
here just to set the terminology used when discussing the showcase of parallel repetition.
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if and only if they win all n repetitions of G (hence the name). We will use a more
general winning condition in which only a certain fraction of the games needs to be
won. We call such games threshold games.
Definition 4.2 (Threshold game). Any two-player game G = (X ,Y,A,B,QXY , R)
induces a two-player threshold game Gn1−γ = (Xn,Yn,An,Bn,Q⊗nXY , Rn1−γ), for
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, where the winning criterion Rn1−γ is defined by:
Rn1−γ(a, b,x,y) = 1⇔
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
R(ai, bi, xi, yi) ≥ 1− γ .
A strategy for a game is simply a box, i.e., a conditional probability distribution,
defining the input-output behaviour of the players. Throughout the thesis, a strategy
for a single game G is denoted by OAB|XY . The winning probability of a strategy
OAB|XY in game G is given by
w
(
OAB|XY
)
=
∑
a,b,x,y
QXY (x, y)OAB|XY (a, b|x, y)R(a, b, x, y) (4.1)
When we say that the optimal non-signalling winning probability in a game G is 1−α
we mean that
max
OAB|XY
w
(
OAB|XY
)
= 1− α ,
where the maximisation is over all non-signalling strategies OAB|XY .
A strategy for the threshold game Gn1−γ is denoted by PAB|XY . PAB|XY ’s
winning probability in the threshold game is given by
w
(
PAB|XY
)
=
∑
a,b,x,y
Q⊗nXY (x,y)PAB|XY (a, b|x,y)Rn1−γ(a, b,x,y) .
4.1.2 Threshold theorems
The parallel repetition question is the following. Let G be a non-local game whose
optimal non-signalling winning probability is 1− α and let Gn1−γ be the threshold
game defined by G (Definition 4.2). We then ask — what is the probability that a
non-signalling strategy PAB|XY wins Gn1−γ? The more “standard” parallel repetition
question is retrieved by setting γ = 0. The interesting scenario to consider is the
one in which 1− γ = 1− α+ β for β > 0.
The players can always use the trivial independent and identically distributed (IID)
strategy for Gn1−α+β : they simply answer each of the n questions independently
according to the optimal non-signalling strategy for G. In this case, the fraction of
successful answers is highly concentrated around 1− α and the probability to win
all games simultaneously is (1− α)n. Thus, for any β > 0, the winning probability
in Gn1−α+β decreases exponentially fast with n.
Can the players do better when using a correlated, i.e., a non-IID, strategy?
There are many examples showing that the answer is yes for certain games. One
of the most interesting examples to a person studying non-locality is that of two
repetitions of the CHSH game. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the optimal classical
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strategy in the CHSH game achieves a winning probability of 3/4. If the players
play two CHSH games in parallel and use the optimal classical strategy of a single
game twice, the probability that they win both games is 9/16. However, there exists
a better classical strategy [Barrett et al., 2002]:
Alice’s actions:
{
(a1, a2) = (1, 1) (x1, x2) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)}
(a1, a2) = (1, 0) (x1, x2) = (0, 1) ,
Bob’s actions:
{
(b1, b2) = (1, 1) (y1, y2) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}
(b1, b2) = (0, 1) (y1, y2) = (1, 0) .
One can easily check that this strategy wins both games with probability 10/16
and, hence, is better than playing the two games independently. More examples are
known for classical games, e.g., [Feige, 1991, Raz, 2011], as well as for quantum and
non-signalling games [Kempe and Regev, 2010].
Still, one may ask whether the players can achieve a significantly higher winning
probability compared to the IID strategy as n increases. In the IID case the
probability of winning more than a fraction 1 − α + β of the games decreases
exponentially fast with n and β2; see Section 7.3.1 for the simple analysis. Does this
type of decrease also hold when considering strategies PAB|XY that may correlate
the different rounds? If correlated strategies for Gn1−α+β are not substantially better
than independent ones, even in an asymptotic manner, we learn that “one cannot
fight independence with correlations”. As long as the questions are asked, and
the answers are verified, in an independent way, creating correlations between the
different answers using a correlated strategy cannot help much.
The first exponential parallel repetition theorem was derived for classical two-
player games and appeared in [Raz, 1998]: it was shown that if the classical optimal
winning probability in a game G is smaller than 1, then the probability to win all the
games in the repeated game, using a classical strategy, decreases exponentially with
the number of repetitions n. This was improved and adapted to the non-signalling
case in [Holenstein, 2007]. Another improvement was made in [Rao, 2011], where
a threshold theorem for the classical two-player case was proven: the probability
to win more than a fraction 1− α+ β of the games for any β > 0 is exponentially
small in n.
Following the same proof technique as [Raz, 1998, Holenstein, 2007, Rao, 2011],
[Buhrman et al., 2013] gave a threshold theorem for multi-player non-signalling
complete-support games. Their threshold theorem was the first result where
more than two players were considered. In [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b,
Lancien and Winter, 2016] a completely different proof technique, based on de
Finetti reductions, was used to derive similar (improved in some respects) results
as [Holenstein, 2007, Buhrman et al., 2013].2 [Holmgren and Yang, 2017] gave a
counter example to a general non-signalling parallel repetition — they show that for
a certain three-player game without complete-support the probability of winning n in-
stances of the game played in parallel remains constant. This implies that the results
2The de Finetti reduction used in these proofs is the topic of Chapter 8; the non-signalling
threshold theorem of [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b] acts as one of our showcases and is discussed
in Chapter 10.
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of [Buhrman et al., 2013, Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b, Lancien and Winter, 2016]
cannot be extended to games without complete-support (as they hold for any number
of parties).
The question of parallel repetition in the quantum case is less well understood
than its classical and non-signalling versions. The only results applicable to all
two-player games is that of [Yuen, 2016], which states that the probability of winning
all n instances of the game decreases inverse polynomially with n. Exponential
decrease is known for different classes of two-player games [Cleve et al., 2008,
Kempe et al., 2010, Dinur et al., 2015, Chung et al., 2015] or modifications
thereof [Kempe and Vidick, 2011, Bavarian et al., 2017a, Bavarian et al., 2017b].
4.2 Introduction to device-independent quantum cryp-
tography
Classical cryptography relies on computational assumptions, such as the hardness
of factoring, to deliver a wide range of functionalities. The advent of quantum
information brought forward a completely different possibility: security based only
on the fundamental laws of physics. For example, the quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocols by Bennett and Brassard [Bennett and Brassard, 1984] and Ek-
ert [Ekert, 1991] allow mutually trustful users connected only by an authenticated
classical channel, and an arbitrary quantum channel, to establish a private key whose
security is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. With their private key,
the users can communicate with perfect security using, e.g., a one-time pad.
The security of cryptographic protocols such as QKD relies on certain assumptions
regarding the physical implementation, such as the quantum states and measure-
ments used in the apparatus implementing the protocol. In real life, however, the
manufacturer of the device can have limited technological abilities (and hence cannot
guarantee that the device’s actions are exact and non-faulty) or even be malicious.
Furthermore, the quantum device may be far too complex for the honest parties
running the protocol to open and assess whether it works as alleged. In the crypto-
graphic setting, imperfections in the physical apparatus are of a real concern, even
when the manufacture himself is honest and has good intentions. Indeed, when
trying to implement quantum devices we find that creating perfect states and mea-
surements is practically impossible. In the presence of an adversary, imperfections
and noise in the implementation can and are being exploited to gain information on
the outputs of the cryptographic protocols [Fung et al., 2007, Lydersen et al., 2010,
Weier et al., 2011, Gerhardt et al., 2011]. This means that if one does not trust that
the quantum devices are exactly as supposed to be, due to a potentially incompetent
or malicious manufacture, then the security of the protocols no longer holds.
To solve this issue the quantum cryptography community took one step further. In
contrast to “standard” quantum cryptographic protocols that are proven to be secure
only for specific implementations of the used devices, device-independent quantum
cryptographic protocols achieve an unprecedented level of security with guarantees
that hold (almost) irrespective of the quality, or trustworthiness, of the physical
devices used to implement them and hence count as the “gold standard” of quantum
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cryptography [Ekert and Renner, 2014]. In device-independent cryptography we
let the adversary, called Eve, prepare the quantum devices used in the protocol.
The honest parties, Alice and Bob, must therefore treat the possibly faulty or
malicious device as an untrusted device (as defined in Section 3.3) with which they
can only interact according to the protocol. The protocol must allow them to test
the untrusted device and decide whether using it to run the considered cryptographic
protocol poses any security risk. The protocol guarantees that by interacting with
the device according to the specified steps the honest parties will either abort, if
they detect a fault, or produce secure outputs (with high probability). Clearly, the
security proof cannot rely on the inner-workings of the device as it may be malicious.
Hence, if we are able to prove that the produced outcomes are secure to use, then
the statement is inherently independent of the implementation of the physical device
(hence the name “device-independent security”).
At first sight, it seems impossible to prove that the outputs of a cryptographic
protocol are secure to use when the adversary is the one to manufacture the device.
As known for quite some time now, the solution is to base device-independent
protocols on the violation of Bell inequalities [Ekert, 1991, Mayers and Yao, 1998,
Barrett et al., 2005]. As explained in Section 3.2.1, a Bell inequality can be thought
of as a game played by the honest parties using the device they hold. Different
devices lead to different winning probabilities when playing the game. The game
has a special property – there exists a quantum device which achieves a winning
probability ω greater than all classical, local, devices. Hence, if the honest parties
observe that their device wins the game with probability ω they conclude it must be
non-local.3 A non-local game therefore acts as a “test for quantumness”. The idea of
basing the security of cryptographic protocols (QKD especially) on the violation
of Bell inequalities originates in the celebrated work of Ekert [Ekert, 1991]. Later,
Mayers and Yao [Mayers and Yao, 1998] recognised that devices that maximally
violate a certain Bell inequality could be fully characterised, up to local degrees of
freedom, and thus need not be trusted a priori.
Device-independent security relies on the following deep but well-established facts.
High winning probability in a non-local game not only implies that the measured
system is non-local but, more importantly, that the kind of non-local correlations
it exhibits are “private” – the higher the winning probability, the less information
any adversary can have about the devices’ outcomes. The amount of entropy, or
secrecy, generated in a single round of the protocol can therefore be calculated
from the winning probability in the game. Let us gain some intuition regarding the
relation between the winning probability in a non-local game and the knowledge of
the adversary about, e.g., Alice’s output in the game by considering two extreme
cases – the optimal classical and quantum strategies for the CHSH game.
If the device is classical its local strategy used to win the game can be written as
3A recent sequence of breakthrough experiments have verified the quantum advantage in non-
local games in a loophole-free way [Hensen et al., 2015, Shalm et al., 2015, Giustina et al., 2015].
In the context of device-independent cryptography, the fact that the experiments are “loophole-free”
means that the experiments were executed without making assumptions that could otherwise be
exploited by Eve to compromise the security of a cryptographic protocol.
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(recall Definition 3.4):
PAB|XY (ab|xy) =
∫
Λ
dλPr [Λ = λ] PA|XΛ(a|xλ) · PB|Y Λ(b|yλ) ,
where λ describes the “hidden variable” (or shared randomness). Pr [Λ = λ] as well
as PA|XΛ and PB|Y Λ are chosen by the adversary and, in particular, PA|XΛ and
PB|Y Λ may be deterministic. It is easy to see that in such a case Eve may simply
keep a copy of λ for herself by extending PAB|XY to include her system E in the
following way:
PABE|XY (abe|xy) =
∫
Λ
dλPr [Λ = λ] PA|XΛ(a|xλ) · PB|Y Λ(b|yλ) · PE|Λ(e|λ) ,
where PE|Λ(e|λ) = 1 if e = λ and PE|Λ(e|λ) = 0 otherwise. Since PA|XΛ is
deterministic, λ (and x, which is considered to be known to the adversary in most
cryptographic protocols) reveals all the information about Alice’s outcome a. Hence,
Eve has full information about Alice’s outcome.
However, if the device is implementing the optimal quantum strategy then
the underlying quantum state and measurements are fully characterised (recall
Section 3.2.2). In particular, the state shared between Alice and Bob must be
the maximally entangled state. As such, any quantum state held by Eve must be
completely uncorrelated with Alice and Bob’s state, i.e., it is of the form
ρQAQBE = |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|QAQB ⊗ ρE ,
and hence is uncorrelated with Alice’s measurement outcome. Furthermore, mea-
suring the maximally entangled state using the optimal measurements employed by
the device results in a uniformly distributed bit on Alice’s side. In total we get that
Alice’s output is completely random from Eve’s perspective. In Section 5.2 we will
see a quantitive relation between the knowledge of any adversary and the winning
probability in the CHSH game which goes beyond the above two extreme cases.
We use the task of device-independent QKD (DIQKD) as one of the showcases
considered in this thesis. In DIQKD the goal of the honest parties, called Alice
and Bob, is to create a shared key, unknown to everybody else but them. To
execute the protocol they hold a device consisting of two parts: each part belongs
to one of the parties and is kept in their laboratories. Ideally, the device performs
measurements on some entangled quantum states it contains. The basic structure of
a DIQKD protocol was presented as Protocol 1.1. The protocol consists of playing n
non-local games with the given untrusted device and calculating the average winning
probability from the observed data (i.e., Alice and Bob’s inputs and outputs). If the
average winning probability is below the expected winning probability ωexp defined
by the protocol, Alice and Bob conclude that something is wrong and abort the
protocol. Otherwise, they apply classical post-processing steps that allow them to
create identical and uniformly distributed keys. (The full description of the DIQKD
protocol considered in the analysis performed in the following chapters is given in
Section 4.2.2 below).
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[Barrett et al., 2005] were the first to derive a “proof of concept”4 of
the security of DIQKD. Following that an extended line of research has
explored the application of the device-independence paradigm to multi-
ple cryptographic tasks. A partial list includes QKD [Barrett et al., 2005,
Pironio et al., 2009, Vazirani and Vidick, 2014, Reichardt et al., 2013,
Miller and Shi, 2014], randomness expansion [Colbeck, 2006, Pironio et al., 2010,
Vazirani and Vidick, 2012, Coudron and Yuen, 2013, Miller and Shi, 2014] and
amplification [Colbeck and Renner, 2012, Gallego et al., 2013a, Chung et al., 2014,
Brandão et al., 2016, Kessler and Arnon-Friedman, 2017], verified quantum com-
putation [Reichardt et al., 2013, Gheorghiu et al., 2015, Hajdušek et al., 2015,
Coladangelo et al., 2017], bit commitment [Aharon et al., 2015] and weak string
erasure [Kaniewski and Wehner, 2016].
The following sections present the preliminary knowledge needed when considering
our showcase of device-independent quantum cryptography in the upcoming chapters.
Specifically, in Section 4.2.1 we explain what is meant when talking about the security
of DIQKD and present the formal security definitions. Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3
describe our DIQKD protocol and explain what is the main challenge in any security
proof. Section 4.2.4 includes a possible implementation of the protocol in the honest
(i.e., non-adversarial) case while Section 4.2.5 describes the assumptions made
regarding a potentially malicious device. The security analysis itself is presented as
a showcase in later chapters. In particular, the full security proof, which previously
appeared in [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016c], is given in Chapter 11.
4.2.1 DIQKD security definitions
A DIQKD protocol consists of an interaction between two trusted parties, Alice and
Bob, and an untrusted device as defined in Section 3.3. At the end of the protocol
each party outputs a key of length `, K˜A for Alice and K˜B for Bob. The goal of
the adversary, Eve, is to gain as much information as possible about Alice and
Bob’s keys without being detected (i.e., in the case where the protocol is not being
aborted).
Correctness, secrecy, and overall security of a DIQKD protocol are defined as
follows (see also [Portmann and Renner, 2014, Beaudry, 2015]):
Definition 4.3 (Correctness). A DIQKD protocol is said to be εcorr-correct, when
implemented using a device D, if Alice and Bob’s keys, K˜A and K˜B respectively,
are identical with probability at least 1− εcorr. That is, Pr(K˜A 6= K˜B) ≤ εcorr.5
Definition 4.4 (Secrecy). A DIQKD protocol is said to be εsec-secret, when
implemented using a device D, if for a key of length `,6
(1− Pr[abort]) ‖ρK˜AE − ρU` ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ εsec ,
4The protocol of [Barrett et al., 2005] could not tolerate any amount of noise and produced just
one secret bit when using the device many times (i.e. the key rate is zero); we therefore consider it
to be a “proof of concept” showing that device-independent security is possible to achieve.
5We use the convention that when the protocol aborts, K˜A = K˜B =⊥.
6` can be thought of as a parameter of the protocol. In what follows, we set ` in terms of the
other parameters of the protocol, such that secrecy holds for the protocol.
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where Pr[abort] is the probability that the protocol aborts when running using
device D and ρK˜AE is Alice and Eve’s quantum state in the end of the protocol,
conditioned on not aborting, with E a quantum register holding Eve’s state that
may initially be correlated with D.
εsec in the above definition can be understood as the probability that some
non-trivial information leaks to the adversary [Portmann and Renner, 2014].
If a protocol is εcorr-correct and εsec-secret (for a given D), then it is εsQKD-
correct-and-secret for any εsQKD ≥ εcorr + εsec.
Definition 4.5 (Security). A DIQKD protocol is said to be (εsQKD, ε
c
QKD)-secure if:
1. (Completeness) There exists an honest implementation of the device D such
that the protocol does not abort with probability greater than 1− εcQKD.
2. (Soundness) For any implementation of the device D, the protocol is εsQKD-
correct-and-secret.
The protocols that we consider below take into account possible noise in the
honest implementation. That is, even when there is no adversary at all, the actual
implementation of the devices might not be perfect. This should be taken into
account when proving the completeness of the protocol – completeness must be
proven for noisy but honest devices (as otherwise the protocol is of no real use). By
doing so we get that the completeness of the protocol implies its robustness to the
desired amount of noise.
Lastly, a remark regarding the composability of this security definition
is in order. A security definition is said to be composable [Canetti, 2001,
Ben-Or and Mayers, 2004, Portmann and Renner, 2014] if it implies that the proto-
col can be used arbitrarily and composed with other protocols (proven secure by
themselves), without compromising security. Obviously, if Alice and Bob wish to use
the keys they produced in a DIQKD protocol in some other cryptographic protocol
(i.e., they compose the two protocols), it is necessary for them to use protocols which
were proven to have composable security.
For the case of (device-dependent) QKD, Definition 4.5 was rigorously proven to
be composable [Portmann and Renner, 2014]. This suggests that the same security
definition should also be the relevant one in the device-independent context and, in-
deed, as far as we are aware, it is the sole definition used in works on DI cryptography.
Nevertheless, the claim that Definition 4.5 is composable for device-independent
protocols as well has never been rigorously proven. Even worse, there is some
evidence indicating that the definition is not composable when the same devices are
being reused in the composition. Let us briefly explain that.
[Barrett et al., 2013] highlighted a simple fact: A malicious device may store the
raw data used to create the key in a first execution of the DIQKD protocol and
then, when reusing the device to execute the protocol for the second time (or any
other protocol for that matter), leak the raw data from the first run.7 Our security
definition, Definition 4.5, deals only with a single execution of the protocol and,
7This should not be confused with “reusing” the device in a given execution of the protocol,
i.e., playing many non-local games with the same physical device.
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Protocol 4.1 CHSH-based DIQKD protocol
Arguments:
D – untrusted device of two components that can play CHSH repeatedly
n ∈ N+ – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] – expected fraction of test rounds
ωexp – expected winning probability in an honest implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the confidence interval for parameter estimation
EC – error correction protocol
PA – privacy amplification protocol
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-4:
2: Alice and Bob choose a random Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
3: If Ti = 0, Alice and Bob choose (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2) and otherwise Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1}
uniformly at random.
4: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and B˜i
respectively.
5: Error correction: Alice and Bob apply the error correction protocol EC. If
EC aborts they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they obtain raw keys denoted by
KA and KB .
6: Parameter estimation: Using B˜ and KB, Bob sets Wi =
wCHSH
(
KBi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
for the test rounds and Wi =⊥ otherwise. He
aborts if
∑
j:Tj=1
Wj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n;.
7: Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob apply the privacy amplification protocol
PA on KA and KB to create their final keys K˜A and K˜B of length `.
hence, does not address this type of attack. In other words, even when proving that
the considered protocol is secure according to Definition 4.5, the above attack can
still be performed by a malicious device when composing two protocols that utilise
the same device. This implies that, as is, the security definition is not composable.
Note that the same issue does not arise when considering device-dependent protocols;
there, by assumption, the devices do not keep any information in their memory after
the end of the execution of the protocol.
Even given the above, Definition 4.5 seems like the most promising security
definition to date. We therefore stick to it here. This implies that, as in all other
works, after the end of the protocol the device cannot be used again in an arbitrary
way.
4.2.2 DIQKD protocol
Our protocol for DIQKD is described as Protocol 4.1. An honest implementation of
a device that can be used to run the protocol is described in Section 4.2.4.
In the first part of the protocol Alice and Bob use their devices to produce the
raw data by playing n CHSH games one after the other. Specifically, in each round
Alice and Bob randomly choose whether the round is going to be a test round or
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a generation round (Ti = 1 or Ti = 0, respectively, in Protocol 4.1). This can be
done using classical communication or shared public randomness. In both cases,
this information becomes available to Eve during the execution of the protocol.
(Crucially, she does not know in advance, i.e., before supplying the devices to Alice
and Bob, which rounds are going to be test rounds). The inputs used by Alice
and Bob in each round depend on whether it is a test or generation round; see
Protocol 4.1.
In the second part of the protocol Alice and Bob apply classical post-processing
steps to produce their final keys. We choose classical post-processing steps that
optimise the key rate but may not be optimal in other aspects, e.g., computation
time. The protocol and the analysis presented in Chapter 11 can easily be adapted
for other choices of classical post-processing.
We now describe the three post-processing steps, error correction, parameter
estimation, and privacy amplification in detail.8
Error correction
An essential property of any QKD protocol is its correctness – Alice and Bob
should hold identical keys in the end of the protocol (see Definition 4.3). Since
the raw data of the two parties may differ in parts, Alice and Bob need to run an
error correction protocol (also termed an “information reconciliation protocol” in
the literature). An error correction protocol9 starts by the exchange of classical
information between Alice and Bob that should help the parties agree on the final
key. When the communication is only from one party to the other, the protocol is
said to be a “one-way error correction protocol”. By sending classical information
about the raw data over a public classical channel the uncertainty of the adversary
regarding the key decreases. A good error correction protocol therefore needs to
minimise the amount of communication, or leakage, while still allowing to correct
the errors with high probability.
In the considered DIQKD protocol, Alice and Bob use an error correction pro-
tocol EC to obtain identical raw keys KA and KB from their raw data A, B˜.10
We use a one-way error correction protocol, based on universal hashing, which
minimises the amount of leakage to the adversary [Brassard and Salvail, 1993,
Renner and Wolf, 2005] (see also [Beaudry, 2015, Section 3.3.2] for more details).
To implement EC Alice chooses an hash function and sends the chosen function
8In many QKD protocols there is an additional step called “sifting”; in the sifting step Alice
and Bob announce their choice of measurements in the different rounds so that they can ignore the
rounds that do not contribute to parameter estimation or the generation of the key (for example,
in protocols like BB84 [Bennett and Brassard, 1984] Alice and Bob ignore the rounds in which
they chose non-identical measurements). Sifting is not necessary in our case since in Step 2 of
Protocol 4.1 Alice and Bob choose Ti together (or exchange its value between them) in every round
of the protocol and choose their inputs accordingly. This is in contrast to choosing Alice and
Bob’s inputs from a product distribution and then adding a sifting step. It follows from our proof
technique that making Ti public as we do does not compromise the security of the protocol.
9Note that we are discussing classical error correction protocols, not to be confused with the
task of quantum error correction [Gottesman, 2010].
10It will become clear in Section 11.3 why we use here B˜i rather than Bi. Although it is not
relevant at the moment, we keep it like this for the sake of consistency.
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and the hashed value of her bits to Bob. We denote this classical communication
by O and the number of bits of O by leakEC. Bob uses O, together with all his
prior knowledge B˜XY T , to compute a guess Aˆ for Alice’s bits A.11 If EC fails to
produce a good guess the protocol aborts; in an honest implementation this happens
with probability at most εcEC. The probability of Alice and Bob not aborting and
while holding non-identical keys is at most εEC.
The following guarantee holds for the described protocol [Renner and Wolf, 2005,
Renner, 2008]:
leakEC ≤ Hε
′
EC
0
(
A|B˜XY T
)
ρhonest
+ log
(
1
εEC
)
, (4.2)
for any εcEC, ε
′
EC, εEC ∈ [0, 1] such that ε′EC = εcEC − εEC and where
H
ε′EC
0 (A|B˜XY T )ρhonest is the smooth zero-entropy (Definition 2.23) evaluated on
the state ρhonest used in an honest implementation of the protocol.12 Equation (4.2)
presents the tradeoff between the probability of having non-identical keys after the
end of the protocol (εEC), the probability of the protocol not succeeding in the
honest case (εcEC), and the number of bits leaked to the adversary in the process
(leakEC). The amount of communication during the error correction protocol is
chosen, before running the DIQKD protocol, such that Equation (4.2) holds. If more
errors than expected in the honest implementation occur when running the DIQKD
protocol (due to the use of adversarial or too noisy devices), then Bob may not have
a sufficient amount of information to obtain a good guess of Alice’s bits and hence
will not be able to correct the errors. If so, this will be detected with probability at
least 1− εEC and the protocol will abort.
Parameter estimation
The goal of the parameter estimation step is to check whether the device D, used to
run the protocol, is sufficiently good in order to produce a secret key. In the case of
device-independent protocols the quantity to be considered is the number of games
won during the run of the protocol. If the number of games won is not large enough,
the honest parties conclude that the device cannot be used to produce a secure key
(an adversary may be present). Specifically, we require that the number of games
won,
∑
j:Tj=1
Wj , fulfils ∑
j:Tj=1
Wj ≥ (ωexpγ − δest) · n , (4.3)
where ωexp, γ, and δest are parameters of the protocol. γ is the probability of a test
round while ωexp is the expected winning probability (of an honest device). Thus,
11The idea is basically the following – given the output of the hash function, there is a small
set of possible strings (from the domain of the function) compatible with it; Bob then chooses the
one which is most compatible to his prior knowledge about Alice’s key [Brassard and Salvail, 1993,
Section 4].
12For quantum channels with an IID noise model Hε
′
EC
0
(
A|B˜XY T
)
ρhonest
can be bounded
by above using the asymptotic equipartition property, discussed in Section 7.2.2. The explicit
calculation is done in Section 11.3.3.
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the multiplication ωexpγ gives the expected fraction of games won out of all rounds
of the protocol. δest describes the desired confidence interval (which cannot be zero
since we consider a finite number of rounds n).
After the error correction step described above, Bob has all of the relevant
information to perform parameter estimation from his data alone, without any
further communication with Alice.13 Using his raw data B˜ and his guess of Alice’s
key KB , Bob sets
Wi =
{⊥ Ti = 0
wCHSH
(
Aˆi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
= wCHSH
(
KBi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
Ti = 1 ,
where wCHSH is the CHSH winning condition given in Equation (3.8). Bob aborts if
the fraction of successful game rounds is too low, that is, if Equation (4.3) is not
fulfilled.
As Bob does the estimation using his guess of Alice’s bits, the probability of
aborting in this step in an honest implementation, εcPE, is bounded by
εcPE ≤ Pr
( ∑
j:Tj=1
Wj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n
∣∣∣KA = KB)
+ Pr
(
KA 6= KB and EC does not abort
)
.
(4.4)
Privacy amplification
The final classical post-processing step is that of privacy amplification. The goal
of privacy amplification is to take Alice’s raw key14 A, on which the adversary
may have partial information, and transform it to a secret final key, as required by
the secrecy definition of the protocol (Definition 4.4). To this end, Alice applies a
quantum-proof randomness extractor, defined as follows.
Definition 4.6 (quantum-proof strong extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1}` that takes as an input a string A ∈ {0, 1}n together with a seed
S ∈ {0, 1}d and outputs a string K˜A ∈ {0, 1}` (for ` ≤ n) is called a quantum-
proof (m, εPA)-strong extractor if for any ρAE with Hmin(A|E)ρ ≥ m and uniformly
distributed seed S we have
‖ρExt(A,S)SE − ρU` ⊗ ρSE‖1 ≤ εPA . (4.5)
Several constructions of extractors have been shown to be fulfil the
above definition, among them [Renner and König, 2005, Konig and Terhal, 2008,
13In many QKD protocols error correction is performed after the parameter estimation step. In
such cases, Alice and Bob reveal the data collected in the test rounds and use it for parameter
estimation. Further information is then communicated during the error correction step.
14Note that Alice’s and Bob’s raw keys, A and Aˆ respectively, are identical with high probability,
due to the error correction step. As we now explain, in the privacy amplification step Alice and
Bob can perform the exact same actions so that they end with identical final keys (assuming that
the error correction step was successful). Thus, we describe here only Alice’s actions, while keeping
in mind that Bob is going to perform the same steps on his raw key.
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Fehr and Schaffner, 2008, De et al., 2012]. Different constructions are used in dif-
ferent scenarios; for example, some constructions minimise the length d of the seed
while others maximise the output length ` or the computation time needed to apply
the extractor.
Before continuing, an important (though somewhat technical) remark is in order.
An extractor, as above, is defined with respect to the min-entropy. However, it is
the smooth min-entropy Hεsmin(A|E)ρ, rather than the min-entropy, that is known
to give a tight bound on the maximum amount of uniform randomness that can
be extracted from A while being independent from E [Konig et al., 2009]. If one is
interested in using an extractor when starting with a lower bound on the smooth
min-entropy, then some parameters should be adapted. In particular, εPA appearing
in Equation (4.5) is the error probability of the extractor when it is applied on
a normalised state satisfying the relevant min-entropy condition. For universal
hashing [Renner and König, 2005] for example, when only a bound on the smooth
min-entropy is supplied the smoothing parameter εs should be added to the error
εPA (as done below). When working with other extractors one should adapt the
parameters accordingly; see [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016a, Section 4.3].
For simplicity we use universal hashing [Renner and König, 2005,
Tomamichel et al., 2010b] as our privacy amplification protocol PA.15 The
secrecy of the final key K˜A = Ext(A, S) depends only on the privacy amplification
protocol used and the value of Hεsmin(A|XY TOE), evaluated on the state at the
end of the protocol, conditioned on not aborting. For universal hashing, for any
εPA, εs ∈ (0, 1) a secure key of maximal length [Tomamichel et al., 2010b]
` = Hεsmin(A|XY TOE)− 2 log
1
εPA
(4.6)
is produced with probability at least 1− εPA − εs.
4.2.3 Main task of a security proof
After presenting the DIQKD protocol and the relevant security definition we are
equipped with the necessary information needed to explain what the main task is
when proving security of a DIQKD protocol. First, note that in order to prove
security one needs to prove both the correctness (Definition 4.3) and the secrecy
(Definition 4.4) of the protocol. Correctness follows almost directly from the error
correction step performed in the protocol. We therefore focus below on the secrecy
of the protocol.
Returning to the secrecy requirement of a DIQKD protocol given in Definition 4.4
and the definition of a quantum-proof extractor as in Definition 4.6, we see that by
applying the extractor we assure that the output of the extractor K˜A = Ext(A, S)
is εPA-close to an ideal key, i.e., a uniform key ofm bits that is completely independent
of the overall side-information SE16 and hence the protocol is secret.
15Any other quantum-proof strong extractor, e.g., Trevisan’s extractor [De et al., 2012], can be
used for this task and the analysis done in Chapter 11 can be easily adapted.
16We include the seed S as part of the side-information and ask that the output of the extractor
is close to uniform even conditioned on the seed S. Extractors that fulfil this requirement are called
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For the extractor to work, the raw data A must exhibit a sufficient amount of
min-entropy (by definition). Relations for specific extractor, such as the one given
in Equation (4.6), determine the length of the key that can be extracted for a given
amount of (smooth) min-entropy. Therefore, the main task of any security proof
of a protocol applying an extractor boils down to computing a lower bound on the
(smooth) min-entropy. Indeed, the security proofs presented in Section 7.3.2 and
Chapter 11 are focused on deriving such bounds.
4.2.4 The honest implementation
The honest implementation of the device D describes the way the device acts when
an adversary is not present. In other words, this is the device Alice and Bob expect
to share when the manufacture of the device is not malicious and “everything goes
according to the plan”. In the analysis of DIQKD the description of the honest
implementation is used in two places. Firstly, the completeness of the protocol (recall
Definition 4.5) is proven with respect to the chosen honest implementation. Secondly,
it is used to set the amount of communication between Alice and Bob during the
error correction step, according to the relation presented in Equation (4.2). We
remark that these are the only two places in the proof where the choice of honest
implementation is taken into account and both are used solely for choosing the
parameters of the protocol. Critically, the soundness proof does not depend in any
way on the choice of honest implementation.
The chosen honest implementation may also be noisy. In fact, in an experiment,
the mathematical description of the honest device, or honest boxes, should be
chosen to fit the behaviour of the physical systems as accurately as possible. An
accurate description allows us carefully choose the parameters of the DIQKD protocol
(e.g., ωexp) such that the produced key rate is maximised while keeping the probability
of the protocol aborting, when utilising the honest device, small. That is, an accurate
description allows us to construct a protocol which is useful in practice.
Most commonly, one chooses the honest implementation to be an IID one. That
is, that device D acts in an IID manner: in every round i ∈ [n] of the protocol D
performs the measurementsMaixi ⊗Mbiyi on Alice and Bob’s state σQAQB . That is,
the device is initialised with an IID bipartite state, σ⊗nQAQB , on which the device
makes IID measurements. The state σQAQB and measurements are such that the
winning probability achieved in the CHSH game in a single round is ωexp.17
As a concrete example, one possible realisation of such an implementation is the
following. Alice and Bob share the two-qubit Werner state
σQAQB = (1− ν) |φ+〉 〈φ+|+ ν
I
4
for |Φ+〉 = 1/√2 (|00〉+ |11〉) and ν ∈ [0, 1]. The state σQAQB arises, e.g., from the
“strong extractors” (while those that fulfil the weaker condition ‖ρExt(A,S)E−ρU`⊗ρE‖1 ≤ εPA are
termed “weak extractors”). When considering QKD protocols, one needs to use a strong extractor
since the seed S is to be communicated between Alice and Bob and hence should be considered as
information which leaks to the adversary.
17Note that in our notation, the noise that affects the winning probability in the CHSH game is
already included in ωexp.
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state |Φ+〉 after going through a depolarisation channel. We can therefore think
of the over all state σ⊗nQAQB as resulting from the transmission of |Φ+〉
⊗n using an
IID noisy channel. For every i ∈ [n], Alice’s measurements Xi = 0 and Xi = 1
correspond to the Pauli operators18 σz and σx respectively and Bob’s measurements
Yi = 0, Yi = 1, and Yi = 2 to the Pauli operators σz+σx√2 ,
σz−σx√
2
and σz respectively.
The winning probability in the CHSH game (restricted to Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1}) using
these measurements on σQAQB is
ωexp =
2 +
√
2(1− ν)
4
and the quantum bit error rate is given by
Q = Pr[Ai 6= Bi|(Xi, Yi) = (0, 2)] = ν
2
.
4.2.5 Model of an arbitrary device
As previously mentioned, Alice and Bob’s device is considered to be an untrusted
device, as defined in Section 3.3.
On top of the general statements made in Section 3.3, we can further describe
the untrusted device in the case of DIQKD as follows. Alice and Bob interact with
D according to Protocol 4.1. Alice and Bob’s components of D implement the
protocol by making sequential measurements on quantum states. In each round of
the protocol, we say that the device is implementing some strategy for the CHSH
game. The device may have memory, and thus apply a different strategy each time
the game is played, depending on the previous rounds. Therefore, the measurement
operators may change in each round, and the state on which the measurements are
performed may be the post-measurement state from the previous round, a new state,
or any combination of these two.
To be specific, we consider the following scenario. In-between different rounds of
the protocol, Alice and Bob’s components of the device are allowed to communicate
freely. During the execution of a single round, however, no communication is allowed.
In particular, when the game is being played, there is no communication between
the components once the honest parties’ inputs are chosen and until the outputs
are supplied by the device. That is, communication is allowed in every round i
right after Step 4 is done, and until the beginning of round i+ 1, i.e., before Ti+1
is chosen in Step 2. Furthermore, in-between rounds Eve may send information to
the device, but not receive any from it. In actual implementations this implies that
entanglement can be distributed “on the fly” for each round of the protocol, instead
of maintaining large quantum memories.
Section 3.3 includes a list of standard assumptions made when working with
device-independent protocols. The following list includes the assumptions that are
made when proving the security of DIQKD:
1. Alice and Bob have a trusted random number generator.
18Even though both are denoted by σ, do not confuse our bipartite state σQAQB describing the
honest state with the Pauli operators σx and σz defined in Equation (2.4).
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2. Alice and Bob have trusted classical post-processing units.
3. There is a public, but authenticated, classical channel connecting the honest
parties.
4. Alice’s and Bob’s physical locations are secure (unwanted information cannot
leak outside to Eve.
5. Quantum physics is correct.
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Chapter 5
Single-round box
In the device-independent framework we use “boxes” to describe the physical devices,
or resources, of interest. A box, formally modelled as a conditional probability
distribution (recall Section 3.1), is always defined with respect to a specific task or
protocol. More specifically, note the following:
1. To define a box PAB|XY we need to fix the sets of the inputs X ,Y and the
outputs A,B of the box. These sets are chosen according to the task in which
the box is being used. For example, if a box is used to play a single CHSH
game then the sets are all chosen to be {0, 1}. The box’s action is undefined
when it is used with, e.g., the input x = 2.
2. The location of the used devices in space (or space-time) also sets the conditions
that the box describing the devices must fulfil. For example, if a protocol
demands two devices, separated in space, that cannot communicate during
the execution of the protocol then the defined box should fulfil certain non-
signalling conditions.1
3. When considering boxes that are used to execute a complex protocol, in which
many games are being played with the box (as done in the succeeding chapters),
we also need to take into account the type of interaction when defining the
box. For example, some protocols require boxes with which we can interact
sequentially – in each round of the protocol we give one input to the box, wait
for the output, and only then give the next input. Other protocols involve
boxes which accepts all the inputs and only then produces all the outputs. If
we only give one input to such a box we do not expect it to output anything
and its action is undefined. Thus, these differences in the behaviour of the
boxes depend on the way we intend to use it in the task of interest and effect
the mathematical model of the considered boxes.
1Interestingly, if one considers protocols with more than two parties in which the devices can only
be used in specific space-time coordinates and merely assumes that the box modelling the devices
respects relativistic causality (in the sense that it cannot lead to casual loops) then the conditions
defining the box are different than the non-signalling ones [Horodecki and Ramanathan, 2016].
This acts as another example for how the specific use of the devices effects the mathematical model
of the box.
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To grasp the dependence of the box on the considered task, as described above,
one can contrast it with the standard formalism used to define quantum states
and measurements. For example, the definition of a quantum state in terms of a
density operator is completely independent of the way we might want to measure
it. Consider, for example, a quantum state used to play the CHSH game with the
measurements σx and σz for one of the parties. Even though we only intend to
perform these measurements, the formalism also tells us what will happen if we
choose to measure σy instead. This stands in contrast to Item 1 above.2
The current chapter as well as Chapter 6 are devoted to the way one models
the different boxes used in device-independent information processing, depending
on the considered setting and interaction with the boxes. In Chapter 6 we will be
interested in boxes, or devices, which can be used to implement certain protocols.
Before we explain how such boxes can be described let us focus on a simpler object –
the “single-round box”.
We think of a single-round box as a small device that can be used to play a
single round of a Bell game. That is, in the case of the CHSH game, for example,
Alice and Bob can input their bits x, y ∈ {0, 1} to the box and receive the outcomes
a, b ∈ {0, 1}. After that the box can no longer be used (i.e., Alice and Bob cannot
play another game with it). Mathematically, such a box can be described by a non-
signalling conditional probability distribution PAB|XY as explained in Section 3.1.
Physically, an example of a single-round box is a single EPR pair together with a
set of possible measurements for each party.
A single-round box is not a useful resource in the operational sense. Since our
starting point in the device-independent setting is that we do not know how the
device operates, we must interact with it to test it. However, since a single-round
box allows us to play just a single game we can hardly conclude anything regarding
its inner-working. One can imagine Alice and Bob playing the CHSH game with
their box and observing (a, b, x, y) = (0, 0, 0, 0). Then what? It can always be the
case that they are sharing a classical device that always outputs (a, b) = (0, 0) for
the inputs (x, y) = (0, 0). Thus, Alice and Bob cannot learn anything regarding,
e.g., the randomness of their outputs, from this single game. As the information
collected in a single game is not sufficient to test the box we start, instead, with an
assumption regarding the box, e.g., that it can be used to win the CHSH game with
winning probability ω. As will be shown below, various fundamental properties can
be concluded by starting with such an assumption.
Although a single-round box is not a valuable resource in practice, it is useful
as a simple abstract object that allows us to study the fundamental implications
of violating a Bell inequality (while putting aside many technical details that arise
when considering the complex devices used in protocols). Furthermore, it is the
goal of this thesis to explain how “single-round box statements” can be lifted to
operational statements regarding more complex scenarios such as the analysis of
2One can rightfully say that this property of boxes, among several other properties, renders
them an “unphysical description” of real systems and resources. With this respect, the formalism
of the so called “generalised probabilistic theories” [Barrett, 2007, Chiribella et al., 2010] is a more
appropriate mathematical setting to discuss physical theories which extend, or abstract, quantum
physics. In contrast, boxes are merely a simplified mathematical model sufficient for certain
analyses.
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Figure 5.1: A single-round box. We think of a single-round box as a small device,
shared between Alice and Bob, which can be used to play a single round of a
Bell game, such as the CHSH game. It is described by a conditional probability
distribution PAB|XY .
device-independent protocols.
5.1 The model
Mathematically, we model a single-round black box by a non-signalling conditional
probability distribution PAB|XY that can be used to play a single Bell game G defined
over the sets of inputs X ,Y and outputs A,B for Alice and Bob (see Section 3.2.1
for complete definitions). PAB|XY is also sometimes referred to as a strategy for G.
As mentioned above, when considering single-round boxes one usually assumes
that the box PAB|XY can be used to win the game with a certain winning probabil-
ity ω. That is, PAB|XY is such that
Ex,y
∑
a,b|
w(a,b,x,y)=1
PAB|XY (ab|xy) = ω , (5.1)
where the expectation Ex,y is defined with respect to the input distribution of the
considered game and w : A × B × X × Y → {0, 1} is the winning function of the
game.
Depending on the context, one can consider quantum single-round boxes or
non-signalling ones.
Quantum single-round boxes
When we say that a single-round box is quantum we mean that its inner-working
can be described within the quantum formalism. Specifically:
Definition 5.1 (Quantum single-round box). Given a Bell game G, a quantum
single-round box is a quantum box PAB|XY , as in Definition 3.3, defined for the
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inputs and outputs of the game G – X ,Y,A,B. That is, there exist a bipartite state
ρQAQB and measurements {Mxa } and {Myb } such that
PAB|XY (ab|xy) = Tr (Mxa ⊗Myb ρQAQB ) ∀a, b, x, y . (5.2)
The quantum single-round box is said to win G with winning probability ω when
the state and measurements are such that Equation (5.1) holds.
Note that mathematically a quantum single-round box is merely a quantum box
(Definition 3.3). What makes it single-round is that PAB|XY is defined for the inputs
and outputs of a single game G.
When considering cryptographic applications where a quantum adversary is
present we extend the box to the adversary. That is, we let ρQAQBE be the
purification of ρQAQB where E is a quantum register belonging the the adversary
and ρQAQB = TrE (ρQAQBE) is Alice and Bob’s marginal satisfying Equations (5.1)
and (5.2).
Non-signalling single-round boxes
Instead of restricting our attention to quantum boxes we can also consider non-
signalling single-round boxes. These are defined in a similar way to their quantum
counterparts.
Definition 5.2 (Non-signalling single-round box). Given a Bell game G, a non-
signalling single-round box is a non-signalling box PAB|XY , as in Definition 3.1,
defined for the inputs and outputs of the game G – X ,Y,A,B. That is, for all a ∈ A,
b ∈ B, x, x′ ∈ X and y, y′ ∈ Y,∑
b
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) =
∑
b
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y′)∑
a
PAB|XY (a, b|x, y) =
∑
a
PAB|XY (a, b|x′, y) .
The non-signalling single-round box is said to win G with winning probability ω
when PAB|XY is such that Equation (5.1) holds.
Here as well one can consider an extension of the single-round box to an additional
party describing a non-signalling (super-quantum) adversary. This will not be needed
in this thesis so we do not explain how this is done. The interested reader is referred
to [Hänggi, 2010, Section 3.2].
5.2 Showcase: device-independent quantum cryp-
tography
As mentioned above, a single-round box is useful as a simple abstract object that
allows us to study the fundamental implications of violating a Bell inequality. More
specifically, certain properties of the box can be concluded if we assume to know the
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probability of winning a Bell game using a single-round box described by PAB|XY .
We consider out showcase of device-independent cryptography as an example.
The most crucial observation when considering device-independent cryptographic
protocols is the fact that high winning probability in a Bell game not only implies
that the measured system is non-local, but more importantly that the kind of
non-locality it exhibits cannot be shared: the higher the winning probability, the less
information any eavesdropper can have about the outcomes produced by the box.
There are different ways of making such a statement quantitive. One possible way
(that will also be of relevance later on) is to consider the conditional von Neumann
entropy H(A|XY E) where A is the random variable describing Alice’s outcome bit,
X and Y are the random variables describing the inputs of Alice and Bob and E is a
quantum register holding the quantum side information belonging to the adversary.
If the adversary is completely oblivious to the value of a bit A even given X, Y
and E then takes its maximal value H(A|XY E) = 1.
A tight trade-off between the winning probability of a single-round box ω and
the entropy H(A|XY E) generated by the box was derived in [Pironio et al., 2010,
Acín et al., 2012] and is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3 ([Pironio et al., 2010, Acín et al., 2012]3). For any quantum single-
round box PAB|XY with winning probability ω ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
in the CHSH game,
H(A|XY E) ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω (ω − 1) + 3
)
, (5.3)
where E denotes the quantum side-information belonging to the adversary and h(·)
is the binary entropy function.
The relation stated in Equation (5.3) is plotted in Figure 5.2. One can see that
the entropy increases as the winning probability ω increases. That is, the amount of
secret randomness in Alice’s outcome is directly related to the winning probability
of the single-round box. In particular, we observe that H(A|XY E) = 0 (i.e., the
adversary knows the value of A) for the optimal classical winning probability and
H(A|XY E) = 1 (i.e., A looks completely random to the adversary) for the optimal
quantum winning probability. 4 Note that there can be many different boxes PAB|XY
(and hence extensions to the adversary) with the same winning probability ω. That
is, the assumption regarding the winning probability of the box does not pin down
the full probability distribution. The bound given in Equation (5.3) is thus very
strong – it says that for any single-round box with winning probability ω and any
purification to the adversary the stated lower bound holds.
Instead of considering the von Neumann entropy as above, one can also study
lower-bounds on the conditional min-entropy Hmin(A|XY E) as a function of the
3Lemma 5.3 is stated in the form appearing in [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016c]. To see how the
original results of [Pironio et al., 2010] can be used to derive the lemma as we state it, follow the
proof given in Appendix C.1.
4These two extreme cases are easy to understand. When the box employs a classical strategy
the adversary can simply hold a copy of A. When the box employs the optimal quantum strategy
the used state is the maximally entangled state. Then, due to monogamy of entanglement, the
adversary is completely decoupled from the Alice and Bob’s state. For more details see Section 4.2.
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Figure 5.2: Secrecy vs.winning probability ω in the CHSH game for a single-
round box. Two lower-bounds are shown: one for the conditional von Neumann
entropy H(A|XY E) [Pironio et al., 2010] and the other for the conditional min-
entropy Hmin(A|XY E) [Masanes et al., 2011]; both bounds are tight. As soon
as the winning probability is above the classical threshold of 75% some secret
randomness is produced.
winning probability of a single-round box – as was done in [Masanes et al., 2011].
We plot the resulting bound in Figure 5.2. As can be seen in the figure, for non-
optimal Bell violation the min-entropy can be significantly lower than the von
Neumann entropy. Indeed, the min-entropy is always upper-bounded by the von
Neumann entropy (hence the name). Still, in some cases a bound on the min-
entropy, rather than the von Neumann entropy, is needed or, at the least, is easier to
derive. In particular, lower-bounds on the min-entropy for single-round boxes can be
found using general techniques based on the semidefinite programming hierarchies
of [Navascués et al., 2008] while, up to date, there is no general technique to derive
(or even estimate) such bounds on the von Neumann entropy.
Similar bounds were derived also for other Bell inequalities. For example, lower-
bounds on the min-entropy produced by a single-round box were found as a function
of the violation of the Mermin inequality [Gallego et al., 2013b, Equation (6)] and
the tilted-CHSH inequality [Bamps et al., 2017, Lemma 2]. Another result in the
same spirit is that of [Nieto-Silleras et al., 2016, Section 5], where a bound on the
min-entropy is derived as a function of several Bell inequalities all at once.5 Lower-
bounds on the von Neumann entropy were derived as a function of the violation of
the MDL inequalities [Kessler and Arnon-Friedman, 2017, Section 3] and the MABK
inequality [Ribeiro et al., 2017, Lemma S5].
Before continuing to the next chapter, we emphasise once again that single-
round statements as mentioned above should not be understood as operational
statements. If we are given a single-round box but we do not assume to know its
5That is, instead of assuming that we know just the winning probability of the single-round
box in a specific game, we assume we know its winning probabilities in several different games. In
the context of single-round boxes this is a stronger assumption regarding the device. However, in
actual application this is not an issue, as will be mentioned later on.
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winning probability ω then we cannot conclude anything about its properties (e.g.,
the entropy of the outputs). When considering, for example, device-independent
cryptographic protocols one must test the device in order to estimate whether it
can violate a Bell inequality or not. This is done by playing several games with
the device and collecting statistic regarding its input-output behaviour. For this
purpose we need to consider multi-rounds boxes, as done in the following sections.
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Chapter 6
Multi-round box
In the previous chapter we discussed the single-round box, which can be seen as
a simple abstract object that allows us to study the fundamental aspects of non-
locality. When studying actual device-independent information processing tasks,
however, one must consider more complex objects that describe the behaviour of the
devices while performing the task of interest. More concretely, in actual applications
we usually interact with a device by playing many games. Even in the simplest
setting where one would like to merely verify the violation of a Bell inequality, as in
experiments performing loophole-free Bell tests, a Bell game is played many times
so that sufficient amount of data can be collected to estimate the violation in a
satisfactory statistical manner. Playing just a single game is clearly not enough.
Another example is device-independent protocols, such as quantum key distribution.
All protocols include a phase in which the users (or honest parties) are playing many
games with their device in order to decide whether it can be used for the considered
task. Hence, considering boxes that can be used to play just a single game is not
enough. Instead, we need to work with multi-round boxes.
Multi-round boxes can be described using a conditional probability distribu-
tion PAB|XY over the inputs and outputs of many rounds of a game. That is, for n
the number of games which one would like to play with the box (e.g., the number
of rounds of a protocol), A = A1A2 . . . An is a random variable over An and B,X,
and Y are similarly defined.
As explained in the beginning of Chapter 5, the way we model a box, and in
particular a multi-round box, depends on the type of interaction that we would
like to perform with it. We consider two different forms of interactions: paral-
lel and sequential interactions. Different tasks require different types of boxes.
Parallel boxes are used, for example, in self-testing [Natarajan and Vidick, 2017],
parallel quantum key distribution [Jain et al., 2017], and certification of entan-
glement [Arnon-Friedman and Yuen, 2018]. Some examples for settings in which
sequential boxes are considered are delegated computation [Reichardt et al., 2013]
and randomness amplification [Kessler and Arnon-Friedman, 2017]. In the scope of
this thesis, Chapters 8 and 10 deal with parallel boxes while Chapters 9 and 11 focus
on sequential boxes.
70 6. Multi-round box
Figure 6.1: Parallel multi-round box. We think of a parallel multi-round box as
a large device, shared between Alice and Bob, which can be used to play many
rounds of a Bell game, all at once. Such a box is expecting to get the inputs for all
rounds, x and y, at the same time, and it will then produce all the outputs, a and b
for Alice and Bob.
6.1 Parallel interaction
The simplest to describe form of interaction is the “parallel interaction”. In such
an interaction the box is “expecting” to get the n inputs of all the rounds, x and
y, at the same time and is expected to give all the outputs, a and b, together; see
Figure 6.1. If the box is only given inputs of a single game, e.g., x1, y1, it is not
expected to return any output. This behaviour of the box will present itself in the
mathematical model of the box, as we explain below.
For a given a game G, a parallel multi-round box is a device with which Alice and
Bob can play n instances of G in parallel (i.e., at the same time). Mathematically this
translates to a conditional probability distribution PAB|XY , non-signalling between
Alice and Bob, defined over the inputs and outputs of n games. For example, when
considering the CHSH game, A,B,X, and Y are all random variables over {0, 1}n.
As explained in Section 3.1.1, the non-signalling conditions between Alice and
Bob imply that Alice and Bob’s marginals, PA|X and PB|Y respectively, are well-
defined. The fact that we are talking about a parallel multi-round box means that
no further structure can be assumed. In particular, other marginals, e.g., PA1|X1 or
PA2B2|X2B2 , are not necessarily well-defined. Intuitively this stands for the fact that
the box is expecting to get all the inputs together and only then it produces the
outputs; the output for A1 can therefore depend, for example, on the value of X5
and not on just that of X1. Hence the conditional probability distribution PA1|X1 is
not properly defined.
Non-signalling parallel boxes
One can consider a parallel multi-round box which is only restricted by the non-
signalling conditions. We then get the following definition.
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Definition 6.1 (Non-signalling parallel multi-round box). Given a Bell game G,
a non-signalling parallel multi-round box is a non-signalling box PAB|XY , as in
Definition 3.1, defined for the inputs and outputs of n rounds of the game G –
Xn,Yn,An,Bn. That is, for all a ∈ An, b ∈ Bn, x,x′ ∈ Xn and y,y′ ∈ Yn,∑
b
PAB|XY (ab|xy) =
∑
b
PAB|XY (ab|xy′)∑
a
PAB|XY (ab|xy) =
∑
a
PAB|XY (ab|x′y) .
(6.1)
As mentioned above, the only non-signalling conditions restricting the parallel
box, are those between Alice and Bob appearing in Definition 6.1; we do not set any
other assumptions regarding the box apart from that.
Quantum parallel boxes
Similarly to a quantum single-round box, as in Definition 5.1, a quantum parallel
multi-round box is just a quantum box (Definition 3.3) defined for the inputs and
outputs of n rounds of G.
Definition 6.2 (Quantum parallel multi-round box). Given a Bell game G, a
quantum parallel multi-round box is a quantum box PAB|XY , as in Definition 3.3,
defined for the inputs and outputs of n rounds of the game G – Xn,Yn,An,Bn.
That is, there exist a bipartite state ρQAQB and measurements {Mxa } and {Myb }
such that
PAB|XY (ab|xy) = Tr (Mxa ⊗Myb ρQAQB ) ∀a, b,x,y . (6.2)
The non-signalling conditions in Equation (6.1) are automatically fulfilled by
quantum parallel boxes defined above. We remark again that there are no further
assumptions regarding the structure of the state and measurements apart from what
appears in Equation (6.2). Specifically, ρQA and ρQB are not assumed to have some
further subsystem structure and the measurements need not have a tensor product
form such as Mx1a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Mxnan .
6.2 Sequential interaction
In the previous section we discussed parallel multi-rounds boxes. These are boxes
that allow (and “expect”) to be interacted with in a parallel way, i.e., by giving all
the inputs to the box at the same time. As the parallel multi-round box receives
all the inputs at once, the output for, e.g., the first game, A1, can depend on the
inputs for all games X1, X2, . . . , Xn.
In this section we consider a different type of multi-round boxes – sequential
multi-round boxes. Such boxes are, in some sense, more structured than parallel
multi-round boxes and accurately model the devices used in many device-independent
scenarios. As such, sequential multi-round boxes are of relevance for applications.
Furthermore, the additional structure of sequential multi-round boxes will allow us
to derive stronger results than those derived for their parallel counterparts.
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Figure 6.2: Sequential interaction with a multi-round box. Alice and Bob start by
playing the first game with the box and only once they receive the outputs from the
box they proceed to the second game, and so on.
As mentioned above, the way we model a multi-round box depends on how
we would like to interact with it. Most device-independent protocols proceed in
rounds which are performed one after the other: Alice and Bob use their box in
the first round of the protocol and only once they receive the outputs from the box
they proceed to the second round, and so on; See Protocol 1.1 for an example. We
call such an interaction with the box “sequential interaction”. This is illustrated in
Figure 6.2 (the reader may compare Figure 6.2 to the single-round box in Figure 5.1
and the parallel multi-round box in Figure 6.1).
The chronological order which is implied by the sequential interaction enforces
certain constraints on the behaviour of the box. In particular, while past events
can influence future ones, the future cannot change the past. For example, the
first output A1 can depend on the first input X1 but not on the inputs of the next
rounds X2, . . . , Xn. The second output A2 can depend both on X2 and past events,
such as the values assigned to A1 and X1, but not on the following inputs X3, . . . , Xn.
We define two different types of sequential boxes – one which allows for communi-
cation between the rounds of interactions and one which does not. A box that allows
for communication between the rounds is a box in which Alice and Bob’s devices
can exchange classical or quantum information after finishing playing a game and
before starting the next one. Such boxes should be considered when entanglement
is to be distributed “on the fly”, e.g., in protocols where Alice is expected to send
half of an entangled state to Bob in each round, or when the devices are located far
enough so they cannot communicate during a single game but too close to make
sure signals from one round cannot arrive to the other device until the end of all
games. A box that does not allow for communication can be considered, e.g., in
cryptographic settings in which any communication between the devices implies
that all information can leak to the adversary. We remark that parallel boxes and
sequential boxes that allow for communications are incomparable to one another,
while both are more general than sequential boxes without communication; see
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Figure 6.3: The relation between the different multi-round boxes.
Figure 6.3. This is explained in more detail after formally defining the two types of
sequential boxes.
6.2.1 Without communication between the rounds
As in the case of a parallel multi-round box, a sequential multi-round box is described
by a conditional probability distribution PAB|XY defined over the inputs and outputs
of n rounds of the game G – Xn,Yn,An,Bn. The special thing about a sequential
box is that the marginals describing the individual rounds of the game are well-
defined and non-signalling between Alice and Bob. That is, they are boxes by
themselves.
In this section we consider a model of sequential boxes in which Alice’s and Bob’s
components are not allowed to communicate between the rounds of the game. For
short, we call such boxes non-communicating sequential boxes. Formally, to define a
non-communicating sequential box we consider the marginals of PAB|XY describing
a round i ∈ [n]. The relevant marginals are
PAiBi|XiYiHi,AliceHi,Bob (6.3)
where Hi,Alice = X1,...,i−1A1,...,i−1 and Hi,Bob = Y1,...,i−1B1,...,i−1 denote the
“histories” of Alice and Bob’s boxes in round i. These histories basically describe
all the information that can be kept by the boxes from the previous rounds (we
can think of such boxes as devices which record past events in their memory). The
history may include more information1 than past inputs and outputs; for simplicity
we stick to the above choice.
A first requirement on a sequential box is that the marginals (6.3) are well-
defined. This can be mathematically described by a set of non-signalling conditions.
Explicitly, for every i ∈ [n], we denote:
1For example, in device-independent quantum key distribution protocols the parties randomly
choose in each round whether the round is used for testing the device or for generating key bits.
This information can also be included in the history Hi.
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1. P = [i− 1], aP = a1, . . . , ai−1, and similarly for bP , xP , and yP .
2. F = {i+ 1, . . . , n}, aF = ai+1, . . . , an, and similarly for bF , xF , and yF .
3. For any xP , yP , xi, yi, xF , yF , x′F , and y
′
F ,
(a) x = xP , xi,xF
(b) x′ = xP , xi,x′F
and similarly for y and y′.
Then, we require that the following non-signalling conditions hold for all aP , bP ,
xP , yP , ai, bi, xi, yi, xF , x′F , yF , and y
′
F ,∑
aF ,bF
PAiBiAFBF |APBPXY (ai, bi,aF , bF |aP , bP ,x,y) =∑
aF ,bF
PAiBiAFBF |APBPXY (ai, bi,aF , bF |aP , bP ,x′,y′) .
(6.4)
Now that the marginals PAiBi|XiYiHi,AliceHi,Bob are well-defined for all i ∈ [n], we
further ask that they are non-signalling between Alice and Bob, when each party holds
only its own history. That is, PAi|XiHi,Alice and PBi|YiHi,Bob need to be well-defined
as well. Explicitly, for each round i ∈ [n], for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B, x, x′ ∈ X , y, y′ ∈ Y
and histories hi,Alice, hi,Alice
′ ∈ X i−1 ×Ai−1 and hi,Bob, hi,Bob′ ∈ Yi−1 × Bi−1,∑
b
PAiBi|XiYiHi,AliceHi,Bob(a, b|x, y, hi,Alice, hi,Bob) =∑
b
PAiBi|XiYiHi,AliceHi,Bob(a, b|x, y′, hi,Alice, hi,Bob
′
)∑
a
PAiBi|XiYiHi,AliceHi,Bob(a, b|x, y, hi,Alice, hi,Bob) =∑
a
PAiBi|XiYiHi,AliceHi,Bob(a, b|x′, y, hi,Alice
′
, hi,Bob) .
(6.5)
The fact that the boxes cannot communicate between the rounds presents itself
by having two different histories, one for Alice and one for Bob. The above equations
then imply that the actions of Alice’s box in round i depend only on Alice’s history,
i.e., on what happened in the previous rounds on Alice’s side (while she is oblivious
to Bob’s history), and similarly for Bob.2
Note that we only ask the marginals PAi|XiHi,Alice and PBi|YiHi,Bob to be well-
defined. PAi|Xi , on the other hand, are not necessarily valid boxes.
2This should be compared to the next section, where we will have just a single history Hi for
Alice and Bob together.
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Non-signalling non-communicating sequential boxes
A non-signalling non-communicating sequential multi-round box is simply a
box PAB|XY fulfilling the above non-signalling constraints; there are no further
requirements.
Definition 6.3 (Non-signalling non-communicating sequential multi-round box).
Given a Bell game G, a non-signalling non-communicating sequential multi-round
box is a conditional probability distribution PAB|XY defined for the inputs and
outputs of n rounds of the game G – Xn,Yn,An,Bn fulfilling the non-signalling
conditions given in Equations (6.4) and (6.5).
Quantum non-communicating sequential boxes
The simplest way of defining a quantum non-communicating sequential box is to
consider the initial state shared by Alice and Bob and the sequence of measurements
that they perform.
More specifically, in each round Alice and Bob’s boxes can perform a measurement
on the post-measurement state of the previous round. We denote the state in the
beginning of round i ∈ [n] (i.e., before performing the measurements of the i’th
round) by ρi,h
i,Alice,hi,Bob
QAQB
. As clear from the notation, this state depends on the
histories hi,Alice, hi,Bob. We identify ρ1QAQB = ρQAQB as the initial state of the box.
Furthermore, we denote the (Kraus) measurements performed in each round
by {Kxa} and {Kyb }.3 One can think of the measurements {Kxa} as depending on the
history hi,Alice and similarly for Bob. Alternatively, we can imagine that the history
is already kept in some classical registers within the quantum state ρi,h
i,Alice,hi,Bob
QAQB
,
i.e., ρQA includes also the information hi,Alice and similarly for Bob. The measure-
ments can thus be defined as first reading the history and then applying the relevant
measurement depending on the history. This allows us to use the shorter notation
in which the operators do not depend on the histories explicitly.
Using the above notation, the relation between the state in round i to that of
round i− 1 is simply (up to normalisation of the state)
ρi,h
i,Alice,hi,Bob
QAQB
∝(
Kxi−1ai−1 ⊗K
yi−1
bi−1
)
ρi−1,h
i−1,Alice,hi−1,Bob
QAQB
((
Kxi−1ai−1
)†
⊗
(
K
yi−1
bi−1
)†)
,
(6.6)
where hi,Alice and hi,Bob uniquely determine xi−1, ai−1, hi−1,Alice and
yi−1, bi−1, hi−1,Bob, respectively (i.e., the values on the righthand-side of
Equation (6.6) should be consistent with the histories on the lefthand-side). The
conditions stated in Equation (6.5) follow directly.
Definition 6.4 (Quantum non-communicating sequential multi-round box). Given
a Bell game G, a quantum non-communicating sequential multi-round box is a
3Note that in contrast to the previous definitions, the measurement operators K are now
written as Kraus operators and not POVMs, since we are interested in the post-measurement state.
See Section 2.3 for more details.
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conditional probability distribution PAB|XY defined for the inputs and outputs of n
rounds of the game G, Xn,Yn,An,Bn, such that there exist a bipartite state ρQAQB
and measurements {Kxa} and {Kyb } defining a sequence of bipartite states for i ∈ [n]
as in Equation (6.6).
As mentioned before, a non-communicating sequential box is also a parallel one.
Indeed, it is easy to see that a parallel box can always simulate the behaviour of a
non-communicating sequential box.
6.2.2 With communication between the rounds
In the previous section we considered sequential boxes in which Alice’s and Bob’s
components are not allowed to communicate between the rounds. This implies
that Alice’s and Bob’s components evolve separately in time and each of them
has their own “history”: hi,Alice for Alice and hi,Bob for Bob. Now, we consider a
scenario in which Alice’s and Bob’s components are allowed to communicate between
the different games, i.e., after the outputs of round i − 1 were supplied by the
box and before the i’th inputs are given.4 Considering boxes that are allowed to
communicate is, in particular, relevant when considering realistic application of, e.g.,
device-independent cryptography. There, one would like to allow the experimentalists
to distribute entanglement “on the fly” during the protocol. To send a new quantum
state in each round the communication channels need to be open and an adversarial
box may use this opportunity to communicate.
Mathematically this setting can be formalised by allowing Alice and Bob to
keep a common history register that includes the classical information of all past
events on both sides. More specifically, the marginal describing the i’th round of the
game, for i ∈ [n], is given by PAiBi|XiYiHi , where Hi denotes the history defined
by the previous rounds. Hi includes X1,...,i−1Y1,...,i−1A1,...,i−1B1,...,i−1 as well as
any other information available to Alice’s and Bob’s component. For simplicity we
assume that Hi = X1,...,i−1Y1,...,i−1A1,...,i−1B1,...,i−1 similarly to what was done
before. The only non-trivial communication to consider is one which depends on
the history, since any other information could have been included as part of the
box to begin with. Therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that the
communicated information is simply the entire history.
As before, we first require that PAiBi|XiYiHi are well-defined, i.e., Equation (6.4)
is fulfilled. In addition, PAiBi|XiYiHi needs to be non-signalling between Alice
and Bob, when they both hold their common history. That is, PAi|XiHi and
PBi|YiHi are well-defined. Formally: for each round i ∈ [n], for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B,
x, x′ ∈ X , y, y′ ∈ Y and hi ∈ Ai−1 × Bi−1 ×X i−1 × Yi−1,∑
b
PAiBi|XiYiHi(a, b|x, y, hi) =
∑
b
PAiBi|XiYiHi(a, b|x, y′, hi)∑
a
PAiBi|XiYiHi(a, b|x, y, hi) =
∑
a
PAiBi|XiYiHi(a, b|x′, y, hi) .
(6.7)
4In Protocol 1.1, for example, “between the different games” refers to the time after Step 3 of
round i− 1 and before Step 2 of round i, for all i ∈ [n].
6.2 Sequential interaction 77
In contrast to Equation (6.5), in the above equations the behaviour of Alice’s
component in the i’th round may depend also on past events on Bob’s side, as Hi
includes also Y1,...,i−1B1,...,i−1, and similarly for Bob’s part of the box.
Non-signalling communicating sequential boxes
A non-signalling communicating sequential multi-round box is a box PAB|XY
fulfilling the above non-signalling constraints.
Definition 6.5 (Non-signalling communicating sequential multi-round box). Given
a Bell game G, a non-signalling communicating sequential multi-round box is a
conditional probability distribution PAB|XY defined for the inputs and outputs of n
rounds of the game G – Xn,Yn,An,Bn fulfilling the non-signalling conditions given
in Equations (6.4) and (6.7).
It is perhaps instructive to note that PAB|XY itself is not a non-signalling box.;
communication (i.e., signalling) between the rounds may be necessary in order to
implement the box. We give a trivial example in the end of the section.
Quantum communicating sequential boxes
When we say that a communicating sequential multi-round box is quantum we mean
that in each round the behaviour of the box can be described within the formalism
of quantum physics.
Definition 6.6 (Quantum communicating sequential multi-round box). Given a
Bell game G, a quantum sequential multi-round box is a conditional probability
distribution PAB|XY defined for the inputs and outputs of n rounds of the game G,
Xn,Yn,An,Bn, such that for all i ∈ [n] the marginal PAiBi|XiYiHi , for Hi =
X1,...,i−1Y1,...,i−1A1,...,i−1B1,...,i−1, is a quantum box as in Definition 3.3. That is,
there exist a bipartite state ρh
i
QAQB
and measurements {Mhi,xa } and {Mh
i,y
b } such
that
PAiBi|XiYiHi(ab|xyhi) = Tr
(
Mh
i,x
a ⊗Mh
i,y
b ρ
hi
QAQB
)
∀a, b, x, y, hi . (6.8)
The box in Equation (6.8) is written as PAiBi|XiYiHi so it is mathematically
clear which marginals of PAB|XY are being discussed. On the level of the state
and measurements one thinks of ρh
i
QAQB
, {Mhi,xa }, and {Mh
i,y
b } as depending on
the history hi, which allows the actions in each round to depend on the past. As
in Section 6.2.1, we may also consider a state ρh
i
QAQB
that keeps hi in one of its
registers and measurements that first read the history and then apply the relevant
operations; in such a case we may think of {Mxa }, and {Myb } independent of the
history.
It may seem from Definition 6.6 that only the individual rounds are considered.
The sequential nature of the box is concealed in the relations between the different
rounds. It becomes apparent when noting that all the marginals describing the indi-
vidual rounds should be consistent with the same overall box PAB|XY . Alternatively,
one can consider an equivalent definition of a quantum communicating sequential
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multi-round box that is perhaps more intuitive (but mathematically more complex):
Similarly to the evolution described in Equation (6.6), we start with some initial
quantum state and make sequential measurements. In contrast to Equation (6.6),
however, we allow for an additional general operation, which may depend on the
history, to be performed on the post-measurement state of each round. The general
operation between the rounds is what models the communication between the two
parts of the box.
Before concluding this section, let us mention the relations between the different
types of multi-round boxes. The relations are shown in Figure 6.3. It is obvious to
see that communicating sequential boxes are more general than non-communicating
sequential boxes. In contrast to non-communicating sequential boxes, parallel boxes
cannot simulate a general communicating sequential box. A trivial example is a
communicating sequential box that always outputs b2 = x1. Clearly, since a parallel
box must, in particular, fulfil Equation (6.1), it cannot simulate such a box. On the
other hand, communicating sequential boxes cannot simulate a general parallel box.
For example, a communicating sequential box cannot simulate a parallel box for
which a1 = x2. Thus, the two types of boxes are incomparable.
Chapter 7
Working under the IID
assumption
In this thesis, we are interested in analysing the behaviour of multi-round boxes
when such boxes are used to play many non-local games, e.g., while running a
cryptographic protocol. In the previous chapter we discussed the different models of
multi-round boxes (the parallel and sequential ones). As we saw, their behaviour
can be quite complex. As a consequence, the analysis of protocols which use such
boxes is (a priori) tedious in the good case and infeasible in the worst.
In this chapter we discuss an assumption that can make the analysis of the scenar-
ios of interest much simpler – the so called “independent and identically distributed”
(IID) assumption. The assumption states that the boxes behave independently and
identically when playing the n games. The IID assumption is commonly made in
the literature as it significantly simplifies the behaviour of the considered boxes and
allows us to gain better intuition and understanding of the problem at hand. As we
explain below, there is no reason to believe that the IID assumption can be enforced
in the device-independent setting; we use it just as a first stage before moving on to
the general analysis. In Chapters 8-9 we will see that, in certain scenarios, some
techniques can be used to reduce the general analysis to the one made under the
IID assumption.
We start by explaining the assumption itself. Following that, we present a
mathematical tool, namely the “quantum asymptotic equipartition property”, which
is of great use when considering IID random variables and quantum systems. Finally,
we discuss the analysis of our showcases under the IID assumption.
7.1 The IID assumption
As in the previous chapter, we consider multi-round boxes. An IID box, as the
name suggests, is a multi-round box which behaves identically and independently in
each game played with it. Pictorially, we can think of an IID box as n identical and
independent copies of a single-round box, as shown in Figure 7.1. Comparing this
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Figure 7.1: IID box. The box PAB|XY can be described as n identical and indepen-
dent copies of a single-round box. Each game is played with a different copy of the
box. We can see each copy as a well defined subsystem.
to Figures 6.1 and 6.2, one sees that an IID box has more structure than the other,
more general, multi-round boxes. In particular, in the case of an IID box we can
talk about a subsystem structure of the box. In the quantum case, for example, if σ
denotes the state of a single-round box in Figure 7.1 then the overall state of the
IID box is σ⊗n. A similar tensor product structure also holds for the measurements
describing the box. Mathematically, an IID box is defined as follows.
Definition 7.1 (IID box). Given a non-local game G, an IID box is a conditional
probability distribution PAB|XY defined for the inputs and outputs of n rounds of
the game G, Xn,Yn,An,Bn, such that
PAB|XY (a, b|x,y) =
∏
i∈[n]
PAB|XY (ai, bi|xi, yi) (7.1)
for some single-round box PAB|XY . An IID box is said to be quantum or non-
signalling if the single round box PAB|XY is quantum (Definition 5.1) or non-
signalling (Definition 5.1), respectively.
Note that the single-round box PAB|XY in Equation (7.1) is the same for every
round i ∈ [n]. This means that the behaviour of the box is identical in each round
and independent of all other rounds.1 Hence, the behaviour of an IID box PAB|XY
is solely characterised by the single-round box PAB|XY and, thus, the substance of
any analysis done for the IID box is the study of the single-round box. This also
implies that the box behaves exactly the same whether we give it all the inputs at
once (parallel interaction) or one after the other (sequential interaction). An IID
box is therefore both a parallel multi-round box and a sequential multi-round box;
1As always, a box is a conditional probability distribution and its definition is therefore
independent of the distribution of the inputs, x and y, which can be arbitrary (depending on how
the box is being used). It is perhaps helpful to note that the idea here is that, while the inputs of
the different rounds may be correlated in general (i.e., not IID), the box itself does not “create”
further correlations between the rounds (in contrast to parallel and sequential boxes). In any case,
in most scenarios the inputs are usually taken to be IID random variables as well.
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Figure 7.2: The relation between the sets of multi-round boxes. The intersection of
the sets of sequential and parallel boxes includes the set of IID boxes. The analysis
of IID boxes is rather simple.
see Figure 7.2. Given all of the above, it indeed makes sense that any analysis done
solely for IID boxes can be much simpler than the general analysis in which one
needs to deal with parallel or sequential multi-round boxes.
When considering device-independent protocols one usually encounters IID boxes
in two different contexts – the so called “completeness” and “soundness” of the
protocols (recall, e.g., Section 4.2). When proving the completeness of a protocol
one shows that an “honest implementation” of the box does not cause the protocol
to abort (with high probability). The honest implementation is the implementation
of the box that one would like to have if the manufacture of the device is to be
trusted and, most commonly, it is described as an IID box. Thus, investigating
the behaviour of the protocol when an IID box is being used allows us to see what
happens in the honest scenario when “everything goes according to the plan”.
The second context to discuss IID boxes is that of the soundness proof. There,
one ought to show that the protocol acts as required for any box, i.e., even for
adversarial ones.2 Clearly, not all boxes are IID boxes and hence analysing the
situation only for IID boxes is not sufficient. That is, by assuming that all boxes
behave in an IID manner we weaken the final statement. Still, working under the
IID assumption allows us to gain better understanding of the full question at hand.
It is important to remark that, even though quite convenient for the soundness
analysis, the IID assumption cannot be justified a priori. Assuming that the box
behaves in an IID way goes against the spirit of device-independence by imposing
severe restrictions on the implementation of the box. In particular, the assumption
implies that the multi-round box does not include any, classical or quantum, internal
memory (i.e., its actions when playing one game cannot depend on the other games)
and cannot display time-dependent behaviour. We therefore emphasise that working
2Recall that in the device-independent setting we assume that the adversary is the one
constructing the box. Device-independent protocols are expected to abort, with high probability,
when an adversarial device is detected.
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under the IID assumption is only a first step in the process of proving full soundness
(as will be shown in the proceeding chapters).
7.2 Asymptotic equipartition property
When analysing IID processes a useful mathematical tool is the so called “asymp-
totic equipartition property” (AEP). The entropic formulation of the AEP used in
this thesis basically asserts that when considering IID RV A = A1, A2, . . . , An, all
identical copies of the RV A, the smooth min- and max-entropies rates, Hεmin(A)/n
and Hεmax(A)/n, converge to H(A) [Holenstein and Renner, 2011]. Similarly, the
quantum version of the AEP asserts that the same is true for IID quantum
states (σA)
⊗n and, even more, it holds also when considering conditional en-
tropies [Renner, 2008, Tomamichel et al., 2009, Tomamichel, 2012].
In many information theoretic tasks one needs to bound the smooth min- and
max-entropies, as they describe operational quantities. In particular, this will be
the case in one of the showcases investigated in the thesis. When considering IID
processes, as done in this chapter, the AEP allows us to reduce the analysis of the
smooth entropies for IID boxes to the analysis of the von Neumann entropy for a
single-round box.3 This explains why the AEP is a useful tool when working under
the IID assumption.
To comprehend the statement of the AEP and its significance we start by
presenting and explaining the classical AEP. The quantum variant is then presented
as an extension of the classical one.
7.2.1 Classical asymptotic equipartition property
The (classical) AEP can be seen as the “information theoretic version” of the law of
large numbers. Given IID RV A1, A2, . . . , An the law of large numbers states that
for large enough number of samples n, the average is close to the expected value in
probability. Formally this can be written as
∀µ > 0 lim
n→∞Pr
[∣∣∣ 1
n
∑
i
Ai − E [A]
∣∣∣ > µ] = 0 , (7.2)
for A = A1 = · · · = An a single copy of the RV. Similarly, the AEP, which is a direct
consequence of the law of large numbers,4 states that for IID RV
∀µ > 0 lim
n→∞Pr
[∣∣∣− 1
n
log (PA[a])−H(A)
∣∣∣ > µ] = 0 , (7.3)
where we denoted A = A1A2 . . . An.
3An example of the analysis of the von Neumann entropy for single-round boxes was presented
in Section 5.2. The AEP motivates the analysis done in that section when working under the IID
assumption.
4To see this, one can define a new RV, A˜i, which, for all a ∈ A takes the value log (Pr[a]) with
probability Pr[a]. Applying Equation (7.2) for the new IID RV A˜1, . . . , A˜n, Equation (7.3) follows.
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Assume that we sample a sequence a. What can we say about its probability
PA[a]? We learn from Equation (7.3) that, for large enough n,
2−n(H(A)+µ) < PA[a] < 2−n(H(A)−µ) (7.4)
with high probability. This allows us to talk about “typical sequences” and “typical
sets”. A typical sequence is a sequence A for which Equation (7.4) holds and
the typical set includes all typical sequences. Denote by 1 − ε the probability
that Equation (7.4) holds or, in other words, the probability of the typical set.
In the limit n → ∞, ε → 0, the typical set has probability approximately 1, all
elements of it appear with approximately 2−nH(A) probability, and, hence, it includes
approximately 2nH(A) elements. (For formal proofs see [Cover and Thomas, 2012,
Chapter 3]). Thus, the AEP implies that when analysing probabilistic statements
regarding a sequence of IID RV, one can focus on the typical events (and ignore the
non-typical ones) without introducing much of an error.
Equation (7.4) can be used to state the AEP in terms of the smooth min- and
max-entropies; this form of the AEP is the one used in this thesis.
Theorem 7.2 (AEP5 (direct part)). Let A = A1A2 . . . An be a sequence of IID RV.
Then, for any ε ∈ (0, 1) and n large enough,
1
n
Hεmin(A) ≥ H(A)−
δ√
n
1
n
Hεmax(A) ≤ H(A) +
δ√
n
,
where δ depends on ε and A.6
To gain some intuition of how the smooth entropies enter to the above
theorem we sketch the main arguments here in a somewhat hand-waving way.
For the more accurate analysis we refer the interested reader to [Renner, 2008,
Holenstein and Renner, 2011, Tomamichel, 2012]. Recall that
Hmin(A) = min
a
− log [PA[a]]
Hmax(A) ≤ max
a|PA[a]6=0
− log [PA[a]] .
Thus, when considering only typical events, it follows from Equation (7.4) that
1
n
Hmin(A) > H(A)− µ
1
n
Hmax(A) < H(A)− µ .
5Note that this theorem is actually a non-asymptotic version of the AEP, as it describes also
the convergence rate for finite n (i.e., it includes also the second order term). The limit, stated as
Equation (7.5) below, follows trivially from the presented theorem.
6For the time being we are not interested in the explicit form of δ; this will be discussed when
relevant.
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To account for non-typical events we need to incorporate their probability ε. We
do so by switching to the smooth versions of the entropies while using ε as the
smoothing parameter.7
Theorem 7.2, in combination with a converse bound8, implies that when n goes
to infinity both smooth entropies converge to the Shannon entropy:
lim
n→∞
1
n
Hεmin(A) = lim
n→∞
1
n
Hεmax(A) = H(A) . (7.5)
This explains why the Shannon entropy is so important in information theory —
the smooth entropies, which describe operational tasks (recall, for example, Sec-
tion 4.2), converge to the Shannon entropy when considering a large number of
independent repetitions of the relevant task. A commonly used example is that of
“data compression”. There, one would like to encode an n bit string using less bits.
If we allow for some small error when decoding the data, roughly Hεmax(A) bits are
needed [Renner and Wolf, 2004]. For a large enough IID sequence A1, A2, . . . , An,
however, nH(A) bits suffices [Shannon, 1948].
A final important comment about the entropic formulation of the AEP is with
regards to the so called “chain rules”. The Shannon entropy respects the chain rule
H(A) =
∑
iH(Ai|A<i), where A<i denotes the sequence of all RV Aj with j < i.
In the case of IID RV this is reduced to H(A) = nH(A). That is, the total amount
of entropy of A is n times the entropy of a single copy of A. Thus, in order to
calculate H(A) we only need to know H(A). In contrast to the Shannon entropy,
the smooth min- and max-entropies do not fulfil a similar chain rule. Theorem 7.2
tells us that, to first order in n, Hεmin(A) = H
ε
max(A) = nH(A). Therefore, for
sufficiently large n, the total amount of the smooth min- and max- entropies of A
are n times the Shannon entropy of a single copy of A and, here as well, we only
need to know H(A) to calculate Hεmin(A) and H
ε
max(A).
7.2.2 Quantum asymptotic equipartition property
As the name suggests, the quantum AEP is an extended version of the AEP that
applies to IID quantum states ρ = (σAB)
⊗n (the classical variant is then a special
case of the quantum one). The following theorem, developed in [Tomamichel, 2012,
Result 5] (see also [Tomamichel et al., 2009, Theorem 9]), acts as the generalisation
of Theorem 7.2 above; it extends the theorem to quantum states and, at the same
time, incorporates conditioning on quantum systems.9
7The above only (roughly) explains why the smooth entropies are considered, without addressing
the second order term of the AEP. The second order term does not come from the law of large
numbers but its refinement — the central limit theorem.
8The converse bound roughly follows from the monotonicity of the so called α-entropies. For
details see [Tomamichel, 2015, Section 6.4].
9The classical AEP, given as Theorem 7.2, can be easily written also in terms of conditional
entropies if the conditioning is done on classical systems (then one can directly define the probability
distribution of A as the conditional one). This is not the case when conditioning on quantum
systems. That is to say that the statement of the theorem which includes conditional entropies
does not follow directly from a “non-conditional” variant.
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Theorem 7.3 (Quantum AEP (direct part) [Tomamichel, 2012]). Let ρ = (σAB)
⊗n
be an IID quantum state. Then, for any ε ∈ (0, 1) and n large enough,
1
n
Hεmin(A|B)ρ ≥ H(A|B)σ −
δ(ε, ν)√
n
(7.6)
1
n
Hεmax(A|B)ρ ≤ H(A|B)σ +
δ(ε, ν)√
n
, (7.7)
where δ(ε, ν) = 4 log ν
√
log(2/ε2) for ν = 2
√
2Hmax(A|B) + 1.
In combination with a converse bound [Tomamichel, 2015, Corollary 6.3], we get
the asymptotic equality of the conditional entropies:
lim
n→∞
1
n
Hεmin(A|B)ρ = lim
n→∞
1
n
Hεmax(A|B)ρ = H(A|B)σ .
For the proofs of the quantum AEP the reader is directed to [Tomamichel, 2015,
Section 6.4].
The quantum AEP reveals the same important facts as its classical counterpart
when considering IID quantum states – it justifies the use of the von Neumann
entropy in quantum information processing and tell us that, for sufficiently large n,
the total amount of the conditional smooth entropies, Hεmin(A|B)ρ and Hεmax(A|B)ρ,
are n times the von Neumann entropy H(A|B)σ of a single copy of σ. That is,
instead of calculating the entropies of the full state ρ one only needs to analyse the
von Neumann entropy for a single copy of σ.
When considering applications in which the analysis should be done for a finite
number of repetitions n, it is not sufficient to know that the smooth entropies
converge to the von Neumann entropy; we also need to know how fast they converge.
The second order terms appearing in Equations (7.6) and (7.7), i.e., the terms that
scale with 1/
√
n, account for the “finite-size effects”. While the 1/
√
n dependency is
optimal, the constant δ is not tight.10
7.3 Using the IID assumption
In this section we discuss the analysis of our showcases when working under the
IID assumption. The analysis of the parallel repetition question, presented in
Section 7.3.1, is somewhat trivial. Our showcase of device-independent cryptography,
considered in Section 7.3.2, demonstrates the use of the quantum AEP in device-
independent information processing tasks.
7.3.1 Showcase: non-signalling parallel repetition
In our terminology, parallel repetition results aim to upper-bound the probability
that a parallel multi-round box can simultaneously win all the n games played
10To see that the 1/
√
n dependency is optimal follow, e.g., the proof of [Renner, 2008,
Theorem 3.3.3]. Second order terms with constants better than δ can be derived
from [Tomamichel and Hayashi, 2013].
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with it; recall Section 4.1. The discussion below holds for classical, quantum, and
non-signalling strategies. The word “optimal” then refers to the considered type of
players.
One simple strategy for the parallel repeated game is the IID strategy. This
strategy takes the form of an IID box, which plays each of the n games independently
and identically, as in Definition 7.1. That is, the box does not take advantage of
the fact that it gets all the inputs at the same time. For an optimal IID strategy,
i.e., the strategy which achieves the maximal probability of winning all games out of
all IID strategies, the single-round box PAB|XY appearing in Equation (7.1) is the
optimal single-game strategy, that is, the one achieving winning probability of 1− α.
It is easy to see that the probability that an IID box wins all the n games
simultaneously decreases exponentially fast with n. Specifically, consider an IID box
(or strategy) PAB|XY with
PAB|XY (a, b|x,y) =
∏
i∈[n]
PAB|XY (ai, bi|xi, yi)
for some single-round box PAB|XY . Let Wi denote the RV describing whether the
i’th game is won (Wi = 1) or not (Wi = 0) and denote by 1− α = Pr [Wi = 1] the
winning probability of the single-round box PAB|XY (aibi|xiyi) in a single game (as
in Equation (5.1)). Due to the IID assumption, all the RV Wi are independent and
identically distributed. Thus, the probability that all the n games are won is given
by
Pr
[∑
i
Wi = n
]
=
∏
i
Pr [Wi = 1] = (1− α)n ,
Clearly, for any 1− α < 1, (1− α)n decreases exponentially fast in n.
It is easy to show that also a concentration bound holds for any IID box: for
any 0 ≤ β ≤ α, Hoeffding’s inequality tells us that11
Pr
[∑
i
Wi ≥ (1− α+ β)n
]
≤ exp (−2nβ2) ,
which decreases exponentially fast in n as well. The answer to the parallel repetition
question, under the IID assumption, is therefore almost trivial.
7.3.2 Showcase: device-independent quantum cryptography
Following the first proof of concept of the security of device-independent
quantum key distribution derived in [Barrett et al., 2005], a long line of
works [Acín et al., 2006a, Acín et al., 2006b, Scarani et al., 2006, Acín et al., 2007,
Masanes, 2009, Pironio et al., 2009, Hänggi et al., 2010a, Hänggi and Renner, 2010,
Masanes et al., 2011, Masanes et al., 2014] considered the security of device-
independent quantum and non-signalling cryptography under the IID assumption.
11Hoeffding’s inequality tells us even more; it says that when using the optimal IID strategy the
probability of winning less than 1− α− β fraction of the games is also decreasing exponentially
fast.
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In this section we explain how the IID assumption is used when analysing device-
independent quantum cryptographic protocols. Specifically, we consider here the
task of device-independent randomness certification in the presence of a quantum
adversary, which acts as the main building block of many device-independent crypto-
graphic protocols, e.g., device-independent quantum key distribution. We focus only
on the parts of the security proof in which the IID assumption plays a crucial role and
present them in a slightly simplified form. In particular, we consider large enough
number of rounds n and neglect finite-size effects for the moment. In Chapter 11 we
give full security proofs (which do not rely on the IID assumption) and contrast the
relevant parts with the analysis done here.
When dealing with device-independent cryptography we first need to model
the box used by the honest parties, Alice and Bob, and the adversary’s knowledge
about it. Under the IID assumption, the state of Alice and Bob has an IID
structure ρQAQB = (σQAQB )
⊗n where each copy of σQAQB is a bipartite state
shared between Alice and Bob. Moreover, we assume that the measurements
performed in each round of the protocol are all identical and independent of one
another, i.e., for all a,x, Mxa = (Mxa )
⊗n and similarly for Bob’s measurements. The
most general quantum adversary holds a purification of Alice and Bob’s state. As
all purifications are equivalent up to local unitaries on Eve’s state, we can assume
without loss of generality that the overall state of Alice, Bob, and Eve takes the IID
form12
ρQAQBE = (σQAQBE)
⊗n
. (7.8)
We remark that while we assume that ρ has the above IID structure, the
state σQAQBE is unknown.
Equation (7.8), together with the IID form of the quantum measurements de-
scribing the device, indeed leads to an IID box PAB|XY as in Equation (7.1). In
particular, this implies that A1, A2, . . . , An are IID RV. Furthermore, it follows from
Equation (7.8) that, for all i ∈ [n], the quantum system Ei holds information only
regarding the output Ai of the same round (that is, A1 and E2, for example, are
independent of one another).
Recall from Section 4.2.3 that the central task when proving security of quantum
cryptographic protocols is to bound the amount of information that Eve may
obtain about certain values generated by the protocol, which are supposed to
be unknown to her. In the case of randomness certification the main technical
step of all soundness proofs is to lower-bound the smooth min-entropy of Alice’s
outputs A = A1, A2, . . . , An (see, e.g., Protocol 1.1). Our goal is therefore to
lower-bound Hεmin(A|E), where E = E1, E2, . . . , En are Eve’s IID quantum systems
appearing in Equation (7.8).
The rough idea behind a security proof under the IID assumption is illustrated
in Figure 7.3 and is rather simple. The first step is the estimation of the winning
12It is the equivalence of all purifications that allows us to go from an IID assumption regarding
Alice and Bob’s state ρQAQB to an IID assumption regarding the state ρQAQBE , which also
includes Eve. Interestingly, the same thing cannot be done when considering non-signalling boxes
and adversaries. It follows from [Arnon-Friedman and Ta-Shma, 2012] that the extension of a
non-signalling IID box to the adversary does not necessarily have an IID structure as well. (See
also [Masanes et al., 2014], where the box itself is assumed to have a subsystem structure similar
to that of an IID box while the structure of the adversary’s system is unrestricted).
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Figure 7.3: Sketch of a security proof under the IID assumption and for large
enough n. The honest parties hold an IID box. Each quantum system Ei, belonging
to the adversary, can be entangled only to the i’th box. The non-local game is being
played with each of the independent and identical boxes. The statistics are then
collected and used to estimate the winning probability ω of the single-round boxes.
According to the quantum AEP, for large enough n, the total amount of smooth
min-entropy is the sum of the von Neumann entropy of each round, which can be
bounded as a function of the estimated winning probability ω.
probability ω of the single-round box defining the IID box, i.e., the unknown
state σQAQB . Alice and Bob play the n games with each of their independent
quantum boxes and collect the statistics. Denoting by Wi the RV describing whether
the i’th game is won or not, the IID assumption implies that W1,W2, . . . ,Wn are,
as well, IID RV. Thus, it follows from Chernoff’s bound that the average 1n
∑
iWi is
close to the expected winning probability E[W ], which is no other than the winning
probability ω of a single copy of the state (see Equation (5.1)). That is,
ω ≈ 1
n
∑
i
Wi .
The second step is to lower-bound the conditional smooth min-entropyHεmin(A|E)
as a function of ω. Due to the IID assumption, we can do so using the quantum
AEP presented as Theorem 7.3 above. Specifically, for large enough n we have
Hεmin(A|E) ≈ nH(A|E)
≥ nf(ω) , (7.9)
where f(ω) is some function of ω that lower-bounds the conditional von Neumann
entropy H(A|E)σ for any state σ with the estimated winning probability ω.13 For
the CHSH game, such a function f(ω) was given in Lemma 5.3 as part of the
discussion of single-round boxes.
13We previously wrote σ as the tripartite state σQAQBE while here we are referring also to the
classical register A. What is meant by this notation is that σ is a state which can lead to winning
probability ω when measured with some given measurements {Mxa } and
{
Myb
}
. The result of
measuring QA with {Mxa } defines the RV A.
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In certain protocols one would like to use different copies of the boxes in different
ways. For example, in device-independent quantum key distribution the protocol
includes “test rounds” and “generation rounds”. Alice’s usage of the box in a test round
may be different than her usage in a generation round. The winning probability ω is
estimated from the statistics collected in the test rounds, as discussed above. Using
the IID assumption we can conclude that the other boxes, utilised in the generation
rounds, could have also been used to win the game with probability ω, even though
Alice and Bob do not test these boxes.
Clearly, the IID assumption plays a crucial role in the above proof sketch; it
allows us to talk about a single-round box, estimate its winning probability in a
meaningful way, and, furthermore, to bound the total amount of smooth min-entropy
of the outputs as the number of games played times the von Neumann entropy of
the output of a single game. In total, the IID assumption allows us to reduce the
analysis of the multi-round box to that of a single-round box – the “physics” enters
the analysis only in the single-round statement (e.g., Lemma 5.3) while the rest is
done using standard mathematical tools such as Chernoff’s bound and the AEP.
Quantum key distribution key rates
The main fundamental difference between device-independent randomness certifica-
tion and device-independent quantum key distribution is that in the latter Alice and
Bob should share identical secret keys in the end of the protocol. To this end, they
need to apply an additional classical post-processing step, namely, error correction.
The goal of the error correction step is to reconcile the differences between Alice’s
and Bob’s keys so they share the same final key with high probability.
In classical error correction protocols utilising one-way communication, Alice
sends some classical information about her key to Bob. This information, together
with all of Bob’s prior information, helps Bob conclude which key Alice is most
likely to hold. If the information sent is not sufficient in order for Bob to derive a
conclusion, the parties abort the protocol. Since Alice sends the additional infor-
mation to Bob over a public (but authenticated) classical channel, this information
also leaks to the adversary and hence increases her knowledge about Alice’s key.
In other words, the leakage reduces the conditional smooth min-entropy – we now
need to consider Hεmin(A|EO), where O denotes the leaked information, instead
of Hεmin(A|E) appearing in Equation (7.9).
Notice the resulting tradeoff. To get good key rates, we wish to leak as little
information as possible to the adversary (so we do not reduce the min-entropy by
too much). On the other hand, we want the error correction step to succeed when
Alice and Bob use the honest box14 and, thus, Alice needs to send a sufficient
amount of information that will allow Bob to correct the errors. We therefore
wish to minimise the amount of leakage needed for successful error correction.
As explained in Section 4.2, this turns out to be quantified by the conditional
14If the box is malicious or simply noisier than we wished for, we anyhow expect the protocol to
abort. Thus, we only ask that the error correction protocol does not abort with high probability
when the honest implementation of the devices is used since, otherwise, it will affect the completeness
of the protocol.
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smooth zero-entropy Hε0(A|B) [Renner and Wolf, 2005], which is closely related to
the conditional smooth max-entropy Hεmax(A|B).
In many cases the honest box, which also incorporates the considered honest
noise model, is chosen to be an IID box. (For example, a common choice is a
box describing n independent pairs of maximally entangled states which are being
distributed over an IID noisy quantum channel.) Hence, one can use the AEP to
get
Hεmax(A|B) ≈ nH(A|B) (7.10)
and by this upper-bound the amount of leakage due to error correction. All and all,
under the IID assumption and for sufficiently large n, the key rate is governed by
r ' 1
n
(Hεmin(A|E)−Hεmax(A|B)) (7.11)
' H(A|E)−H(A|B) . (7.12)
Equation (7.12) is usually referred to as the DW-formula since it first ap-
peared in [Devetak and Winter, 2005, Theorem 2.1]. In [Renner and Wolf, 2005],
the smooth entropies where used to describe the optimal key rates with-
out employing the IID assumption and, by the use of the AEP, the results
of [Renner and Wolf, 2005] imply Equation (7.12) (as we sketched above). Inter-
estingly, [Devetak and Winter, 2005, Theorem 2.8] states that, up to some possible
classical post-processing, Equation (7.12) is tight for any protocol utilising error
correction with one-way communication.
Two last remarks are in order. Firstly, we would like to emphasise that Equa-
tion (7.10) does not rely on the IID assumption that we are making in order to
simplify the soundness analysis. Here we are allowed to use the AEP since we choose
to consider an IID box as our honest box. Other choices can also be made (if one,
for example, wishes to analyse the protocol under a different honest noise model)
and then the AEP might no longer be relevant. In Chapter 11 we will drop the
IID assumption used for the soundness analysis but will still choose an IID honest
implementation for the completeness analysis.
Secondly, since an adversary limited to preparing IID boxes is weaker than
one that can make general multi-round boxes, tight key rates achieved under the
IID assumption act as upper-bounds on the achievable key rates in the general
setting. Thus, by calculating key rates using Equation (7.12) we usually already
get a feeling of what is the best we can hope for when performing the general
analysis. Indeed, [Pironio et al., 2009] used Equation (7.12) to derive tight key rates
for device-independent quantum key distribution under the IID assumption for
n → ∞. These will act as an upper-bound when considering the most powerful
quantum adversary in Chapter 11.
7.4 Beyond IID
In this chapter we studied the behaviour of IID boxes and saw how the main
ingredient in an analysis of IID boxes is the analysis of a single-round box. In a
way, one can say that once we understand the behaviour of a single-round box, we
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Figure 7.4: The big picture. The single-round box, at the bottom of the figure, is
the simplest object to consider (Chapter 5). The IID box consists of many copies
of the single-round box and, thus, can be easily analysed once we understand the
behaviour of the single-round box (Chapter 7). The multi-round boxes are the most
complex objects (Chapter 6). “Reductions to IID” techniques can be used to simplify
the analysis of multi-round boxes by reducing it to that of IID boxes. The “de
Finetti reduction” technique (Chapter 8) is used when dealing with parallel boxes
while the “entropy accumulation theorem” (Chapter 9) is relevant for sequential
boxes. In total, with the help of the different reductions, the main thing to study
when considering device-independent information processing tasks is the behaviour
of single-round boxes.
understand the “physics”, or the essence, of the problem at hand. Unfortunately, IID
boxes are far from being the most general ones and so we are enforced to go beyond
the IID analysis and consider more complicated objects, namely, the different types
of multi-round boxes that we encountered in Chapter 6.
As explained in Chapter 1, it is the goal of this thesis to show that the analysis
of IID boxes can be almost directly extended, at least in some cases, to the analysis
of multi-round boxes via a reduction to IID. In the following chapters we present
two techniques that can be used to reduce the analysis of parallel and sequential
boxes to that of IID boxes; see Figure 7.4. Specifically, Chapter 8 deals with a
technique called “de Finetti reduction” that relates permutation invariant parallel
boxes to IID boxes [Arnon-Friedman and Renner, 2015]. Chapter 9 presents the so
called “entropy accumulation theorem” that relates sequential boxes, fulfilling certain
Markov-chain conditions, to IID ones [Dupuis et al., 2016].
With the help of those techniques one can show that, in certain scenarios, the
analysis of IID boxes is sufficient without loss of generality. This is not to say that
all multi-round boxes are IID boxes; clearly this is not the case. Instead, we claim
that even though there exist multi-round boxes that can not be described as IID
boxes, one can sometimes restrict the attention solely to IID boxes and the rest will
follow. This will be clarified with the aid of our showcases in Chapters 10 and 11.
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Chapter 8
Reductions to IID: parallel
interaction
Multi-round parallel boxes, discussed in Section 6.1, can display an almost arbitrary
behaviour and hence are complicated to analyse. However, some additional structure
of the boxes can be assumed when certain types of symmetries are present in the
considered information processing task. In this chapter we focus on the analysis of
parallel boxes that are permutation invariant. Permutation invariance is an inherent
symmetry in many information processing tasks, device-independent tasks among
them. Thus, analysing permutation invariant boxes (as defined below) is of special
interest.
A well known family of tools used to study permutation invariant systems1 is the
family of “de Finetti-type theorems”. A de Finetti-type theorem is any theorem that
relates (in one way or another) permutation invariant systems to a more structured
system, having the form of a convex combination of IID systems, called a de Finetti
system (or state). The relation given by the theorem can be used, in certain cases,
to argue that instead of analysing permutation invariant systems one can restrict
the attention to the simpler to analyse (convex combination of) IID systems. A de
Finetti theorem therefore acts as a reduction to IID.
The first de Finetti theorem [de Finetti, 1969] established that the collection
of infinitely exchangeable sequences, i.e., distributions on infinite strings that
are invariant under all permutations, exactly coincides with the collection of all
convex combinations of IID distributions. Subsequent results gave quantitative
bounds of different forms [Diaconis and Freedman, 1980a, Raggio and Werner, 1989,
Caves et al., 2002, Renner, 2007, Christandl et al., 2007, Christandl et al., 2009,
Christandl and Toner, 2009, Brandao and Harrow, 2013]. de Finetti-type theorems
had proven to be useful in various proofs. The quantum de Finetti theorems, for
example, enable a substantially simplified analysis of many quantum information
tasks such as quantum cryptography [Christandl et al., 2009, Leverrier, 2014], to-
mography [Christandl and Renner, 2012], channel capacities [Berta et al., 2011] and
1Depending on the context, the term system may refer to a probability distribution, a quantum
state, or a box.
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complexity [Brandao and Harrow, 2013].
The de Finetti theorems listed above cannot be used in the device-independent
setting for various reasons.2 In this chapter we present a de Finetti-type theorem,
which was introduced in [Arnon-Friedman and Renner, 2015], that is applicable
when working with parallel boxes. Our de Finetti theorem, termed “de Finetti
reduction for correlations”, is then used in the analysis of one of our showcases,
namely, non-signalling parallel repetition, in Chapter 10.
The chapter is arranged as follows. We start by explaining the notion of permu-
tation invariance in the device-independent context in Section 8.1. The de Finetti
reduction is presented and proven in Section 8.2. Section 8.3 exemplifies how the
reductions can be used in two different general ways (while Chapter 10 deals with
a specific application). The theorems proven in Section 8.3 clarify in what sense
we think of a de Finetti reduction as a reduction to IID in the device-independent
setting.
In accordance with the rest of the thesis, the chapter focuses only on the case of
two parties. All the statements can be extended to any number of parties, as can be
seen in [Arnon-Friedman and Renner, 2015].
8.1 Permutation invariance
As mentioned above, we are interested in considering permutation invariant parallel
multi-round boxes. Let n be the number of games that can be played with the parallel
box of interest PAB|XY . A permutation pi is a bijective function pi : [n]→ [n]. We
denote pi(x) = xpi−1(1), xpi−1(2), . . . , xpi−1(n) and similarly for pi(y), pi(a), and pi(b).
A permutation invariant box3 is defined as follows.
Definition 8.1 (Permutation invariant box). Given a parallel multi-round box
PAB|XY , defined over Xn,Yn,An,Bn, and a permutation pi : [n]→ [n] we denote
by PAB|XY ◦ pi the box defined by
∀a, b,x,y (PAB|XY ◦ pi) (a, b|x,y) = PAB|XY (pi(a), pi(b)|pi(x), pi(y)) . (8.1)
A parallel multi-round box PAB|XY is said to be permutation invariant if and only if
∀pi PAB|XY = PAB|XY ◦ pi .
Figure 8.1 illustrate the action of permuting a parallel box. The action of the
permuted box can be understood as follows: First, the box applies the permutation pi
on the inputs. Second, it uses the initial box PAB|XY to produce the intermediate
outputs. Lastly, it applies the inverse permutation pi−1 on the intermediate outputs
and returns these final strings as the ultimate outputs. Note that only the inputs
and the outputs of the box are being permuted, all using the same permutation pi.
2The mentioned theorems rely on some initial subsystem structure and/or a bound on the
dimension of the subsystems. In the device-independent setting one cannot start with such
assumptions regarding the considered boxes in general.
3The definition and the derived theorem are independent of the nature of the box, i.e., if it is
classical, quantum, non-signalling, or even signalling. This will be addressed in Section 8.2.
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Figure 8.1: Permutation of a box PAB|XY . The permuted box, PAB|XY ◦ pi acts
by first applying the permutation pi on the inputs, then producing the outputs using
the initial box PAB|XY , and lastly applying the inverse permutation on the outputs.
The input output distribution of the box is then defined according to Equation (8.1).
A box is said to be permutation invariant if for all pi, PAB|XY = PAB|XY ◦ pi.
In particular, we do not permute the parties, that is, Alice and Bob do not swap
their inputs and outputs with one another.
As we are merely permuting the classical inputs and outputs, the box itself need
not to have a subsystem structure. That is, we do not require, e.g., PA1|X1 to be a
valid system (i.e., a conditional probability distribution). This is in contrast to, e.g.,
quantum de Finetti-type theorems such as [Renner, 2007, Christandl et al., 2009],
where the permutation is applied on the quantum states themselves.4 This distinction
is relevant when wishing to discuss general parallel boxes (recall Section 6.1).
In some applications (e.g., the showcase considered in Chapter 10) one can easily
show that it is sufficient to consider permutation invariant boxes without loss of
generality. If this is not the case, it is also possible to enforce permutation invariance.
A protocol, for example, can be modified to enforce the symmetry by adding a
step in which a random permutation is applied5 on the box and by this make it
permutation invariant. Precisely: given any parallel box PAB|XY , let
P˜AB|XY =
1
n!
∑
pi
PAB|XY ◦ pi
be the result of applying a permutation pi, chosen uniformly at random out of all
permutations, on the original box. It can be easily verified that P˜AB|XY is indeed
a permutation invariant box.
4In a quantum de Finetti statement a permutation takes a state |φ1〉 ⊗ . . . |φn〉 to |φpi−1(1)〉 ⊗
. . . |φpi−1(n)〉. That is, the quantum states themselves are being permuted.
5Depending on the considered scenario, the application of the permutation may be a purely
theoretical step or needs to be done in practice.
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8.2 de Finetti reductions for correlations
A de Finetti-type theorem is any theorem that relates a permutation invariant
system to a much more structured system called a de Finetti system. In our context,
we consider permutation invariant and de Finetti boxes. A de Finetti box is defined
as follows.
Definition 8.2 (de Finetti box6). A de Finetti box is any box of the form of
a convex combination of IID boxes. That is, it is a box τAB|XY , defined over
Xn,Yn,An,Bn, such that
τAB|XY =
∫
O⊗nAB|XY dOAB|XY ,
where dOAB|XY is some measure on the space of bipartite boxes over A, B, X ,
and Y and O⊗nAB|XY is the IID box defined by OAB|XY , i.e.,
O⊗nAB|XY (a, b|x,y) =
∏
i∈[n]
OAB|XY (ai, bi|xi, yi) .
As seen from the above definition, by choosing different measures dOAB|XY
we define different de Finetti boxes. Depending on the measure, τAB|XY may be
classical, quantum, non-signalling, or even signalling between the two parties. If the
measure dOAB|XY assigns weight only to, e.g., non-signalling boxes OAB|XY , then
the de Finetti box τAB|XY is non-signalling as well. The other direction does not
necessarily hold – there are convex combinations of signalling boxes that result in
over-all non-signalling boxes.
A de Finetti reduction is a de Finetti-type theorem of a specific form: it sets an
inequality relation between any permutation invariant box to a certain de Finetti
box. Specifically, the following theorem is a de Finetti reduction for any permutation
invariant conditional probability distribution [Arnon-Friedman and Renner, 2015].7
Theorem 8.3 (de Finetti reduction for conditional probability distributions).
For any X , Y, A, B, and n there exists a de Finetti box τAB|XY , defined over
Xn,Yn,An,Bn, such that for every permutation invariant box PAB|XY
∀a, b,x,y PAB|XY (a, b|x,y) ≤ (n+ 1)|X ||Y|(|A||B|−1) τAB|XY (a, b|x,y) . (8.2)
To see why Theorem 8.3 is not trivial and what needs to be done to prove it, let
us first consider a “bad choice” of a de Finetti box, τbadAB|XY . Imagine that we choose
our de Finetti box to be the uniform distribution over An × Bn for all x and y.
6As previously mentioned, we focus on the case of two parties. The definition extends to any
number of parties trivially.
7In [Arnon-Friedman and Renner, 2015], a more general version of Theorem 8.3 was proven,
in which further symmetries of PAB|XY (on top of permutation invariance) can be exploited
to construct more structured de Finetti boxes and prove de Finetti reductions with improved
parameters. Theorem 8.3 was then derived as a corollary. To keep things (relatively) concise, we
present in this thesis a direct proof of Theorem 8.3.
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With this chocie, τbadAB|XY (a, b|x,y) = (|A||B|)−n for all a, b, x, and y. Then, the
only inequality relation that holds is
∀a, b,x,y PAB|XY (a, b|x,y) ≤ (|A||B|)n τbadAB|XY (a, b|x,y) ,
i.e., a relation with a pre-factor exponential in n. By choosing a “good” de Finetti
box, we are able to get a pre-factor polynomial in n instead; this is crucial for
applications of de Finetti reductions. In Section 8.3 we show how Theorem 8.3 can
be utilised as a reduction to IID in certain scenarios.8
The proof of the theorem proceeds in two steps. In the first, an explicit de
Finetti box τAB|XY is constructed and a lower-bound on its entries is calculated.
In the second step the permutation invariance of PAB|XY is used to upper-bound
its entries. The theorem follows by combining the two bounds.
In the proofs below we use the following notation.
1. |X ||Y| = l and we identify each pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y with a label j ∈ [l] by
writing (x, y) = j.
2. |A||B| = m and we identify each pair (a, b) ∈ A × B with a label k ∈ [m] by
writing (a, b) = k.
3. For all j ∈ [l] and k ∈ [m], pjk ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
k p
j
k = 1.
4. For all j ∈ [l] and k ∈ [m], cjk = 1−
∑
t<k p
j
t .
5. For all x, y, and j ∈ [l], nj = | {i : (xi, yi) = j} |, i.e., nj denotes the number
of indices of (x,y) in which the type of inputs is (x, y) = j.
6. For all x, y, a, b, j ∈ [l], and k ∈ [m], njk = | {i : (xi, yi) = j ∧ (ai, bi) = k} |,
i.e., njk denotes the number of indices of (x,y,a, b) in which the type of inputs
is (x, y) = j and the type of outputs is (a, b) = k.
Note that by definition:
1. For all j ∈ [l] and k ∈ [m− 1], pjk ∈ [0, cjk] and pjm = cjm.
2. For all j ∈ [l], njm = nj −
∑m−1
k=1 n
j
k.
According to Definition 8.2, a de Finetti box is defined via the choice of mea-
sure dOAB|XY . We think of a bipartite box OAB|XY as a set of probabilities p
j
k,
with the identification OAB|XY (a, b|x, y) = pjk for (x, y) = j and (a, b) = k. Thus,
we can define a measure over OAB|XY by a measure over the probabilities p
j
k. Our
chosen measure is
dOAB|XY =
l∏
j=1
dpj1
cj1
. . .
dpjm−1
cjm−1
,
8A curious reader may already take a glimpse of Theorems 8.11 and 8.15.
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where dpjk is the uniform measure over [0, c
j
k] for c
j
k defined above. The resulting de
Finetti box is given by
τAB|XY (a, b|x,y) =
∫
O⊗nAB|XY dOAB|XY
=
l∏
j=1
[∫ cj1
0
dpj1
cj1
(
pj1
)nj1]
. . .
[∫ cjm−1
0
dpjm−1
cjm−1
(
pjm−1
)njm−1]
· (pjm)nj−∑m−1k=1 njk .
(8.3)
The measure dOAB|XY assigns some weight to all conditional probability dis-
tributions OAB|XY . As a result, the de Finetti box in Equation (8.3) is signalling.
This is discussed in Section 8.4 below.
The following lower-bound on the entries of the above de Finetti box is proven
in Appendix A.1:
Lemma 8.4. For all a, b, x, and y,
τAB|XY (a, b|x,y) ≥
l∏
j=1
(
nj
nj1, . . . , n
j
m
)−1
1
(nj + 1)m−1
,
where τAB|XY is as in Equation (8.3).
Next, we exploit the permutation invariance of PAB|XY to prove the following
upper-bound on it:
Lemma 8.5. For every permutation invariant box PAB|XY , as in Definition 8.1,
and for all a, b, x, and y,
PAB|XY (a, b|x,y) ≤
l∏
j=1
(
nj
nj1, . . . , n
j
m
)−1
.
Proof. To prove the lemma we bound the value of a specific entry PAB|XY (a, b|x,y)
by counting how many entries PAB|XY (a˜, b˜|x,y) must have the same value as
PAB|XY (a, b|x,y) due to permutation invariance. The normalisation of PAB|XY
then implies a bound on the value of the entries.
Denote
N (a, b,x,y) =
∣∣∣ {(a˜, b˜) ∈ A× B : PAB|XY (a˜, b˜|x,y) = PAB|XY (a, b|x,y)} ∣∣∣ .
The permutation invariance of PAB|XY implies that N (a, b,x,y) is lower-bounded
by the number permutations pi for which pi(x) = x, pi(y) = y. To keep pi(x) = x
and pi(y) = y, the relevant permutations pi are only allowed to permute indices
with the same input type (x, y). The number of such permutations is exactly∏l
j=1
(
nj
nj1,...,n
j
m
)
. Thus,
N (a, b,x,y) ≥
l∏
j=1
(
nj
nj1, . . . , n
j
m
)
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and
PAB|XY (ab|xy) ≤ 1N (a, b,x,y) ≤
l∏
j=1
(
nj
nj1, . . . , n
j
m
)−1
.
Proof of Theorem 8.3. Using Lemmas 8.4 and 8.5 one can easily prove Theorem 8.3.
For all a, b, x, and y,
PAB|XY (a, b|x,y)
τAB|XY (a, b|x,y) ≤
∏l
j=1
(
nj
nj1,...,n
j
m
)−1
∏l
j=1
(
nj
nj1,...,n
j
m
)−1
(nj + 1)−(m−1)
≤
l∏
j=1
(nj + 1)m−1
≤ (n+ 1)l(m−1) .
To end this section let us give a last remark regarding Theorem 8.3. Notice the
order of the quantifiers; there exists one de Finetti box for which Equation (8.2)
holds for all permutation invariant box. For the purpose of applications, one could
also imagine a different statement in which for each permutation invariant box a de
Finetti box is constructed (i.e., different permutation invariant boxes may be related
to different de Finetti boxes). Such a statement has the potential of improving the
obtained parameters and simplifying the use of the reduction in applications (see
also [Arnon-Friedman and Renner, 2015] for examples of such statements).
8.3 Ways of using the reductions
The main motivation for considering de Finetti reductions as in Theorem 8.3 is
to allow us to simplify the analysis of device-independent information processing
tasks. However, it is a priori not clear how one can bring an inequality as that in
Equation (8.2) into work. The aim of this section is to exemplify the usage of the
inequality in a mathematical way by considering two types of abstract applications.
Chapter 10 discusses a more concrete application of the reduction to prove a non-
signalling parallel repetition theorem.
To derive the results presented in this section we use an alternative, but equiv-
alent, version of the de Finetti reduction; this is the topic of Section 8.3.1 below.
Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.3 present two ways of using the de Finetti reduction via the
alternative formulation.
8.3.1 Post-selecting permutation invariant boxes
Lemma 8.6. There exists a de Finetti box τAB|XY and a non-signalling extension9
of it (Definition 3.2) to a larger box τABC|XY Z such that for every permutation
9Note that τAB|XY may be signalling, as in our previous statements. The fact that we
are considering non-signalling extensions only means that the marginals τAB|XY and τC|Z of
τABC|XY Z are well defined.
100 8. Reductions to IID: parallel interaction
τABC|XY Z
x,y z
a, b cz
= PAB|XY
x,y
a, b
Figure 8.2: post-selecting a box PAB|XY from an extension of τAB|XY . Conditioned
on the output cz, the resulting box is PAB|XY .
invariant box PAB|XY there exists an input z and an output of this input cz for
which
∀a, b,x,y τABC|XY Z(a, b, cz|x,y, z) = 1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
PAB|XY (a, b|x,y) ,
where l = |X ||Y| and m = |A||B|.
This lemma states that there exists a de Finetti box τAB|XY and a non-signalling
extension of it τABC|XY Z such that any permutation invariant box PAB|XY can be
post-selected from it with probability greater or equal to 1
(n+1)l(m−1) . When we say
that PAB|XY can be post-selected we mean that there exists an input z to τABC|XY Z
and an output cz of this input such that with probability τC|Z(cz|z) ≥ 1(n+1)l(m−1)
the resulting box (the “post-measurement box”, using terminology borrowed from
quantum physics) is PAB|XY (see Figure 8.2). Note that we consider a single
extension τABC|XY Z of the box τAB|XY , and by choosing different inputs z we can
post-select different boxes PAB|XY .
It is easy to see how to derive Lemma 8.6 from Theorem 8.3 by using the formalism
introduced in [Hänggi et al., 2010b, Hänggi and Renner, 2010] of partitions of a
conditional probability distribution. We repeat here the relevant statements.
Definition 8.7. A partition of a box QAB|XY is a family of pairs
{(
qc,Q
c
AB|XY
)}
c
where qc ≥ 0,
∑
c qc = 1, and the boxes Q
c
AB|XY are such that
QAB|XY =
∑
c
qc ·QcAB|XY .
Lemma 8.8 (Lemma 9 in [Hänggi et al., 2010b]). Given a box QAB|XY , there
exists a partition with element
(
qc,Q
c
AB|XY
)
if and only if
∀a, b,x,y qc ·QcAB|XY (a, b|x,y) ≤ QAB|XY (a, b|x,y) .
Lemma 8.9 (Lemma 3.2 in [Hänggi and Renner, 2010]). Given a box QAB|XY , let
Z be the set of all partitions
{(
qcz ,Q
cz
AB|XY
)}
cz
of QAB|XY . Then, there exist
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PAB|XY
x,y
a, bTT (a, b,x,y) ∈ {0, 1}
Figure 8.3: The test T interacts with PAB|XY by supplying it with inputs x,y and
collecting its outputs a, b. The test then decides whether to output 0 or 1 depending
on x, y, a, and b. If the output is 0 then we say that the test failed.
a non-signalling extension QABC|XY Z of QAB|XY , an input z, and an output cz
such that
∀a, b,x,y QABC|XY Z(a, b, cz|x,y, z) = qcz ·QczAB|XY (a, b|x,y) .
Using the lemmas above and Theorem 8.3 we can now prove Lemma 8.6.
Proof of Lemma 8.6. The above lemmas together with Theorem 8.3 imply that for
any permutation invariant box PAB|XY ,
(
1
(n+1)l(m−1) ,PAB|XY
)
is an element of a
partition of τAB|XY . Moreover, there exists a box τABC|XY Z and an input z such
that with probability 1
(n+1)l(m−1) the resulting box is PAB|XY :
∀a, b,x,y τABC|XY Z(a, b, cz|x,y, z) = 1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
PAB|XY .
Lemma 8.6 is used in the following sections to illustrate two ways in which de
Finetti reductions can be used in applications.
8.3.2 Failure probability of a test
We start by considering the following abstract application. Let T be a test which
interacts with a box PAB|XY and outputs “success” or “fail” with some probabilities.
One can think about this test, which can be chosen according to the application
being considered, as a way to quantify the success probability of a protocol when
the box PAB|XY is given as input. For example, if one considers an estimation, or
a tomography, protocol a test can be chosen to output “success” when the estimated
box is close to the actual box [Christandl et al., 2009]. Another type of test will be
considered explicitly in Section 10.2.
A test T interacts with PAB|XY by supplying it with inputs x,y, according to
some probability distribution PrT (x,y) over Xn×Yn, and collecting its outputs a, b.
This is illustrated in Figure 8.3. The test then decides whether to output 0 or 1
depending on x, y, a, and b. Given a test T , we denote by Prfail(PAB|XY ) the
failure probability of the test, i.e., the probability that T outputs 0 after interacting
with PAB|XY :
Prfail(PAB|XY ) =
∑
x,y
PrT (x,y)
∑
a,b:T (a,b,x,y)=0
PAB|XY (a, b|x,y) .
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The event of failing the test can therefore be defined as an event over Xn × Yn ×
An × Bn.
We consider permutation invariant tests, defined as follows.
Definition 8.10. A test T is permutation invariant if and only if for all boxes
PAB|XY and all permutations pi we have
Prfail(PAB|XY ) = Prfail(PAB|XY ◦ pi) .
Using the de Finetti reduction in Theorem 8.3 we can prove upper bounds of the
following type:
Theorem 8.11. Let T be a permutation invariant test. Then for every box PAB|XY
Prfail(PAB|XY ) ≤ (n+ 1)l(m−1)Prfail(τAB|XY ) ,
where τAB|XY is the de Finetti box given in Equation (8.3).
The importance of de Finetti reductions is already obvious from Theorem 8.11 —
if one wishes to prove an upper bound on the failure probability of the test T ,
then instead of proving it for all boxes PAB|XY , it is sufficient to prove it for the
de Finetti box τAB|XY and “pay” for it with the additional polynomial pre-factor
of (n+ 1)l(m−1). Since the de Finetti box can be written as a convex combination
of IID boxes, this can highly simplify the calculations of the bound. In this sense
the de Finetti reduction acts as a reduction to IID.
In many cases one finds that the bound on Prfail(τAB|XY ) is exponentially
small in n. For an estimation protocol, the failure probability of the test, when
interacting with an IID box, can be shown to be exponentially small in the number
of boxes n used for the estimation, using Chernoff bounds. This is also the case
when dealing with security proofs – the failure probability of a protocol, when a de
Finetti box is given as input, is usually exponentially small in the number of boxes n
used in the protocol. If this is indeed the case then the polynomial pre-factor of
(n+ 1)l(m−1) becomes irrelevant in the asymptotic limit of large n. In other words,
an exponentially small bound on Prfail(τAB|XY ) implies an exponentially small
bound on Prfail(PAB|XY ).
Let us prove Theorem 8.11 using the de Finetti reduction given as Theorem 8.3.
Proof of Theorem 8.11. We follow here a similar proof given in [Renner, 2010] for
the quantum post-selection theorem [Christandl et al., 2009]. First, since the test
T is permutation invariant it is sufficient to consider only permutation invariant
boxes. To see this recall that for any box PAB|XY and permutation pi we have
Prfail(PAB|XY ) = Prfail(PAB|XY ◦ pi) according to Definition 8.10. Therefore we
also have by linearity10
Prfail(PAB|XY ) =
1
n!
∑
pi
Prfail(PAB|XY ◦ pi) = Prfail
(
1
n!
∑
pi
PAB|XY ◦ pi
)
.
10Linearity refers here to the linearity of the test in the box PAB|XY , which follows from the
fact that the test interacts only once with PAB|XY (or, in other words, the test gets only a single
copy of the box).
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The box 1n!
∑
pi PAB|XY ◦ pi is permutation invariant and therefore we can consider
only permutation invariant boxes without loss of generality.
Next we define the following probabilities. Let Prfail∧cz(τABC|XY Z) be the
probability that the second part of the box, τC|Z , is used with the input z and the
output is cz and that the first part of the box, τAB|XY , fails the test T at the same
time. That is,
Prfail∧cz (τABC|XY Z) = Prfail(τAB|XY ) · τC|Z(cz|z) .
In a similar way we define Prfail|cz (τABC|XY Z) to be the probability that τAB|XY
fails the test T given that cz is the output of τC|Z when used with the input z. We
have
Prfail|cz (τABC|XY Z) =
Prfail∧cz (τABC|XY Z)
τC|Z(cz|z) ≤
Prfail(τAB|XY )
τC|Z(cz|z)
since Prfail∧cz (τABC|XY Z) ≤ Prfail(τAB|XY ) always holds.
Lemma 8.6 implies that τC|Z(cz|z) ≥ 1(n+1)l(m−1) and that Prfail|cz (τABC|XY Z) =
Prfail(PAB|XY ) (given that the output was cz, the resulting box is PAB|XY ). All
together we get Prfail(PAB|XY ) ≤ (n+ 1)l(m−1)Prfail(τAB|XY ) as required.
8.3.3 Diamond norm
Theorem 8.3 allows for a simple treatment of cases that can be analysed using the
notation of a test. In some information processing tasks this is not possible and
different ways of utilising the reductions are needed. In this section we consider the
task of distinguishing two channels acting on boxes. The channels can describe, for
example, a cryptographic protocol.11
When considering quantum protocols the distinguishing advantage is given by
the diamond norm [Kitaev, 1997]. The distance between two channels E and F
which act on quantum states ρAB is given by ‖E −F‖ = max
ρABC
‖ (E − F)⊗ I ρABC‖1
where ρABC is a purification of ρAB and ‖ · ‖1 is the trace distance. Informally, the
idea is that in order to distinguish two channels we are not only allowed to choose
the input state to the channels, ρAB , but also keep to ourselves a purifying state ρC .
Although the definition of the diamond norm includes a maximisation
over all states ρABC it was proven, using the quantum post-selection theo-
rem [Christandl et al., 2009], that when considering permutation invariant channels
it is sufficient to calculate the distance for a specific quantum de Finetti state.
Motivated by this, we give a similar bound on a distance analogous to the diamond
norm for channels which act on boxes (instead of quantum states).
In the following, we denote by P the set of all boxes PAB|XY and by K the set
of all probability distributions PK over {0, 1}t for some t ∈ N. We consider channels
of the form E : P → K which interact with boxes PAB|XY and output a classical bit
11Let us briefly explain why the notation of a test considered in Section 8.3.1 is not appropriate
in the cryptographic setting. When considering tests, we were interested in events defined over
Xn ×Yn ×An ×Bn. Whether an output of a protocol (a key, for example) is secure to use cannot
be defined as an event. Security depends on the process of producing the key rather on the specific
data that was produced during the run of the protocol.
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PABC|XBZ
x,y
a, b
z c
E
k = E(a, b,x,y)
Figure 8.4: The channel E ⊗ I acts on an extension PABC|XBZ of PAB|XY and
outputs a classical string k ∈ {0, 1}t according to the probability EK(k).
string k ∈ {0, 1}t of some length t ≥ 0 with some probability PK(k). The connection
between the channel and the box is illustrated in Figure 8.4.12
The probability distribution of the output depends on the channel E itself and is
given by the following definition.
Definition 8.12. The probability that a channel E outputs a string k ∈ {0, 1}t
when interacting with PAB|XY is
EK(k) =
∑
x,y
PrE(x,y)
∑
a,b:
E(a,b,x,y)=k
PAB|XY (a, b|x,y)
where PrE(x) is the probability that E inputs x,y to PAB|XY and E(a, b,x,y) is the
function according to which the output of the channel is determined. Analogously,
EK|C(k|c) =
∑
x,y
PrE(x,y)
∑
a,b:
E(a,b,x,y)=k
PAB|XY C(a, b|x,y, c) .
Definition 8.13. The distance between two channels E ,F : P → K according to
the diamond norm is
‖E − F‖ = max
PABC|XY Z
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(PABC|XY Z)‖1 ,
where the maximisation is over all boxes PAB|XY and all possible extensions of
them and
E ⊗ I(PABC|XY Z) = E ⊗ I(PAB|XY C · PC|Z)
= EK|C · PC|Z .
F ⊗ I(PABC|XY Z) is defined in a similar way.
Similarly to the concept of a permutation invariant test presented in Defini-
tion 8.10, we define a permutation invariant channel:
12Figure 8.4 is almost identical to Figure 8.3, describing a test. The difference between the two
scenarios lies in the quantity that we wish to bound; see the previous footnote.
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Definition 8.14. A channel E is permutation invariant if for all boxes PAB|XY
and all permutations pi we have
E(PAB|XY ) = E(PAB|XY ◦ pi) .
Using the de Finetti reduction, Theorem 8.3, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 8.15. For any two permutation invariant channels E ,F : P → K
‖E − F‖ ≤ (n+ 1)l(m−1) max
τABC|XY Z
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(τABC|XY Z)‖1 (8.4)
where τABC|XY Z is a non-signalling extension of the de Finetti box τAB|XY where
given in Equation (8.3).
Theorem 8.15 tells us that when looking to bound the diamond norm for permu-
tation invariant channels, one does not need to optimise over all possible boxes (as
in Definition 8.13) but can consider only extensions of de Finetti boxes13 without
loss of generality. This gives us another example as to why a de Finetti reduction
is a reduction to IID technique. As in the case of Theorem 8.11 if one is able
to find an exponentially small upper bound on ‖ (E − F) ⊗ I(τABC|XY Z)‖1, an
exponentially small upper bound on ‖E − F‖ follows. That is, the polynomial
pre-factor (n+ 1)l(m−1) does not affect the asymptotic behaviour.
The proof of Theorem 8.15 builds on the following lemma.
Lemma 8.16. For every two permutation invariant channels E ,F : P → K where
PK is a probability distribution over k ∈ {0, 1}t for some t > 0, and all PABC|XY Z ,
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(PABC|XY Z)‖1 ≤ (n+ 1)l(m−1)‖ (E − F)⊗ I(τPABC|XY ZABC|XY Z )‖1
where τPABC|XY ZABC|XY Z is a non-signalling extension of τAB|XY which depends on the
specific box PABC|XY Z .
The proof of the lemma follows by using Lemma 8.6 in order to construct a
specific convex decomposition of τAB|XY from a convex decomposition of PAB|XY .
A detailed proof is given in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 8.15 now easily follows from Lemma 8.16:
Proof of Theorem 8.15. Using Lemma 8.16,
‖E − F‖ = max
PABC|XY Z
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(PABC|XY Z)‖1
≤ (n+ 1)l(m−1) max
τ
PABC|XY Z
ABC′|XY Z
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(τPABC|XY ZABC′|XY Z)‖1
≤ (n+ 1)l(m−1) max
τABC|XY Z
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(τABC|XY Z)‖1
where τABC|XY Z is a non-signalling extension of τAB|XY .
13Note, however, that the extension τABC|XY Z itself cannot be written as a convex combination
of IID boxes, only its marginal τAB|XY is a de Finetti box. Furthermore, τAB|XY may be signalling
in general, as before.
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8.4 Impossibility results
Before concluding this chapter, let us discuss the directions in which one could hope
to further develop the technique of device-independent de Finetti reductions. We do
so by presenting several impossibility results with regards to different variants of
Theorem 8.3.
Restricted de Finetti box
First, as explained in the above sections, our de Finetti box, given in Equation (8.3),
is a signalling box. Clearly, this raises some difficulties when coming to use the
different theorems presented in this chapter.14 Ideally, we would have wished to
have a de Finetti reduction in which the de Finetti box τAB|XY can be quantum or
non-signalling when starting with a quantum or non-signalling box PAB|XY . That
is, we wish to find reductions of the form (with some c polynomial15 in n):
PquantAB|XY ≤ c · τquantAB|XY ; PnsAB|XY ≤ c · τnsAB|XY , (8.5)
where PquantAB|XY and τ
quant
AB|XY are quantum boxes and, similarly, P
ns
AB|XY
and τnsAB|XY are non-signalling boxes.
Sadly, such reductions cannot be true when considering general permutation
invariant boxes PquantAB|XY and P
ns
AB|XY . One way to see that this is the case is
by considering the task of parallel repetition of games (which acts as one of our
showcases; see Section 4.1). Reductions as those in Equation (8.5) will imply very
strong parallel repetition results. Indeed, if, e.g., PquantAB|XY ≤ c · τquantAB|XY holds for
any permutation invariant quantum box PquantAB|XY , then it follows that, for any game,
w
(
PquantAB|XY
)
≤ c · w
(
τquantAB|XY
)
= poly(n) · ωn , (8.6)
where w (◦) is the winning probability of the considered box in the repeated game, ω
is the winning probability of the optimal quantum strategy in a single game, and
poly(n) is some polynomial of n, possibly depending on the alphabet of the RVs A,
B, X, and Y . However, there are examples of games (in the classical, quantum, and
non-signalling case) for which a strong decrease in the winning probability with the
number of games played n, as in Equation (8.6), does not hold; recall Section 4.1.
Thus, reductions as in Equation (8.5) cannot be true.
Knowing that Equation (8.5) is not more than a wishful thinking, one could hope
for the next best thing, i.e., an approximate version of the reduction. Concretely,
we are interested in reductions of the form
PquantAB|XY ≤ c · τapprox-quantAB|XY ; PnsAB|XY ≤ c · τapprox-nsAB|XY , (8.7)
where τapprox-quantAB|XY is an approximately-quantum de Finetti box and τ
approx-ns
AB|XY is an
approximately-non-signalling one. By approximately-quantum (and analogously for
14Though this does not make them useless; see Chapter 10.
15Weaker statements, e.g., with a pre-factor sub-exponential in n, may also be of interest in
certain applications.
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the non-signalling case) we mean that the de Finetti box can be written as
τapprox-quantAB|XY =
∫ (
OquantAB|XY
)⊗n
dOquantAB|XY +
∫ (
Onon-quantAB|XY
)⊗n
dOnon-quantAB|XY ,
where dOquantAB|XY and dO
non-quant
AB|XY are measures over quantum and non-quantum
single-round boxes, respectively, and
∫
dOnon-quantAB|XY is, say, exponentially small in n
and/or assigns weight only to boxes Onon-quantAB|XY which are close to quantum boxes,
under some distance measure.16
Parallel repetition results can, again, be used to show that such reductions
cannot hold in general, at least in the non-signalling case. Here the reason lies in the
observation that the reductions in Equation (8.7) are independent of the choice of
distribution over the inputs Xn and Yn (while they may depend on the alphabet of the
inputs). Thus, they would imply general parallel repetition results which hold for any
distribution over the inputs to the parallel boxes. As there are games for which such
non-signalling parallel repetition results do not hold [Holmgren and Yang, 2017], at
best PnsAB|XY ≤ c · τapprox-nsAB|XY cannot be true in general.
By this we learn that we ought to consider reductions that also include the input
distribution PXY :
PXY P
quant
AB|XY ≤ c · PXY τapprox-quantAB|XY , (8.8)
PXY P
ns
AB|XY ≤ c · PXY τapprox-nsAB|XY . (8.9)
The case of PXY = Q⊗nXY is of special interest. For such distributions, two results are
known. In Section 10.2 we prove a result in the flavour of Equation (8.9) using the de
Finetti reduction given as Theorem 8.3. The result, which originally appeared as part
of [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b], is stated informally as Theorem 10.2. Roughly
speaking, it says that observed data that is sampled using a permutation invariant
non-signalling parallel box looks as if it was sampled using an approximately
non-signalling IID box.
In [Lancien and Winter, 2016] a reduction similar to that of Equation (8.9) was
proven by combining the de Finetti reduction in Theorem 8.3 together with another
de Finetti-type theorem, presented in [Lancien and Winter, 2017]. Their theorem
can be written as follows:17
Theorem 8.17 (Theorem 4.3 in [Lancien and Winter, 2016]). For any non-
signalling permutation invariant parallel box PAB|XY and distribution QXY
Q⊗nXY PAB|XY ≤
∫
F˜ (OABXY )
2n
O⊗nABXY dOABXY , (8.10)
where
F˜ (OABXY ) = min
{
max
RA|X
F
(
QXY RA|X ,OAXY
)
, max
RB|Y
F
(
QXY RB|Y ,OBXY
)}
16The hope here is that by adding the additional weight on non-quantum or signalling boxes
one could account for the “gap” between Equation (8.6) and the known parallel repetition results.
17We present only the bipartite case; [Lancien and Winter, 2016, Theorem 4.3] is stated for an
arbitrary number of parties.
108 8. Reductions to IID: parallel interaction
for F the fidelity.
To see that Equation (8.10) is in the spirit of Equation (8.9) note that F˜ (OABXY )
is some measure of how far OABXY is from QXY O˜AB|XY for a non-signalling
box O˜AB|XY . Recall that the fidelity is small when the distributions are far from one
another; thus, F˜ (OABXY )
2n assures that only negligible weight is assigned to distri-
butions OABXY originating from highly signalling boxes (or with marginals OXY
far from QXY ).
We conjecture that reductions similar to Equation (8.8), relevant for quantum
boxes, should also hold. Yet, up to date there are no proofs in this direction (the
difficulty in deriving such a statement is discussed in Chapter 10).
Extension to an adversary
Another direction in which one may wish to extend our de Finetti reductions
is relevant for device-independent cryptographic protocols. To explain what we
aim for, let us first discuss the quantum variant of Theorem 8.15, also called the
post-selection technique, developed in [Christandl et al., 2009].18 The post-selection
theorem implies that for any two permutation invariant quantum channels, E and
F , acting on quantum states ρQAQB ∈ S(H ⊗nQAQB ) for some bipartite Hilbert space
HQAQB of dimension d,
‖E − F‖ ≤ (n+ 1)d2−1‖ (E − F)⊗ I(τQAQBE)‖1 (8.11)
where τQAQBE is a purification of a given de Finetti state. Equation (8.11) should
be compared to Equation (8.4); while Equation (8.4) includes a maximisation over
all possible non-signalling extensions of the de Finetti box, in Equation (8.11) we
consider only a single purification. The reason is simple – in the quantum case
all purifications of a state are equivalent up to local unitaries. Furthermore (and
crucially for applications), there exists a purification of a de Finetti state that has a
very special form. To purify
τQAQB =
∫
(σQAQB )
⊗n
dσQAQB
we can first purify the states σQAQB to get
τQAQBE′ =
∫
(σQAQBE′)
⊗n
dσQAQBE′
and then purify the state τQAQBE′ using an additional system E′′ to account for
the convex combination of the pure states (σQAQBE′)
⊗n. This defines us the pure
state τQAQBE′E′′ . Denoting E = E′E′′ we get our pure τQAQBE .
18[Christandl et al., 2009] presented the first de Finetti reduction, i.e., an inequality relation
between permutation invariant systems and de Finetti systems (all previous de Finetti-type theorems
gave other types of relations between the two systems). The term “de Finetti reduction” was not
used at that time and the authors chose the name “post-selection technique” as they first proved
the quantum analogue of Lemma 8.6.
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In the cryptographic setting the quantum register E is considered to belong to
the adversary. Hence, any information about the structure of the system kept in
it could be useful when analysing security. Equation (8.11) in combination with
the observation regarding the structure of the purification, τQAQBE′E′′ , we learn
that the main task when proving security is to analyse the IID case, as in Chapter 7
(see [Christandl et al., 2009, Renner, 2010] for the detailed explanation). That is,
the quantum de Finetti reduction can be used as a reduction to IID in quantum
cryptography.
In contrast, in general, it is impossible to prove a modified version of Theo-
rem 8.15 in which the extension τABC|XY Z of our de Finetti box τAB|XY will be
as structured as the quantum state τQAQBE . In particular, even if we can start
with a de Finetti reduction where both PAB|XY and τAB|XY are non-signalling,19
it is impossible to derive a theorem which would imply that the analysis of device-
independent cryptography in the presence of a non-signalling adversary can be
reduced to the analysis under the IID assumption. This is due to the impossibility re-
sult of [Arnon-Friedman and Ta-Shma, 2012], which asserts that, while exponential
privacy amplification in the presence of a non-signalling adversary is possible under
the IID assumption [Hänggi et al., 2009], it is impossible when the IID assumption
is dropped.
Other de Finetti-type theorems
A final remark is with regards to the more common type of de Finetti theorem,
in which one bounds the trace distance between an n-exchangeable system and
a de Finetti one. More specifically, let us first consider the classical case, i.e.,
a system is a probability distribution. PA1,...,Ak is permutation invariant if it is
invariant under any permutation of A1, . . . , Ak (as before). We say that PA1,...,Ak
is n-exchangeable, for n ≥ k, if it is a marginal of some permutation invariant
PA1,...,An . In [Diaconis and Freedman, 1980b] a bound on the distance between an
n-exchangeable probability distribution and a de Finetti distribution was proven.20
Results of this type were also proven for quantum states [König and Renner, 2005,
Christandl et al., 2007] and non-signalling boxes [Christandl and Toner, 2009].
Let us focus on the non-signalling case [Christandl and Toner, 2009]. There, a
conditional probability distribution PA1,...,An|X1,...,Xn is said to be non-signalling
if the box cannot be used to signal from any subset of parties I ⊂ [n] to the
rest of the parties [n] \ I. Permutation invariance is defined with respect to
permutations pi : [n] → [n]. Similarly to the classical case described above,
PA1,...,Ak|X1,...,Xk is n-exchangeable, for n ≥ k, when it is the marginal of a permu-
tation invariant non-signalling box PA1,...,An|X1,...,Xn . We then have the following
bound [Christandl and Toner, 2009, Theorem 3] (using the above notation):
Theorem 8.18 ([Christandl and Toner, 2009]). For any permutation invariant
non-signalling box PA1,...,An|X1,...,Xn and any k < n there exists a de Finetti
19In the presence of certain types of symmetries (in addition to permutation invariance) one can
derive such de Finetti reductions; see [Arnon-Friedman and Renner, 2015].
20In this language, the original result of de Finetti [de Finetti, 1969] stated that all infinitely-
exchangeable distributions (i.e., distributions that are n-exchangeable for any n ≥ k) are equal to
distributions of the form of a convex combination of IID distributions.
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box τA1,...,Ak|X1,...,Xk such that
∣∣PA1,...,Ak|X1,...,Xk − τA1,...,Ak|X1,...,Xk ∣∣ ≤ min{2k|X ||A||X |n , k(k − 1)|X |n
}
.
The crucial thing to note here is that the boxes PA1,...,Ak|X1,...,Xk and
PA1,...,An|X1,...,Xn are a very special type of parallel boxes: the non-signalling con-
ditions must hold for any division of the indices in [n]. This implies that the for
any i, j ∈ [n], Ai is independent of the inputs Xj for j 6= i. Theorems such as Theo-
rem 8.18 cannot be proven for general parallel boxes since they study exchangeable
boxes, which inherently require the ability to consider the marginals of the boxes.
Chapter 9
Reductions to IID: sequential
interaction
Many device-independent protocols proceed in rounds and, hence, require devices
with which the honest parties can interact sequentially, i.e., one round after the
other. A particular example for such protocols is our showcase dealing with device-
independent quantum cryptography. When analysing the showcase under the IID
assumption (Section 7.3.2), we observed that the quantum AEP, given as Theorem 7.3,
plays a crucial role in the proof of soundness. Specifically, the quantum AEP allowed
us to bound the total amount of the relevant smooth entropy using a bound on the
von Neumann entropy calculated for a single round of the protocol.
The focus of this chapter is the so called “entropy accumulation theorem”
(EAT) [Dupuis et al., 2016, Dupuis and Fawzi, 2018]. The EAT is a generalisation
of the AEP to a scenario in which, instead of the raw data being produced by an
IID process, it is produced by certain sequential quantum processes of interest.1 In
particular, similarly to the AEP, the EAT allows one to bound the total amount of
the considered smooth entropy using the same bound on the von Neumann entropy
calculated for the IID analysis. In this sense, the EAT can be seen as a reduction to
IID — with the aid of the EAT the analysis done under the IID assumption using
the AEP is directly extended to the one relevant for multi-round sequential boxes.
Below, we motivate, present, and explain the EAT in the form relevant for
device-independent quantum information processing [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2018].
The EAT is later used in the analysis of our showcase in Chapter 11. For the
most general statement of the EAT and its proof the interested reader is referred
to [Dupuis et al., 2016, Dupuis and Fawzi, 2018].
1We remark that the EAT, as the quantum AEP, is only relevant when assuming that everything
can be described within the quantum formalism. In particular, it cannot be used when talking
about, e.g., cryptographic protocols in the presence of a non-signalling (super-quantum) adversary.
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Figure 9.1: Sequential quantum process. The initial state ρinR0E is transformed to
the final one ρOSCE by applying a sequence of maps on the marginal ρinR0 . Each
mapMi in the sequence outputs the registers Oi and Si, from which Ci is created.
The “memory system” Ri is being passed to the next map as input.
9.1 Sequential quantum processes
We are interested in multi-round quantum sequential boxes (with communication
between the rounds; see Definition 6.6) fulfilling certain conditions. The simplest way
of describing the relevant conditions is by looking at the sequential quantum process
defining the boxes, i.e., the process that results in the input-output distribution of
the boxes.
Consider a sequential process as illustrated in Figure 9.1. We start with some
initial state ρinR0E ; the distinction between R0 and E is such that R0 is the part
of the state which may change during the considered process while E denotes
the “environment” register, i.e., the part of the state not being modified. The
marginal ρinR0 undergoes a sequence of operations in which a sequence of (non-IID)
registers O = O1, . . . , On and S = S1, . . . , Sn are being created. We treat the
registers O as the “output registers” while S are the “side-information registers”.
Our ultimate objective is to bound the conditional smooth entropies Hεmin(O|SE)
and Hεmax(O|SE).
To be able to bound the above entropies, some statistical data must be collected
during the protocol. Specifically, we consider additional classical registers C =
C1, . . . , C2 holding the information relevant for the estimation phase performed in
the protocol. For every round i ∈ [n], Ci is derived by performing some action on
the registers Oi and Si. For example, the value of Ci can be the result of applying a
function on some classical information included in Oi and Si.
To gain a bit of intuition regarding all the different registers, let us quickly consider
the cryptographic setting (a more precise discussion can be found in Chapter 11).
When analysing cryptographic protocols one may make the following choices: E
acts as the register belonging to the adversary, O as the raw data which is supposed
to be secret, S as the side-information leaked during the protocol (e.g., all classical
information which is communicated between Alice and Bob), and C – the indicators
of whether the test rounds were successful or not (e.g., Ci = 1 when the i’th game
was won). The goal is then to lower bound Hεmin(O|SE) and this should be done
by using the statistics kept in C.
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The sequential process itself is formally defined by a sequence of quantum
channels, namely, CPTP maps (Definition 2.14),
Mi : Ri−1 → RiOiSiCi , (9.1)
for all i ∈ [n]. As seen from Equation (9.1), when we say that a process is sequential
we not only mean that the maps act one after the other, but also that, in each
round i ∈ [n], the output Oi, the side information Si, and the estimation data Ci are
being created by the mapMi applied in that round. That is, O denotes a sequence
of registers created one after the other and similarly for S and C.2 The state of
interest in the end of the process is given by3
ρOSCE = (TrRn ◦Mn ◦ · · · ◦M1)⊗ IE ρinR0E . (9.2)
We remark that in the device-independent setting the initial state ρinR0E , the
maps {Mi}i∈[n], and the final state ρOSCE are unknown; we merely require that
some quantum states and maps {Mi}i∈[n], describing the overall process, exist. In
particular, this implies that we do not restrict the content of the registers {Ri}i∈[n]
and, thus, they may include information which is being passed from previous rounds
to the next ones. That is, we can think of these registers as holding some quantum
memory. This is in stark contrast to what happens when working under the IID
assumption.
9.2 Entropy accumulation theorem
As mentioned above, the EAT [Dupuis et al., 2016] acts as a generalisation of the
quantum AEP to scenarios in which certain sequential processes are considered,
rather than IID ones. The EAT, as the name suggests, quantifies the amount of
entropy accumulated during the considered quantum processes. Moreover, as in the
case of the AEP, the total amount of smooth entropies can be bounded by calculating
certain von Neumann entropies (the precise statements are given below). By this,
the EAT justifies the use of the von Neumann entropy in quantum information
processing even outside of the IID regime. While we discuss the EAT in the context
of device-independent quantum information processing, we remark that the EAT is
a general information-theoretic tool, which can also be applied in other contexts.
9.2.1 Conceptual difficulties to overcome
Before stating the theorem itself, let us explain the conceptual difficulties that arise
when seeking for an “AEP-style” theorem in non-IID scenarios. Specifically, we
2The reader may be concerned by the distinction between, e.g., O1 and O2 – clearly, we can
also consider a situation in which M1 does not output O1 but transfers it to M2 that later
outputs O1O2. We will soon assume that the different registers fulfil certain conditions and then
the distinction will become clear.
3We will be interested below in bounding the smooth entropies evaluated on a state closely
related to the final state ρOSCE , namely, the final state conditioned on the event of not aborting
the considered protocol; see Section 9.2.3.
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would like to understand what is the form of the theorem we are aiming for and
what is non-trivial about it. To keep this section concise we focus on the smooth
min-entropy; the same statements are relevant for the smooth max-entropy as well.
Our goal is to have a theorem resembling the quantum AEP appearing as
Theorem 7.3. That is, we look for a statement of the form
Hεmin(O|SE) ≥ nt− µ
√
n . (9.3)
for some t and µ (independent of n but otherwise unrestricted).
The EAT aims at providing a lower-bound on Hεmin(O|SE) which scales linearly
with the number of rounds n (to first order in n, i.e., up to finite statistic effects, as in
the AEP). As O = O1, . . . , On and S = S1, . . . , Sn are being created in a sequential
manner, we intuitively wish to say that in each round i ∈ [n] we accumulate an
additional constant amount of entropy due to the production of Oi (while taking
into account Si and E) until, in the end of the process, the total amount of entropy
is linear in n. Consider, however, a sequential process in which S1, . . . , Sn−1 are
all empty (i.e., do not reveal any information about the outputs) while the side-
information Sn produced by the last mapMn includes all of the outputs O1, . . . , On.
Clearly, even though we may have accumulated entropy in the rounds i ∈ [n− 1], all
of it is lost after Sn is leaked in the last round n. This implies that we can only hope
to prove a statement like the one given in Equation (9.3) under some restrictions on
the considered sequential processes.
A more fundamental difficulty to overcome is the following. In the case of the
AEP, i.e., when considering IID processes, or boxes, it is clear what t, appearing in
Equation (9.3), is – it is a quantity describing the single-round box defining the IID
box. (And, as it turns out, this quantity is the relevant conditional von Neumann
entropy evaluated on a single-round box; recall Section 7.2.2).
Moving to the sequential processes, or multi-round boxes, it is not obvious at all
which quantity t should describe. We would like to find a quantity related to some
“single-round property”, but how can we even define such a thing in a meaningful
way? Since the behaviour of the box in each round may depend on everything
that happened in previous rounds (see Definition 6.6), we cannot directly define a
multi-round box in terms of single-round ones. To put it differently, when holding a
multi-round device, there is no physical system that we can point to and treat as an
isolated subsystem. Thus, t cannot refer to such a system as in the IID case.
Keeping in mind the conceptual difficulties that one needs to overcome when
phrasing the theorem, we are now ready to discuss the EAT on a more concrete level.
In particular, the following section unveils the resolutions of the issues presented
above.
9.2.2 Prerequisites of the theorem
Before presenting the EAT, we need to define two objects to which the theorem
refers – EAT channels and tradeoff functions. The “correct” definition of these
objects is what allows us to overcome the conceptual difficulties discussed above.
Furthermore, when coming to use the EAT, the choice, or construction, of these
objects is what allows one to derive a strong bound on the considered entropy. Thus,
understanding the prerequisites of the theorem is of great importance.
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EAT channels
As mentioned in the previous section, entropy does not accumulate in any general
sequential process. Therefore, we must restrict our attention to processes which fulfil
certain conditions. Specifically, we work with processes defined via the following
type of maps, called “EAT channels”:
Definition 9.1 (EAT channels). Quantum channels {Mi : Ri−1 → RiOiSiCi}i∈[n]
are said to be EAT channels if the following requirements hold:
1. {Oi}i∈[n] are finite dimensional quantum systems of dimension dO and {Ci}i∈[n]
are finite-dimensional classical systems (RV). {Si}i∈[n] and {Ri}i∈[n] are arbi-
trary quantum systems.
2. For any i ∈ [n] and any input state σRi−1 , the output state σRiOiSi =
Mi
(
σRi−1
)
has the property that the classical value Ci can be measured
from the marginal σOiSi without changing the state. That is, for the map
Ti : OiSi → OiSiCi describing the process of deriving Ci from Oi and Si, it
holds that TrCi ◦ Ti (σOiSi) = σOiSi .
3. For any initial state ρinR0E , the final state ρOSCE = (TrRn ◦Mn ◦ · · · ◦M1)⊗
IE ρinR0E fulfils the Markov-chain conditions (Defintion 2.21)
O1, . . . , Oi−1 ↔ S1, . . . , Si−1, E ↔ Si (9.4)
for all i ∈ [n].
In words, Equation (9.4) states that in each round, the previous outcomes
O1, . . . , Oi−1 are independent of the future side-information Si given all the past
side information S1, . . . , Si−1, E. That is, the side-information of any given round
does not reveal new information about previous outcomes. When coming to use
the EAT, one is free to choose the different systems as one wishes. By choosing Oi
and Si properly the required Markov chain condition can be satisfied by sequential
protocols such as device-independent quantum key distribution, as will be shown in
Chapter 11.4
Equation (9.4) acts as the additional constraint on the sequential process which
allows us to avoid processes in which entropy does not accumulate.5 We remark
that the above requirements, and Equation (9.4) in particular, give sufficient, but
perhaps not necessary, conditions for the entropy to accumulate. That is, there
might be sets of weaker or incomparable conditions that can also be used to show
that entropy accumulates.
4In some cases the obvious choices for Oi and Si are such that Equation (9.4) does not hold. Still,
sometimes, one can overcome the problem by considering related protocols in which the Markov-
chain conditions are “enforced”. This is done, for example, in [Arnon-Friedman and Bancal, 2017].
5One can easily verify that the problematic process described in Section 9.2.1 does not fulfil
the Markov-chain conditions.
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Figure 9.2: A single step in the sequential process. The initial state is σRi−1R′ ; σRi−1
is the input of the map Mi while R′ acts as the environment register and is not
affected by the map (similarly to E in Figure 9.1). The map produces the registers
Oi and Si, from which Ci can be inferred.
Tradeoff functions
As explained in Section 9.2.1, since we cannot directly define a multi-round box
in terms of single-round ones, it is not clear what quantity should replace t in
Equation (9.3). The tradeoff functions, defined below, give an adequate way to
quantify the amount of entropy which is accumulated in a single step of the process,
i.e., in an application of just one channel, and by this allow us to define t in a
meaningful way. We first present the formal definition of the functions and then
explain.
Definition 9.2 (Tradeoff functions). Let {Mi}i∈[n] be a family of EAT channels
and C denote the common alphabet of C1, . . . , Cn. A differentiable and convex
function fmin from the set of probability distributions p over C to the real numbers
is called a min-tradeoff function for {Mi}i∈[n] if it satisfies6
fmin(p) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :Mi(σ)Ci=p
H (Oi|SiR′)Mi(σ) (9.5)
for all i ∈ [n], where the infimum is taken over all purifications of input states ofMi
for which the marginal on Ci of the output state is the probability distribution p.
Similarly, a differentiable and concave function fmax from the set of probability
distributions p over C to the real numbers is called a max-tradeoff function for {Mi}
if it satisfies
fmax(p) ≥ sup
σRi−1R′ :Mi(σ)Ci=p
H (Oi|SiR′)Mi(σ) (9.6)
for all i ∈ [n], where the supremum is taken over all purifications of input states of
Mi for which the marginal on Ci of the output state is the probability distribution p.
Figure 9.2 illustrates the considered scenario – a single step in the sequential
process (compare to Figure 9.1). For any possible input state σRi−1 ∈ S(HRi−1) of
6The infimum and supremum over the empty set are defined as plus and minus infinity,
respectively.
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the mapMi, we denote by σRi−1R′ ∈ S(HRi−1 ⊗HR′) its purification. Note that
the register R′ is not being affected by the map (similarly to E in Figure 9.1). Oi and
Si denote the output and side-information registers of the output stateMi(σ). Ci
can be inferred from Oi and Si as before.
To comprehend these so called tradeoff functions, let us first discuss the set over
which we perform the optimisations in Equations (9.5) and (9.6):
Σ(p) =
{
σRi−1R′ :Mi(σ)Ci = p
}
. (9.7)
Mi(σRi−1) is the output state of the map and Mi(σ)Ci is its marginal over Ci.
Recall that the classical registers Ci are used to collect statistics during the run of
the considered protocol. Hence,Mi(σ)Ci can be seen as a probability distribution
over C. The conditionMi(σ)Ci = p therefore restricts the set of considered states –
Σ(p) only includes states σ that exhibit the statistics defined by the probability
distribution p. If there are no such states then Σ(p) is empty.
As an example, consider a protocol in which the CHSH game is being played
in each round and Ci records whether the game was won (Ci = 1) or lost (Ci = 0).
Denoting by ω the probability that σ wins the game, we can write
Mi(σ)Ci =
(
ω 0
0 1− ω
)
. (9.8)
Σ(p) then includes all of the states for which ω = p(1). For a probability distribution
with p(1) = 1, for example, the set Σ(p) is empty, since there are no quantum states
which can be used to play the CHSH game with probability ω = 1.
Given the above, the infimum/supremum of H (Oi|SiR′)Mi(σ) over the set Σ(p)
describes the worst-case7 conditional von Neumann entropy in a single round,
restricted to states with the correct marginal over Ci.
To get some intuition as to why the tradeoff functions in Definition 9.2 give an
adequate way of quantifying the amount of entropy accumulated in a single step of
the process, let us present two “alternative” definitions that one could try to use and
refute them with the help of simple classical examples.
In both examples we consider classical processes in which each channelMi outputs
a single bit Oi without any side information Si about it; the system E is empty as well.
Every bit Oi may depend on the ones produced previously. We would like to extract
randomness out of O and thus aim to calculate Hεmin (O), which tightly describes the
amount of extractable randomness [Renner, 2008, Tomamichel and Hayashi, 2013].
How much randomness does a single round contribute to the extractable randomness
given that we already accounted for the randomness of the previous rounds?
One possible guess is the conditional von-Neumann entropy:
H(Oi|O1, . . . ,Oi−1) = −Eo1,...,oi log Pr(oi|o1, . . . , oi−1) . (9.9)
The von Neumann entropy fulfils the chain rule and so we have∑
iH(Oi|O1, . . . ,Oi−1) = H(O). Unfortunately, the smooth min-entropy Hεmin (O)
7By “worst-case” we mean lowest or largest, depending on whether we are working with min-
or max- tradeoff functions. This will become clearer when discussing the EAT itself.
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can be arbitrarily lower than H(O). An example for a sequential process in which
this is the case is as follows: O1 is uniform while, for all i ∈ [n] \ {1},
Oi =
{
0 O1 = 0
uniform otherwise.
Direct calculation of H(O) gives H(O) = 1 + (n− 1)/2. The min-entropy, however,
depends on the most probable value of O rather than its expected value. One can
easily check that Hmin(O) = 1, which implies that the extractable randomness is
independent of n. Thus, H(O) is too optimistic — it suggests that one can get
arbitrarily more randomness than we can possibly extract from this process.
Let us try a worst-case version of the min-entropy instead:
Hw.c.min = − log max
o1,...,oi
Pr(oi|o1, . . . , oi−1) . (9.10)
While this option at least does not result in a contradiction (in contrast to the one
above), it is too pessimistic. To see this, consider IID RVs O, where each Oi is a
Bernoulli random variable with expectation p < 1/2. Then, Equation (9.10) tells
us that we can extract − log(1 − p) randomness per round. However, it follows
from the EAP that h(p) > − log(1− p) randomness can be extracted per round, for
sufficiently large n.
The following quantity lies between those given in Equations (9.9) and (9.10):
min
o1,...,oi−1
H(Oi|O1 = o1, . . . , Oi−1 = oi−1) .
This quantity describes the von Neumann entropy of Oi, evaluated for the worst case
values of O1, . . . , Oi−1. Going back to the two processes considered above, one can
easily verify that this choice gives the “correct” amount of extractable randomness
in both cases. The min-tradeoff function defined above is the quantum analogue of
this.
The tradeoff functions are not uniquely defined by Equations (9.5) and (9.6). The
equations merely pose a constraint on the functions. That is, a min-tradeoff function
can be chosen to be any differentiable convex function satisfying the condition8 given
in Equation (9.5), i.e., it is upper-bounded by infΣ(p)H (Oi|SiR′)Mi(σ). Similarly,
a max-tradeoff function is any differentiable concave function lower-bounded by
supΣ(p)H (Oi|SiR′)Mi(σ). To get the tightest bounds on the smooth entropies
using the EAT one should construct tradeoff functions in the tightest way possible,
ideally matching the exact value of the worst-case von Neumann entropy given in
Equations (9.5) and (9.6). In device-independent cryptographic protocols based
on the CHSH game, for example, Lemma 5.3 can be used to construct a tight
min-tradeoff function; this will be done in Chapter 11.
9.2.3 Statement of the theorem
After presenting the prerequisites of the EAT, we are now ready to discuss the
statement of the theorem.
8The value of the functions at points p for which Σ(p) is the empty set is unconstrained and
can be chosen freely (while keeping the function differentiable and convex).
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Conditioning on not aborting
Consider a sequential protocol, i.e., one which proceeds in rounds; the development
of the quantum state throughout the protocol can be described by a sequential
process. In the end of the protocol, the honest parties can choose whether to
abort the protocol or not. For example, if Alice and Bob run a device-independent
cryptographic protocols and observe that the device does not win the game in
sufficiently many games, they conclude that the device might be malicious and abort
the protocol. Our goal is to bound the smooth entropies of the outputs when the
protocol does not abort.
Whether the protocol aborts or not depends on the observed data produced
during the execution of the protocol and, specifically, on the value assigned to C.
Thus, the event of not aborting the protocol, denoted by Ω, is defined to be a
subset of Cn. The most common way of choosing the set Ω is such that whether
c = c1, . . . , cn ∈ Cn belongs to Ω or not depends on its “frequencies”. Formally, for
any c ∈ Cn, denote by freqc the probability distribution over C defined by
freqc(c˜) =
| {i|ci = c˜} |
n
(9.11)
for c˜ ∈ C. We define a set Ωˆ that includes all the probability distributions approved
by the protocol, i.e., the desired frequencies freqc for which the protocol does
not abort. Then, we can write the event of not aborting in terns of the desired
frequencies:
Ω =
{
c : freqc ∈ Ωˆ
}
⊆ Cn .
Note that one can also start by choosing the set Ω describing the event of not
aborting the protocol. Then, Ωˆ can be chosen to be any set fulfilling9
{freqc : c ∈ Ω} ⊆ Ωˆ .
Focusing on permutation invariant sets Ω, in the sense that c ∈ Ω if and only if
pi(c) ∈ Ω for all permutations pi of the n indices, defining Ωˆ via Ω is practically the
same as defining Ω via Ωˆ.
Let us present a simple example of the above definitions and sets. Let C = {0, 1}
and consider, e.g.,
c = 01101000110100111011 . (9.12)
To write freqc we count the number of zeros and ones in the above string and get,
according to Equation (9.11), the probability distribution over {0, 1} defined by
freqc(0) =
9
20
; freqc(1) =
11
20
.
We can now consider a protocol which does not abort whenever the observed statistics
are such that the fraction of ones is greater than half. This leads to
Ωˆ =
{
p : p(1) >
1
2
}
9It will become clear from the statement of the EAT that one should choose a minimal convex
set Ωˆ that includes the frequencies considered in Ω. It is perhaps instructive to observe that, for a
finite n, Ω is a finite set; Ωˆ, on the other hand, includes infinitely many probability distributions.
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Ω =
{
c : freqc ∈ Ωˆ
}
=
{
c : freqc(1) >
1
2
}
and, in particular, for c appearing in Equation (9.12), c ∈ Ω.
The theorem
We first give the formal statement of the EAT and then explain.
Theorem 9.3 (EAT). LetMi : Ri−1 → RiOiSiCi for i ∈ [n] be EAT channels, ρ
be the final state, Ω an event defined over Cn, pΩ the probability of Ω in ρ, and ρ|Ω
the final state conditioned on Ω. Let ε ∈ (0, 1).
For Ωˆ = {freqc : c ∈ Ω} convex,10 fmin a min-tradeoff function for {Mi}i∈[n],
and any t ∈ R such that fmin (freqc) ≥ t for any freqc ∈ Ωˆ,
Hεmin (O|SE)ρ|Ω > nt− µ
√
n , (9.13)
where
µ = 2 (log(1 + 2dO) + d‖Ofmin‖∞e)
√
1− 2 log(ε · pΩ) , (9.14)
dO the dimension of the systems Oi, and ‖Ofmin‖∞ is the infinity norm of the
gradient of fmin.
Similarly, for Ωˆ = {freqc : c ∈ Ω} convex, fmax a max-tradeoff function and any
t ∈ R such that fmax (freqc) ≤ t for any freqc ∈ Ωˆ,
Hεmax (O|SE)ρ|Ω < nt+ µ
√
n , (9.15)
with
µ = 2 (log(1 + 2dO) + d‖Ofmax‖∞e)
√
1− 2 log(ε · pΩ) . (9.16)
Let us parse the statement of the theorem while focusing on the smooth min-
entropy for the moment. Equation (9.13) has exactly the form that we were aiming
for: it gives a lower-bound on the conditional smooth min-entropy, evaluated on
the state ρ|Ω in the end of the protocol and conditioned on not aborting, where the
first order term is linear in n and the second, describing finite statistic effects, scales
like
√
n.
The constant t, governing the entropy rate Hεmin (O|SE)ρ|Ω /n when n → ∞,
is defined via the min-tradeoff function in the following way. The min-tradeoff
function fmin assigns to each probability distribution p, or frequency, a number
describing the minimal amount of conditional von Neumann entropy which is
compatible with the probability distribution p (recall Definition 9.5). We now
10We consider only convex sets Ωˆ (as was done in [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2018]). One can
convince oneself that choosing a convex Ωˆ is the sensible thing to do. For example, a set Ωˆ
including all frequencies, or probability distributions, for which p(1) ∈ [a, b] for some constants
0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1 is convex. If, nevertheless, one wishes to consider arbitrary sets Ω, which are not
defined via a convex Ωˆ, then this comes at the cost of considering only affine tradeoff functions
(instead of convex/concave functions as in Definition 9.2); see [Dupuis et al., 2016] for the original
claim. It is not clear that there are scenarios in which Ω cannot be defined with an underlying
convex set Ωˆ and, at the same time, applying the EAT with adequate affine tradeoff functions does
not result in a trivial statement. Hence, the convexity of Ωˆ should not be seen as a restriction.
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consider all frequencies freqc (i.e., probability distributions) which are accepted by
the protocol. The theorem asserts that t should be chosen as the minimal value
of fmin over this set of accepted frequencies. That is,11
t = inf
{
fmin (freqc) : freqc ∈ Ωˆ
}
.
Since the min-tradeoff function is practically the worst-case conditional von Neumann
entropy, we get that, asymptotically, Hεmin (O|SE)ρ|Ω /n is equal to the lowest von
Neumann entropy of a single-round (in the sense defined by the min-tradeoff function)
that is compatible with the statistics observed in the protocol.
As an example, consider a device-independent protocol that assigns Ci = 1 when
the i’th game is won and Ci = 0 otherwise and which does not abort as long as
the fraction of games won (
∑
i Ci)/n is above some threshold ωT . The min-tradeoff
function is defined over probability distributions p over C = {0, 1}. Thus, we can
also think of it as a function over winning probabilities ω via the relation p(1) = ω
and p(0) = 1− ω (see Equation (11.4)). Assuming that the min-tradeoff function is
increasing with ω (as expected to be; see Lemma 5.3), the lowest value that fmin
assigns to accepted frequencies is fmin(ωT ) and hence this should be the value of t;
this is illustrated in Figure 9.3.
The above discussion refers to the first order term in Equation (9.13). Let
us now briefly discuss the second order term. Similarly to the AEP, the second
order term scales like
√
n, which is the optimal scaling. The constant µ, defined in
Equation (9.14), depends on the different parameters and constants. In particular, it
depends on the dimension of the output systems Oi and the gradient of the tradeoff
functions. To get a good second order term one should therefore choose the possible
values that can be assigned to the registers Oi and the tradeoff functions such that
the quantities of interest can be bounded in a good manner. In particular, to control
the gradient of the tradeoff function one can “cut” when the gradient becomes too
large and linearise the function at that point. An example is given in Section 11.2.2.
Improved second order terms for the EAT were derived in [Dupuis and Fawzi, 2018].
A last remark is with regards to the statement of the EAT for the smooth
max-entropy. When interested in the smooth max-entropy, the registers describing
the environment, i.e., E in Equations (9.4) and (9.15) as well as R′ in Equation (9.6),
can be dropped. The fact that R′ can be dropped from Equation (9.6) was already
noted in [Dupuis et al., 2016, Remark 4.2]; the reason is that for the calculation of
the supremum one can always assume that the system on R′ is in product with the
rest of the systems. To see that E can be dropped from Equations (2.21) and (9.15)
note that the EAT must hold for any initial state ρinR0E and, hence, in particular to a
tensor product state ρinR0E = ρR0⊗ρE , for which the conditional smooth max-entropy
is maximal.
11The reader may be concerned that for finite n all frequencies belonging to freqc ∈ Ωˆ actually
lead to empty sets Σ(freqc), defined in Equation (9.7) and hence t can be arbitrary. Note however
that the tradeoff functions are defined over the set of all probability distributions, not only over
the possible frequencies. Since the tradeoff functions must be differential convex/concave functions
with a finite gradient, the points in which the functions are constrained by Equations (9.5) and (9.6)
also constrain the values of the functions at the points freqc ∈ Ωˆ.
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Figure 9.3: First order term from the min-tradeoff function. We consider a protocol
which does not abort if the fraction of games won is above ωT . The value of t,
appearing in Equation (9.13), should be chosen to be the lowest value that the
min-tradeoff function fmin assigns to accepted winning probabilities, i.e., the black
point in the plot.
To conclude this chapter, we summarise the reasons for why the EAT can be
seen as an extension of the AEP for non-IID processes:
1. Similarly to the AEP, the EAT tells us that for large enough n the smooth
entropies are equal to the von Neumann entropy of a single-round times the
number of rounds.
2. The observed frequencies from the entire process are used when calculating the
entropy accumulated in a single step of the process, as if all steps contribute
equally and independently of each other. This is analogous to the analysis
done in the IID case, as we saw in Section 7.3.
3. The asymptotic bounds on the smooth entropies derived using the EAT are
equal to those derived using the AEP under the IID assumption. As a result,
the bounds resulting form the application of the EAT are tight (assuming that
the constructed tradeoff functions are tight). The second order terms of both
theorems are also similar, as the scaling of both is
√
n.
All the above justifies the use of the EAT as a “reduction to IID” technique.
Chapter 10
Showcase: non-signalling
parallel repetition
In this chapter we consider the showcase of non-signalling parallel repetition, in-
troduced in Section 4.1, and show how threshold theorems derived under the IID
assumption can be extended to threshold theorems for general strategies, using a
reduction to IID.
We focus on the case of non-signalling players.1 That is, the only restriction
on the players is that they are not allowed to communicate. Considering the non-
signalling case is interesting for several reasons. A first reason is to minimise the
set of assumptions to the mere necessary. Minimising the set of assumptions can
be useful in cryptography when one wishes to get the strongest result possible, i.e.,
one where the attack strategies of malicious parties are only restricted minimally
(as in [Hänggi et al., 2010b, Masanes, 2009, Masanes et al., 2014] for example). In
theoretical physics, non-signalling correlations enable the study of generalised theories
possibly beyond quantum theory. It is also important to mention that, due to their
linearity, the non-signalling constraints are often easier to analyse than the quantum
or the classical constraints. Therefore, even if additional constraints hold, focusing
on the non-signalling ones serves as a way to get first insights into a given problem.
Our theorem deals with complete-support games; these are game in which
the distribution QXY over the questions has complete support, i.e., for all x, y,
QXY (x, y) > 0.2 The main result presented in this chapter can be informally stated
as follows.3
Theorem 10.1 (Informal). For any complete-support game, a threshold theorem for
general non-signalling strategies follows from a threshold theorem for non-signalling
1Most steps of our proof can be used as is when considering classical and quantum players as
well. There is one lemma, however, which we do not know how to modify so it can capture the
classical and quantum case. We explain the difficulty later on.
2When considering games with only two players, the requirement for complete support
can be dropped but, even though we focus on two-player games, we do not discuss this here;
see [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b] for the details.
3See Theorem 10.11 for the formal statement.
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IID strategies. Furthermore, given a game with optimal non-signalling winning
probability 1 − α, the resulting threshold theorem states that, for any β > 0, the
probability to win more than a fraction 1− α+ β of n games is exponentially small
in nβ2, as in the IID case.
The result previously appeared in [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b]. We remark
that while the non-signalling threshold theorem of [Buhrman et al., 2013] was
known prior to [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b], the dependence on β did not match
that of the IID case, which is optimal (as follows from the optimal formula-
tion of the Chernoff bound). Following [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b], the work
of [Holmgren and Yang, 2017] showed that parallel repetition does not hold for gen-
eral games without complete-support in the non-signalling case. Thus, Theorem 10.1
is as general as it gets.
Proving parallel repetition via a reduction to IID has the advantage that, as in
the IID case, the proof is oblivious to the number of players and structure of the
considered game. This leads to a general theorem applicable to all games (with
complete support) that is, arguably, simpler than other proof techniques.
When considering a strategy for the repeated game there is one type of symmetry
which one can take advantage of – since the repeated game is permutation invariant
the same symmetry can be assumed to hold for the optimal strategies, without loss of
generality. Permutation-invariant strategies are strategies which are indifferent to the
ordering of the questions given by the referee. That is, the probability of answering
a specific set of questions correctly does not depend on the ordering of the questions
(see Section 10.3 below for the formal definitions). Once we restrict our attention
to permutation-invariant strategies, de Finetti theorems presents themselves as a
natural tool to leverage for the analysis. Indeed, our proof builds on the de Finetti
reduction discusses in Chapter 8, which acts as a reduction to IID in our analysis of
parallel repetition.
The chapter is arranged as follows. In Section 10.1 we explain the main challenge
when proving parallel repetition and threshold theorems using techniques employed
by works predating [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b] and why de Finetti theorems were
not used in the context of parallel repetition before [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b].
In Section 10.2 we give the main technical statements needed to prove our non-
signalling threshold theorem. The different observations and lemmas of Section 10.2
may be of independent interest when analysing non-signalling parallel boxes and
therefore we perform the analysis without referring to multi-player games. The
explicit threshold theorem and its proof are given in Section 10.3. As in the
rest of the thesis, we focus on the case of two parties for simplicity; we refer
to [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b] for the proofs in the case of more than two players
as well as a couple of extensions of our theorem to games without complete support.
10.1 Main challenge and goal
The main difficulty in proving a parallel repetition result comes from the, almost
arbitrary, correlations between the different questions-answers pairs in the players’
strategy for the repeated Gn1−α+β : as the players get all the n questions together
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they can answer them in a correlated way. In most of the known parallel repetition
results (e.g., [Raz, 1998, Holenstein, 2007, Rao, 2011, Buhrman et al., 2013]) the
main idea of the proof is to bound the winning probability for some of the questions,
conditioned on winning the game in several other coordinates. However, as the
strategy itself introduces correlations between the different tuples of questions, a
large amount of technical work is devoted to dealing with the effect of conditioning
on the event of winning the previous questions.
As mentioned above (and formally stated in Section 10.3), due to the permutation
invariance of Gn1−α+β one can study only permutation invariant strategies without
loss of generality. Once we restrict our attention to permutation-invariant strategies,
de Finetti theorems seem like a natural tool to leverage for the analysis. In the context
of games and strategies, de Finetti theorems suggest one may be able to reduce the
analysis of general permutation-invariant strategies to the analysis of a de Finetti
strategy, i.e., a convex combination of IID strategies; recall Chapter 8. As presented
in Section 7.3.1, the behaviour of IID strategies is trivial under parallel repetition.
Hence, a reduction to IID using a de Finetti-type theorem could significantly simplify
the analysis of parallel repetition theorems and threshold theorems.
Yet, de Finetti theorems were not used in this context prior
to [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b], and for a good reason. The many ver-
sions of quantum de Finetti theorems (e.g., [Renner, 2007, Christandl et al., 2009])
could not have been used as they depend on the dimension of the underlying
quantum strategies, while in the quantum multi-player game setting one does
not wish to restrict the dimension. Non-signalling de Finetti theorems, as
in [Barrett and Leifer, 2009, Christandl and Toner, 2009], were also not applicable
for non-signalling parallel repetition theorems, as they restrict almost completely
the type of allowed correlations in the strategies for the repeated game by assuming
very strict non-signalling constraints between the different repetitions, i.e., between
the different questions-answers pairs.
In the proof presented in the next sections, we use the de Finetti reduction
presented in Chapter 8, which imposes no assumptions at all regarding the structure
of the strategies (apart from permutation invariance), and is therefore applicable
in the context of parallel repetition. This allows us to devise a proof technique
which is completely different from the proofs of parallel repetition results predat-
ing [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b].4 In particular, at least in the non-signalling
case presented here, the conditioning problem described above disappears completely
and the number of players does not play a role in the proof structure.
As explained in Section 8.2, the de Finetti strategy that one ought to consider
when using our de Finetti reduction assigns some weight to signalling IID strategies.5
Most of the effort is therefore directed to, informally, showing that when starting
with a permutation-invariant non-signalling strategy the de Finetti strategy must
assign only a small weight to signalling IID strategies. Formally, a similar in spirit
but somewhat different statement is proven; see Theorem 10.2 below. Without
4Following [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b], [Lancien and Winter, 2016] presented another, con-
ceptually similar but technically different, proof of non-signalling parallel repetition based on de
Finetti reductions.
5As discussed in Section 8.4, this is inevitable.
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further ado, let us get into the proof of the exact statements in the following section.
10.2 Approximately non-signalling marginals
Consider a parallel box PAB|XY (as defined in Section 6.1) and some complete-
support distribution QXY , i.e., for all x˜ ∈ X and y˜ ∈ Y, Q(x˜, y˜) 6= 0. Sample x, y,
a, and b according to Q⊗nXY PAB|XY . We assume in this section that all possible
inputs x˜, y˜ appear in the observed data x and y (that is, there exists i ∈ [n] for
which (xi, yi) = (x˜, y˜). For a complete-support distribution QXY , the probability
that this is not the case is exponentially small in n and we will account for it later.
Next, let Ofreq(a,b,x,y)ABXY be the distribution derived from the frequencies in the
observed data via
O
freq(a,b,x,y)
ABXY (a˜b˜x˜y˜) =
∣∣∣ {i : (ai, bi, xi, yi) = (a˜, b˜, x˜, y˜)} ∣∣∣
n
and define
O
freq(a,b,x,y)
AB|XY =
O
freq(a,b,x,y)
ABXY
QXY
. (10.1)
Without the complete-support requirement on QXY it does not even make sense
to talk about a fully defined Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY , i.e., a conditional probability distribution
which is defined for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Indeed, Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY can only be defined for
x ∈ Supp(X ) and y ∈ Supp(Y) due to the estimation process (at least when assuming
that all inputs appear in the observed data, which happens with high probability for
large enough n). If one is willing to consider conditional probability distributions
which are allowed to not assign values to certain inputs then Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY regains
its meaning. In the context of non-signalling boxes, these conditional probability
distributions were termed “sub-non-signalling” boxes in [Lancien and Winter, 2016];
sub-non-signalling boxes fulfil the subset of the non-signalling conditions which apply
for the defined inputs. In the case of two parties, it is known that there is always a
way to “complete” a sub-non-signalling box to a non-signalling box, defined over all
inputs [Ito, 2010, Lancien and Winter, 2016].
The current section deals with the following question: given that we start
with a non-signalling box PAB|XY , what is the probability that the single-
round box Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY is signalling? Under the IID assumption, i.e., when
PAB|XY = O
⊗n
AB|XY , this question is natural and can be easily answered. In
that case, Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY can simply be seen as an estimation of the “real box”,
or marginal, OAB|XY . In particular, according to Sanov’s theorem (Lemma 2.2),
as n→∞, we have Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY = OAB|XY almost surely. Thus, for a non-signalling
IID box PAB|XY , O
freq(a,b,x,y)
AB|XY must be non-signalling as n→∞.
Our goal is to show that roughly the same is true for permutation invariant
non-signalling parallel boxes PAB|XY when boxes such as O
freq(a,b,x,y)
AB|XY take the role
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of the marginals, which are not properly defined for parallel boxes. The theorem
can be stated informally as follows:6
Theorem 10.2 (Informal). Let PAB|XY be a permutation invariant non-signalling
parallel box and Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY be the single-round box defined via the observed data
sampled using Q⊗nXY PAB|XY , as in Equation (10.1). Then, for sufficiently large
n, Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY is close to a non-signalling single-round box with high probability.
This also implies that the observed data can be seen as if, with high probability,
it was sampled using an IID box O⊗nAB|XY with OAB|XY close to a non-signalling
single-round box.
To prove the theorem we utilise the concept of a test, discussed in Section 8.3.2.
Roughly speaking, we define a signalling test T , interacting with a parallel box, which
accepts whenever the box Ofreq(a,b,x,y)AB|XY is highly signalling and rejects whenever the
box is close to a non-signalling box. With the aid of the variant of the de Finetti
reduction phrased as Theorem 8.11 and a rather simple signalling game (defined in
Section 10.2.3) we prove that the probability that the test accepts when interacting
with a permutation invariant non-signalling parallel box is small. We follow this
proof idea in the succeeding sections.
10.2.1 Single-round boxes from frequencies
To ease notation we denote data = a, b,x,y when it is clear from the context which
a, b,x,y are considered. Every observed data is split into two non-overlapping parts,
data1 and data2. Specifically, let7
data1 = a1, . . . , an2 , b1, . . . , b
n
2
, x1, . . . , xn2 , y1, . . . , y
n
2
,
data2 = an2 +1, . . . , an, b
n
2 +1
, . . . , bn, xn2 +1, . . . , xn, y
n
2 +1
, . . . , yn .
(10.2)
data (and hence also data1 and data2) is sampled according to Q⊗nXY PAB|XY ,
where PAB|XY is a non-signalling permutation invariant parallel box. Note the
following:
1. PAB|XY may be signalling between the different rounds i ∈ [n] (i.e., for a
given party, the output of one round may depend on the input of other rounds).
Therefore, even though data1 and data2 are each defined only by part of the
observed data, they may depend on the entire data.
2. Due to permutation invariance, it does not matter which indices i ∈ [n] belong
to each part of the data. We could as well define data1 and data2 by splitting
the data according to whether the index i is even or odd (for example). For
any partition of the data, data1 and data2 are distributed in the same way.
Hence, the choice of partition made in Equation (10.2) is arbitrary and all
other choices give rise to the same results.
6For the formal statement see Theorem 10.10.
7For simplicity we assume n is even; otherwise replace n/2 by dn/2e and modify everything
else accordingly.
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We define two single-round boxes from the observed data, similarly to what was
done in Equation (10.1):
O
freq(data1)
ABXY (a˜b˜x˜y˜) =
∣∣∣ {i ∈ [n/2] : (ai, bi, xi, yi) = (a˜, b˜, x˜, y˜)} ∣∣∣
n/2
,
O
freq(data2)
ABXY (a˜b˜x˜y˜) =
∣∣∣ {|i ∈ {n/2 + 1, . . . , n} : (ai, bi, xi, yi) = (a˜, b˜, x˜, y˜)} ∣∣∣
n/2
(10.3)
and, for t ∈ {0, 1},
O
freq(datat)
AB|XY =
O
freq(datat)
ABXY
QXY
. (10.4)
As mentioned above, for Ofreq(data1)AB|XY and O
freq(data2)
AB|XY to be defined for all inputs we
assume that all inputs (x, y) appear in both data1 and data2.
10.2.2 Signalling test
Below we consider distributions OABXY = QXY OAB|XY . One can then consider
different marginals of OABXY . For example, OBY is simply defined by OBY (b, y) =∑
a,x OABXY (a, b, x, y). Note that the marginals of OABXY are all well-defined even
if OAB|XY itself is signalling.
We wish to define a signalling test. To this end, let us first define a signalling
measure over single-round boxes:
Definition 10.3. Let OAB|XY be a single-round box defined over A, B, X , and Y ,
QXY a distribution over the inputs of the single-round box, and OABXY =
QXY OAB|XY . The amount of signalling from Alice to Bob using the inputs (x, y)
and Bob’s output b is given by
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
)
= OBY (b, y)
[
OX|BY (x|b, y)−QX|Y (x|y)
]
.
Similarly, the amount of signalling from Bob to Alice using the inputs (x, y),
distributed according to QXY , and Alice’s output a, distributed according to
OA|X=x,Y=y, is given by
Sig(B→A,x,y,a)
(
OAB|XY
)
= OAX(a, x)
[
OY |AX(y|a, x)−QY |X(y|x)
]
.
The box OAB|XY is non-signalling if and only if
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
)
= Sig(B→A,x,y,a)
(
OAB|XY
)
= 0 . (10.5)
To see that the above definition makes sense as a signalling measure first notice
that, when positive, OX|BY (x|b, y)−QX|Y (x|y) can be understood as quantifying
Bob’s advantage in guessing Alice’s input x when observing b, compared to his prior
information QX|Y (x|y) about her input. For a uniform distribution over X × Y,
QX|Y (x|y) = 0 for all x and y. Then, the non-signalling requirement means that
Bob cannot infer Alice’s input from his output (as otherwise Alice could signal Bob),
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that is, OX|BY (x|b, y) = 0 as well. The above is a generalisation of this requirement
to non-uniform distributions QXY . On the more technical level — the non-signalling
conditions (Definition 3.1) can be equivalently written as
∀b, x, y
∑
a˜
OAB|XY (a˜, b|x, y) =
∑
x˜
QX|Y (x˜|y)
∑
a˜
OAB|XY (a˜, b|x˜, y) ;
∀a, x, y
∑
b˜
OAB|XY (a, b˜|x, y) =
∑
y˜
QY |X(y˜|x)
∑
b˜
OAB|XY (a, b˜|a, y˜) .
(10.6)
One can verify that, for complete support QXY , these conditions are equivalent to
Equation (10.5).
All statements proven below regarding our signalling measure hold for signalling
in both directions, i.e., from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Alice. We present all the
statements and proofs in terms of signalling from Alice to Bob; to derive the same
statements for signalling from Bob to Alice one can simply replace the parties (their
inputs and outputs) with one another.
We use the following definition to measure the distance between two single-round
boxes.8
Definition 10.4. The distance between KAB|XY and RAB|XY is defined as∣∣KAB|XY−RAB|XY ∣∣1 = E(x,y)∈X×Y ∑
(a,b)∈A×B
∣∣KAB|XY (a, b|x, y)−RAB|XY (a, b|x, y)∣∣ .
The following lemma shows that our measure of signalling is continuous. That
is, if two strategies are close to one another according to Definition 10.4 then their
signalling values are also close. The proof is given in Appendix B.1.
Lemma 10.5. Let O1AB|XY and O
2
AB|XY be two single-round boxes such that∣∣O1AB|XY −O2AB|XY ∣∣1 ≤  .
Then, for all a, b, x, and y,∣∣Sig(A→B,x,y,b)(O1AB|XY )− Sig(A→B,x,y,b)(O2AB|XY )∣∣ ≤ 2ε
We can now define our signalling test. The test interacts with the parallel
box PAB|XY by sampling data according to Q⊗nXY PAB|XY and then checking
whether Ofreq(data2)AB|XY is sufficiently signalling. Formally:
Definition 10.6. Let ζ,  > 0 be parameters satisfying ζ ≥ 7. For any x, y, and b,
a signalling test is defined by9
T (A→B,x,y,b)(PAB|XY ) =
{
1 if Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data2)
AB|XY
)
≥ ζ − 2
0 otherwise ,
(10.7)
8More commonly in the literature, one considers a definition in which E(x,y) is replaced by
maxx,y . We use Definition 10.4 since it allows us to apply Sanov’s theorem later on.
9If data1 does not include an index in which the inputs are (x, y) then the test T (A→B,x,y,b)
rejects by definition (recall Definition 10.3).
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where Ofreq(data2)AB|XY is defined as in Equation (10.4).
Let T denote the event that the signalling test T (A→B,x,y,b) passes. The proba-
bility of the test passing when interacting with PAB|XY is given by
Prdata∼PABXY [T ] =
∑
x,y
Q⊗nXY (x,y)
∑
a,b:
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data2)
AB|XY
)
≥ζ−2
PAB|XY (a, b|x,y) .
The signalling test above is defined with Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data2)
AB|XY
)
, rather
than its absolute value, since this will be the only case relevant for our analysis; see
Appendix B.2.
When considering IID boxes O⊗nAB|XY , the signalling test T (A→B,x,y,b) is reliable —
if Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
) ≥ ζ the test will detect it with high probability, i.e. the
test will accept with high probability, and if OAB|XY is non-signalling then the
test will reject with high probability. It follows, in particular, that if signalling is
detected by the test in Ofreq(data2)AB|XY , O
freq(data1)
AB|XY is also signalling with high probability.
This holds also when considering the de Finetti box as in Definition 8.2.
To make the statement precise, let us define two sets of single-round boxes for
every signalling test T (A→B,x,y,b). The first set is given by
σ(A→B,x,y,b) =
{
OAB|XY : ∀O¯AB|XY s.t. |OAB|XY − O¯AB|XY |1 ≤ 
⇒ Sig(A→B,x,y,b)(O¯AB|XY ) ≥ ζ
}
.
Using the continuity of the signalling measure, Lemma 10.5, we observe that
OAB|XY /∈ σ(A→B,x,y,b) ⇒ Sig(A→B,x,y,b)(OAB|XY ) ≤ ζ + 2 . (10.8)
The second set is defined to be
Σ(A→B,x,y,b) =
{
OAB|XY : ∃O¯AB|XY s.t. |OAB|XY − O¯AB|XY |1 ≤ 
∧ Prdata∼O¯⊗n
AB|XY
[T ] > δ
}
,
where δ = δ
(
n
2 , 
)
=
(
n
2 + 1
)|A||B||X ||Y|−1
e−n
2/4. Since the signalling test is reliable
when acting on IID boxes, one can easily show that
OAB|XY ∈ Σ(A→B,x,y,b) ⇒ Sig(A→B,x,y,b)(OAB|XY ) > ν (10.9)
for any 0 < ν < ζ − 6. This is stated and proven as Lemma B.1 in Appendix B.1.
The sets and the relevant constants are illustrated in Figure 10.1.
We use below the following notation:
• inσ denotes the event that Ofreq(data1)AB|XY ∈ σ(A→B,x,y,b).
• inΣ denotes the event that Ofreq(data1)AB|XY ∈ Σ(A→B,x,y,b).
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SigA→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
)
0 ν ζ ζ + 2
Sig of O ∈ Σ(A→B,x,y,b)
Sig of O /∈ σ(A→B,x,y,b)
constant gap
Figure 10.1: Visualisation of the sets σ(A→B,x,y,b) and Σ(A→B,x,y,b).
• “For all signalling test T (A→B,x,y,b)...” should be understood as “for all x,
y, and b, defining a signalling test T (A→B,x,y,b),..." and similarly for other
quantifiers.
Furthermore, to avoid confusion, we explicitly denote the probability distributions
on which we evaluate the probability of the above events.
As shown in Appendix B.1, the following lemma holds for a de Finetti box:
Lemma 10.7. Let τABXY = Q⊗nXY τAB|XY , where τAB|XY is a de Finetti box. For
every signalling test T (A→B,x,y,b),
1. Prdata∼τABXY
[¬inΣ ∧ T ] ≤ δ
2. Prdata∼τABXY [inσ ∧ ¬T ] ≤ δ,
where δ = δ
(
n
2 , 
)
=
(
n
2 + 1
)|A||B||X ||Y|−1
e−n
2/4.
A similar lemma can be proven for permutation invariant parallel boxes, using
the de Finetti reduction of Theorem 8.3:
Lemma 10.8. Given a parallel box PAB|XY let PABXY = Q⊗nXY PAB|XY . For
every permutation-invariant box PAB|XY and every T (A→B,x,y,b):
1. Prdata∼PABXY
[¬inΣ ∧ T ] ≤ cδ
2. Prdata∼PABXY [inσ ∧ ¬T ] ≤ cδ ,
where c = (n+ 1)|X ||Y|(|A||B|−1) and δ is as in Lemma 10.7.
Proof. We prove both of the claims together. Denote the relevant event by E(data)
and note that for both events we can write
Prdata∼PABXY [E(data) = 1] =
∑
data|
E(data)=1
PABXY (data) .
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From Theorem 8.3 we get PABXY (data) ≤ c · τABXY (data) and therefore
Prdata∼PABXY [E(data) = 1] =
∑
data|
E(data)=1
PABXY (data)
≤ c ·
∑
data|
E(data)=1
τABXY (data)
= c · Prdata∼τABXY [E(data) = 1] .
Combining this with Lemma 10.7 proves the lemma.
10.2.3 Guessing game
The previous section discussed the relations between Ofreq(data1)AB|XY and O
freq(data2)
AB|XY
in terms of the probabilities of certain events which depend on these averaged
single-round boxes. All statements made so far were general, in the sense that they
hold for any permutation-invariant parallel box PAB|XY . In the current section we
focus on permutation-invariant non-signalling parallel boxes PAB|XY . Our goal
is to show that for non-signalling boxes PAB|XY , the averaged boxes O
freq(data1)
AB|XY
and Ofreq(data2)AB|XY cannot be too signalling as we were set to prove.
To this end, we construct a guessing game for every signalling test T (A→B,x,y,b).
In the game, a referee gives Alice and Bob n/2 questions, distributed according
to Q⊗n/2XY . Bob’s goal is to output an index j ∈ [n/2] for which (xj , yj) = (x, y)
(while Alice does not need to output anything). Alice and Bob are allowed to use any
non-signalling box to win the game. Clearly, a non-signalling box should not allow
Bob to learn anything about Alice’s input from his outputs. Bob’s best strategy is
thus to guess an index j for which yj = y. The probability that his guess is correct
is QX|Y (x|y). If Alice and Bob are able to win the game with higher probability
then the used box must be signalling.10
The following lemma asserts that, for non-signalling PAB|XY , conditioned
on the signalling test detecting a lot of signalling in Ofreq(data2)AB|XY , the probability
that Ofreq(data1)AB|XY is highly signalling is bounded away from 1. Intuitively, we would
have expected that if signalling is detected in data2 then data1 should exhibit sig-
nalling practically with certainty. The lemma (roughly) shows that, when starting
with non-signalling boxes, this is not the case.
Before starting, we remind the reader that we assume in this section that all
pairs of questions appear in data1 and data2. For the lemmas and proofs below it is
important to remember that all the probabilities are conditioned on data1. To ease
notation we do not explicitly write it.
Lemma 10.9. Let  ∈ [0, 1] and n be such that
n
ln(n)
> 20|X ||Y||A||B| ln(2/)
2
, (10.10)
10This motivates our signalling measure given in Definition 10.3.
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and PAB|XY a non-signalling parallel box. For any signalling test T (A→B,x,y,b)
denote by PABXY |T=1 the probability distribution PABXY conditioned on the event
T (A→B,x,y,b) (PAB|XY ) = 1, whenever such a conditional probability distribution is
defined. Then,
Prdata∼PABXY |T=1
[
inΣ
]
< 1−
√
cδ , (10.11)
for c and δ as in Lemma 10.8.
Proof. We denote xdata1 = x1, . . . , xn/2 and ydata1 = y1, . . . , yn/2.
For every signalling test T (A→B,x,y,b) and inputs for Bob ydata1 such
that Prdata∼PABXY [T |ydata1 ] 6= 0 we construct a guessing game. Our goal is to
derive a contradiction by showing that if Equation (10.11) is not true, then the
guessing game can be won with probability higher than the optimal non-signalling
winning probability.
The guessing game is as explained above. A referee gives Bob the inputs ydata1
and Alice gets xdata1 distributed according to QXY (x|y). Bob’s goal is to guess an
index j ∈ [n/2] such that (xj , yj) = (x, y) (we assume that such exists).
If the parties share a non-signalling box PAB|XY then Bob’s marginals are
the same for all xdata1 . Therefore, his outputs do not give him any information
about the inputs that Alice got from the referee. The best non-signalling strategy
for the guessing game is therefore to choose, uniformly at random, an index j for
which yj = y. The winning probability is then given by Wns = QX|Y (x|y) < 1.11
We now show that if the parties share PAB|XY for which
Prdata∼PABXY |T=1
[
inΣ |ydata1
] ≥ 1−√cδ (10.12)
then they can win the above guessing game with probability higher than the optimal
non-signalling winning probability Wns.
The idea is as follows. The parties share many identical copies of PAB|XY .
They use the inputs given by the referee as xdata1 and ydata1 in all of the copies
and choose, using shared randomness, the rest of the inputs, associated with data2,
in each copy (i.e., there are different inputs for data2 for each copy). They use
the copies of PAB|XY with the described inputs. Bob then looks for the first
copy of PAB|XY in which the event T holds – such a copy exists as long as12
Prdata∼PABXY [T |ydata1 ] 6= 0; he can find it since he knows all the inputs in data2 (as
they were chosen using shared randomness).13 Alice does not need to know in which
copy the test holds. Using the chosen copy, Bob chooses a random index j ∈ [n/2]
such that yj = y and bj = b.
Let us show that, as long as Prdata∼PABXY [T |ydata1 ] 6= 0, this box achieves a
winning probability which is higher than Wns. For the chosen copy, the event T
11Note that while Bob’s inputs, ydata1 = y1, . . . , yn/2, are fixed in a specific instance of the
guessing game, Alice’s inputs are still distributed according to the prior QXY (x|y).
12To see this note that since the box is non-signalling between Alice and Bob, Bob can check in
which copy the test passes even before Alice uses her input. Therefore, the probability to pass the
test is independent of Alice’s inputs and hence must be non-zero for any of them.
13Recalling Definitions 10.3 and 10.6, we see that only Ofreq(data2)BXY is needed in order to check
whether the signalling test passes or not. Thus, Bob indeed has all the relevant information and he
can locally check whether the test passes or not.
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holds and hence data1 can be seen as data distributed according to n/2 identi-
cal copies of Ofreq(data1)AB|XY , which is with high probability in Σ(i,b,x,y) according to
Equation (10.12). Using Equation (10.9) this implies
Prdata∼PABXY |T=1
[
Sig(A→B,b,x,y)(Ofreq(data1)AB|XY ) > ν|ydata1
]
≥ 1−
√
cδ , (10.13)
where ν > 0 is any parameter satisfying ν < ζ − 6 (recall Equation (10.9)).
Using Definition 10.3 we know that if indeed
Sig(A→B,b,x,y)(Ofreq(data1)AB|XY ) > ν
then Ofreq(data1)BY (b, y) > 0 and
O
freq(data1)
X|BY (x|b, y) >
ν
O
freq(data1)
BY (b, y)
+ QX|Y (x|y) (10.14)
=
ν
O
freq(data1)
BY (b, y)
+Wns .
That is, by choosing an index for which bj = b Bob increase the winning probability.
On the other hand, if Sig(A→B,b,x,y)(Ofreq(data1)AB|XY ) ≤ ν, which can happen with
probability
√
cδ, then Bob may decrease his winning probability. In the worst case
the winning probability is 0. Therefore, for the chosen copy (for which the test
passed) we get the following winning probability
W ≥ (1−
√
cδ)
(
ν
O
freq(data1)
BY (b, y)
+Wns
)
+
√
cδ · 0 . (10.15)
Thus, W > Wns for
ν >
√
cδ
1−√cδWns ≥
√
cδ
1−√cδWns ·O
freq(data1)
BY (b, y) . (10.16)
Using Wns ·Ofreq(data1)BY (b, y) ≤ 1 and
√
cδ ≤ (n+ 1)|X ||Y||A||B|e−n2/8, we see that as
long as n/ ln(n) > 20|X ||Y||A||B|−2 ln(2/) we have
√
cδ WnsO
freq(data1)
BY (b, y)
1−√cδ <  .
Assuming ζ ≥ 7, there is a choice of ν that satisfies both Equation (10.16) and the
earlier condition that ν < ζ − 6.
We get that Equation (10.12) must not hold for any ydata1 and hence cannot
hold also when we omit the conditioning on ydata1 . The lemma therefore follows.
The bound given in Equation (10.11) is weak for two reasons. First, data is
distributed according to the conditional distribution PABXY |T =1 and not according
to PABXY itself. Second, it only tells us that Prdata∼PABXY |T=1
[
O
freq(data1)
AB|XY /∈
Σ(A→B,x,y,b)
] ≥ √cδ, i.e., the probability that Ofreq(data1)AB|XY has a small value of
signalling is higher than
√
cδ. We show how the statement can be amplified using
Lemma 10.8, which utilised our de Finetti reduction.
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Theorem 10.10. Let PAB|XY be a permutation-invariant non-signalling parallel
box and n such that Equation (10.16) is satisfied. Then for any signalling test
T (A→B,x,y,b) such that QXY (x, y) 6= 0 and QX|Y (x|y) 6= 1 and conditioned on the
event of all questions (x, y) appearing in data1 and data2,
Prdata∼PABXY
[
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data)
AB|XY
)
> ζ + 2
]
≤ 4
√
cδ . (10.17)
Similarly, for any signalling test T (B→A,x,y,a),
Prdata∼PABXY
[
Sig(B→A,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data)
AB|XY
)
> ζ + 2
]
≤ 4
√
cδ . (10.18)
Proof. From Lemma 10.8 part 1 we get
Prdata∼PABXY [T ] >
√
cδ ⇒ Prdata∼PABXY |T=1
[¬inΣ] ≤ √cδ
and this can be rewritten as
Prdata∼PABXY [T ] >
√
cδ ⇒ Prdata∼PABXY |T=1
[
inΣ
] ≥ 1−√cδ .
According to Lemma 10.9, this implies
Prdata∼PABXY [T ] >
√
cδ ⇒ PAB|XY is signalling .
Therefore it must be that
Prdata∼PABXY [T ] ≤
√
cδ (10.19)
or alternatively,
Prdata∼PABXY [¬T ] ≥ 1−
√
cδ (10.20)
Next, combining Lemma 10.8 part 2 with Equation (10.20) we get
Prdata∼PABXY |T=0 [in
σ] ≤
√
cδ .
Using Equation (10.19) we get
Prdata∼PABXY [in
σ] ≤ 2
√
cδ .
Using the definition of the set σ(A→B,x,y,b) and Equation (10.8) we get that
Prdata∼PABXY
[
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data1)
AB|XY
)
> ζ + 2
]
≤ 2
√
cδ .
Permutation invariance implies that data1 and data2 are distributed in the same
way. Therefore, we also have
Prdata∼PABXY
[
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data2)
AB|XY
)
> ζ + 2
]
≤ 2
√
cδ .
By definition,
O
freq(data)
AB|XY =
1
2
O
freq(data1)
AB|XY +
1
2
O
freq(data2)
AB|XY
136 10. Showcase: non-signalling parallel repetition
and, thus, using the linearity of the signalling measure, for any fixed observed data
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data)
AB|XY
)
=
1
2
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data1)
AB|XY
)
+
1
2
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data2)
AB|XY
)
.
Equation (10.17) follows by combining the above equations. Switching Alice and
Bob in all lemmas above, Equation (10.18) follows in the exact same way.
Theorem 10.10 tells us that if PAB|XY is a permutation-invariant non-signalling
parallel box then the probability that Ofreq(data)AB|XY is highly signalling (in any direction
and using any inputs and outputs) is exponentially small in the number of games.
De facto, this means that we can think of the observed data sampled from a non-
signalling parallel box as if it came from an IID box defined via a single-round
box that is approximately non-signalling, with high probability. This can be used
to infer properties of non-signalling parallel boxes. In Section 10.3 we show that
Theorem 10.10 implies a threshold theorem almost directly.
Apart from the applications of Theorem 10.10, we see it as an abstract mathe-
matical statement about the observed data produced by non-signalling parallel boxes.
Deriving a similar statement for quantum boxes is also of interest (and, in particular,
will imply a threshold theorem for all quantum games). The main difficulty in
deriving a quantum analogue of Theorem 10.10 lies in finding a “non-quantumness”
measure which, ideally, can be performed locally by one of the parties (as in our
guessing game in the proof of Lemma 10.9).
10.3 Threshold theorem
This section is devoted to deriving the following threshold theorem:
Theorem 10.11. For any complete-support two-player game G whose optimal non-
signalling winning probability is wns = 1− α, there exist C(G) such that for every
0 < β ≤ α and large enough n, the probability that non-signalling players win more
than a fraction 1 − α + β of the n questions in the threshold game Gn1−α+β is at
most exp
[−C(G)nβ2].
That is, for sufficiently many repetitions the probability to win more than a
fraction 1− α+ β of the n games is exponentially small. A sufficient condition on
the number of repetitions for the bound in the theorem to hold is stated in Equation
(10.10), and a choice of constants made around Equation (10.28), for a more precise
bound.
The proof builds on Theorem 10.10 and is rather simple. If Ofreq(data)AB|XY is not too
signalling (for any signalling test), then its winning probability in a single game
cannot be much higher than the winning probability of the optimal non-signalling
strategy for G. Furthermore, the number of games won in any given observed data
can be read directly from the winning probability of Ofreq(data)AB|XY . Thus, by analysing
O
freq(data)
AB|XY we are actually analysing the number of games won. The combination of
these two observations gives the final theorem. We follow these steps below.
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10.3.1 Winning probability of approximately non-signalling
strategies
The linearity of the non-signalling conditions (Definition 3.1) and the winning
probability in a game (Equation (4.1)) allow us to phrase the optimisation problem
of finding the optimal non-signalling winning probability in any game G as a linear
program [Schrijver, 1998]. For complete-support game we can use the following
linear program over the variables OAB|XY (a, b|x, y):
max
∑
a,b,x,y
QXY (xy)R(a, b, x, y)OAB|XY (a, b|x, y) (10.21a)
s.t. Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
)
= 0 ∀x, y, b (10.21b)
Sig(B→A,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
)
= 0 ∀x, y, a (10.21c)∑
a,b
OAB|XY (a, b|x, y) = 1 ∀x, y (10.21d)
OAB|XY (a, b|x, y) ≥ 0 ∀a, b, x, y (10.21e)
The objective function, Equation (10.21a), is exactly the winning probability in
the game when using strategy OAB|XY . Equations (10.21d) and (10.21e) are the
normalisation and positivity constraints on the strategy OAB|XY . In Equations
(B.5a) and (B.5a) all the non-signalling constraints are listed, as follows for complete-
support games from Equation (10.5).14
Our goal is to upper-bound the winning probability of Ofreq(data)AB|XY , which may be
slightly signalling. The optimal winning probability of strategies which are slightly
signalling can be written as a linear program similar to the one above, by relaxing
the constraint in Equations (B.5a) and (B.5b) so that it allows for some signalling.
Specifically, keeping in mind Equation (10.17), we are interested in the following
program:
max
∑
a,b,x,y
QXY (xy)R(a, b, x, y)OAB|XY (a, b|x, y)
s.t. Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
) ≤ ζ + 2 ∀x, y, b
Sig(B→A,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
) ≤ ζ + 2 ∀x, y, a∑
a,b
OAB|XY (a, b|x, y) = 1 ∀x, y
OAB|XY (a, b|x, y) ≥ 0 ∀a, b, x, y
(10.22)
Program (10.22) can be seen as a perturbation of Program (10.21). Their
optimal values are therefore related to one another; the exact relation can be derived
by studying how sensitive the objective function is to small modifications of the
constraints. This process is called “sensitivity analysis of linear programs” and we
14[Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b] includes an explanation of the implications of the linear pro-
gram (10.21) to games with incomplete support.
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follow it in Appendix B.2 for the programs of interest. As a result, we get that
strategies OAB|XY with
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
) ≤ ζ + 2
Sig(B→A,x,y,a)
(
OAB|XY
) ≤ ζ + 2 ,
for all x, y, a, and b achieve winning probability w
(
OAB|XY
)
such that
w
(
OAB|XY
) ≤ 1− α+ (ζ + 2)d , (10.23)
where 1− α is the optimal winning probability of a non-signalling strategy, i.e., it
is the solution of Program (10.21), and d = |X ||Y| (|A|+ |B|) is the number of the
non-signalling constraints in the linear programs above.
10.3.2 Final result
The results of Section 10.2 are applicable when considering permutation invariant
strategies PAB|XY (recall Definition 8.1). As the repeated game Gn1−α+β is by itself
permutation invariant we can restrict the strategies of the players to be permutation
invariant without loss of generality.15 This is shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 10.12. For every strategy PAB|XY for the repeated game Gn1−α+β
there exists a permutation-invariant strategy P˜AB|XY such that w
(
PAB|XY
)
=
w
(
P˜AB|XY
)
.
Proof. Given PAB|XY define its permutation-invariant version to be
P˜AB|XY =
1
n!
∑
pi
PAB|XY ◦ pi .
The winning probability of the game is linear in the strategy, therefore we have
w
(
P˜AB|XY
)
= w
(
1
n!
∑
pi
PAB|XY ◦ pi
)
=
1
n!
∑
pi
w
(
PAB|XY ◦ pi
)
. (10.24)
Since the questions in the repeated game are chosen in an IID manner and
the winning condition is checked for each game separately, the winning probability
is indifferent to the ordering of the questions-answers pairs. As pi permutes the
questions and answers together we have w
(
PAB|XY ◦ pi
)
= w
(
PAB|XY
)
. Thus, we
get w
(
P˜AB|XY
)
= w
(
PAB|XY
)
.
We can now combine everything we have learned in the previous sections in order
to derive the final results. As before, we denote by d the number of non-signalling
conditions appearing in the linear programs above, i.e., d = |X ||Y| (|A|+ |B|).
15This is not to say that all strategies are permutation invariant but only that the optimal
strategy can be assumed to be permutation invariant. It is perhaps interesting to note that, more
commonly, the optimal strategies are taken to be, without loss of generality, deterministic in proofs
of classical parallel repetition and pure in proofs of quantum parallel repetition. Here we are
choosing to focus on permutation invariant strategies instead.
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Lemma 10.13. Let w(G) = 1 − α be the optimal winning probability of a non-
signalling strategy in G. Let 0 < β ≤ α be some constant and n a sufficiently
large integer such that Equation (10.16) is satisfied. Then for any non-signalling
strategy PAB|XY of the threshold game Gn1−α−β,
Prdata∼PABXY
[
w
(
O
freq(data)
AB|XY
)
> 1− α+ β
]
≤ 6d
√
cδ .
Proof. We denote the event of all inputs appearing in data1 and data2 by aid.
Furthermore, let ζ,  > 0 be such that d(ζ + 2) ≤ β,  ≤ minx,y QXY (xy) and
7 ≤ ζ ≤ 1.
If all questions (x, y) appear at least once in data1 and data2, i.e., the event aid
holds, then we can use Equation (10.23) in combination with Theorem 10.10 and get
Prdata∼PABXY
[
w
(
O
freq(data)
AB|XY
)
> 1− α+ β∣∣aid]
≤ Prdata∼PABXY
[
∃a, b, x, y s.t. Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data)
AB|XY
)
≤ ζ + 2
or Sig(B→A,x,y,a)
(
O
freq(data)
AB|XY
)
≤ ζ + 2∣∣aid]
≤ d · 4
√
cδ .
The probability that the event aid does not hold is upper bounded by
2|X ||Y|
(
1−min
x,y
QXY (x, y)
)n/2
≤ 2|X ||Y|e−minx,y QXY (x,y)n/2
≤ 2|X ||Y|e−n/2
≤ 2dδ
and therefore all together we have
Prdata∼PABXY
[
w
(
O
freq(data)
AB|XY
)
> 1− α+ β
]
≤ 6d
√
cδ .
Our threshold theorem, Theorem 10.11, follows from Lemma 10.13:
Proof of Theorem 10.11. Let f denote the fraction of coordinates in which the play-
ers win the game in the observed data. Note that f is equals exactly w
(
O
freq(data)
AB|XY
)
by the definition of Ofreq(data)AB|XY . Lemma 10.13 therefore implies
Prdata∼PABXY [f > 1− α+ β] ≤ 6d
√
cδ . (10.25)
Plugging the values of the parameters d, c, and δ, we see that Equation (10.25)
can be written, for an appropriately defined Cˆ(G, n), as
Prdata∼PABXY [f > 1− α+ β] ≤ Cˆ(G, n) exp[−n2/8]
= poly(n) exp[−n2/8] . (10.26)
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Our goal now is to show that, actually, it must be possible to replace Cˆ(G, n) with
a constant smaller than 1 and by this drop the polynomial pre-factor. We do this
using a step that appeared in [Lancien and Winter, 2016, Proof of Theorem 3.1].16
To this end, denote by ωopt(Gn1−α+β) the optimal winning probability in the
threshold game Gn1−α+β . For any n, let C˜n be the constant for which the tight
bound
ωopt(G
n
1−α+β) = C˜n exp[−n2/8] (10.27)
holds. In particular, this means that there exists a strategy Pn that achieves the
above winning probability.
Assume by contradiction that there exists N0 such that C˜N0 > 1. Thus, there ex-
ists a strategy PN0 achieving C˜N0 exp[−N02/8], with C˜N0 > 1, in the game GN01−α+β .
Let N1 be sufficiently large, so that Equation (10.10) holds for n = N0N1 and
consider the threshold game GN0N11−α+β . On the one hand, using N1 independent copies
of PN0 achieves winning probability of
(
C˜N0
)N1
exp[−N0N12/8] and thus
ωopt(G
N0N1
1−α+β) ≥
(
C˜N0
)N1
exp[−N0N12/8] .
On the other hand, Equation (10.26) must hold for n = N0N1:
ωopt(G
N0N1
1−α+β) ≤ poly (N0N1) exp[−N0N12/8] .
To reconcile both bounds, we must have
(
C˜N0
)N1 ≤ poly (N0N1) for all sufficiently
large N1. Thus, C˜N0 ≤ 1, which leads to a contradiction.
We get that for all sufficiently large n, C˜n ≤ 1. In combination with Equa-
tion (10.27) we therefore have
ωopt(G
n
1−α+β) ≤ exp[−n2/8] .
To get a better feeling of the result, without trying to optimise it, one can make the
following choices. Let  = β10d , ζ = 8 and ν =  (assuming minx,y QXY (x, y) >
β
10d ).
Using these choices, our proof holds for n and β such that
n
ln(n)
> 20|A||B||X ||Y| ln(20d/β)
(β/10d)2
with the following constants in Theorem 10.11:
C(G) = (30d)−2 = (30|X ||Y| (|A|+ |B|))−2 . (10.28)
The theorem then reads
Prdata∼PABXY [f > 1− α+ β] ≤ exp
[
−nβ2 (30|X ||Y| (|A|+ |B|))−2
]
.
A different choice of parameters can improve the dependence of the constants on
the game G.
16The part of the proof starting at this point onward did not appear in the proof
of the threshold theorem of [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b]. We follow here the last
part of the proof of the threshold theorem presented in [Lancien and Winter, 2016], which
appeared after [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b], and can be used to improve the result
of [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b].
10.4 Open questions 141
10.4 Open questions
In this chapter we considered the question of parallel repetition of games when
the players are allowed to use any non-signalling strategy. The most interesting
direction for future work is the development of a similar proof technique, based on
de Finetti reductions or other forms of reductions to IID, for classical and quantum
parallel repetition. In the case of classical games, parallel repetition results for
general games with more than two parties are unknown. For quantum games, even
the case of two-player games is not completely solved. (Recall Section 4.1.2 for
further information). Since our proof captures all types of games and any number of
players (see [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b]), a similar proof technique for classical
and quantum games will solve some open questions.
To understand what is the main challenge when trying to extend the proof to
classical and quantum case, note the following. In the standard proofs of parallel
repetition theorems, i.e., proofs following the approach of [Raz, 1998] most of the
difficulties arise due to the effect of conditioning on the event of winning some of the
game repetitions. As this event is one that depends on the structure of the game
and strategy and we have no control over them, conditioning can introduce arbitrary
correlations between the questions used in different repetitions of the game, a major
source of difficulty for the remainder of the argument. In our proof we also need to
analyse the effect of conditioning on a certain event, the event of the non-signalling
test accepting, and this is done in Lemma 10.9. However, the key advantage of our
approach is that the test has a very specific structure, and in particular conditioning
on the test passing can be done locally by the players in a way that respects the non-
signalling constraints. As a result it is almost trivial to deal with the conditioning in
the remainder of the proof. This shift from conditioning on an uncontrolled event,
success in the game, to a highly controlled one, a non-signalling test that we design
ourselves, is a key simplification that we expect to play an important role in any
extension of our method to classical or quantum strategies.
By finding appropriate “non-classicality” and “non-quantumness” measures which
can replace our signalling measure in Definition 10.3 one may be able to adapt the
proof to the multi-player classical and quantum cases as well. Unfortunately, it is
not clear which measure can be used by the players, preferably locally, to determine
if their systems are classical or quantum. In other words, the main difficulty is
finding a measure for which Lemma 10.9 can be proven. The rest of the proofs
should follow easily for most “non-classicality” and “non-quantumness” measures of
one-game strategies.
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Chapter 11
Showcase: device-independent
quantum cryptography
In this chapter we consider the showcase of device-independent quantum cryptography
and show how the security proof of device-independent cryptographic protocols can
be performed via a reduction to IID. We introduce a general framework for obtaining
proofs of device-independent security for a broad range of cryptographic tasks. For
the sake of explicitness, we focus in this chapter on the task of device-independent
quantum key distribution (DIQKD).1
The main result that we present can be phrased in the following informal way
(the formal theorem is stated as Theorem 11.6):
Theorem 11.1 (Informal). Security of DIQKD in the most general case follows
from security under the IID assumption. Moreover, the dependence of the key rate
on the number of rounds, n, is the same as the one in the IID case, up to terms that
scale like 1/
√
n.
The theorem establishes the a priori surprising fact that general quantum ad-
versaries are no stronger than an adversary restricted to IID attacks, even in the
device-independent setting. This allows us to give simple and modular security
proofs of DIQKD and to extend tight results known for DIQKD under the IID
assumption to the most general setting thus deriving essentially optimal key rates
and noise tolerance.2
Our technique takes advantage of the sequential nature of the protocol, as
well as the specific way in which classical statistics are collected by users of the
protocol, and makes use of the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT), discussed as
1Since the initial announcement of our work [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016c], our framework
has already been applied to a variety of additional tasks, including conference key agree-
ment [Ribeiro et al., 2017], randomness expansion [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016c] and privatiza-
tion [Kessler and Arnon-Friedman, 2017], as well as randomness generation with sub-linear quan-
tum resources [Bamps et al., 2017].
2This is crucial for experimental implementations of device-independent protocols. Our quanti-
tive results have been applied to the analysis of the first experimental implementation of a protocol
for randomness generation in the fully device-independent framework [Liu et al., 2017].
144 11. Showcase: device-independent quantum cryptography
part of Chapter 9. The analysis and results of this chapter previously appeared
in [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016c, Arnon-Friedman et al., 2018].
The chapter is arranged as follows. We first explain in Section 11.1 what
is the main challenge when proving the security of device-independent quantum
cryptographic protocols, such as DIQKD. Section 11.2 deals with the analysis of the
main subroutine of most device-independent protocols. Then, the security proof of
DIQKD is given in Section 11.3. As we are about to encounter many parameters
and variables throughout the proofs, we list them in Appendix C.3 for convenience.
11.1 Main challenge and goal
The central task when proving security of cryptographic protocols consists in bound-
ing the information that an adversary, called Eve, may obtain about certain values
generated by the protocol, which are supposed to be secret. In the case of QKD, for
example, the relevant output of the protocol is the raw data K, and proving security
is essentially equivalent3 to establishing a lower bound on the smooth conditional
min-entropy Hεmin(K|E), where E is Eve’s quantum system, which can be initially
correlated to the device producing K. The quantity Hεmin(K|E) determines the
maximal length of the secret key that can be created by the protocol. Hence, proving
security amounts to establishing a lower bound on Hεmin(K|E). Evaluating the
smooth min-entropy Hεmin(K|E) of a large system is often difficult, especially in the
device-independent setting where not much is known about the way K is produced
and the system E is out of our control.
The IID assumption, discussed in Chapter 7, is commonly used to simplify the
task of calculating Hεmin(K|E). The analysis of the smooth min-entropy under
the IID assumption was sketched in Section 7.3.2; in that case the total smooth
min-entropy can be easily related to the sum of the von Neumann entropies in
each round separately, using the quantum asymptotic equipartition property (Sec-
tion 7.2.2). A bound on the entropy accumulated in one round can usually be
derived using the expected winning probability in the game played in that round
(as appeared in Section 5.2), which in turn can be easily estimated during the
protocol in the IID case using standard Chernoff-type bounds. A long line of
works [Acín et al., 2006a, Acín et al., 2006b, Scarani et al., 2006, Acín et al., 2007,
Masanes, 2009, Pironio et al., 2009, Hänggi et al., 2010a, Hänggi and Renner, 2010,
Masanes et al., 2011, Masanes et al., 2014] considered the security of device-
independent quantum and non-signalling cryptography under the IID assumption.
Most relevant for our work are the results of [Pironio et al., 2009], where security of
a DIQKD protocol was proven in the asymptotic limit, i.e., when the device is used
n→∞ times, and under the IID assumption. Their protocol is based on the CHSH
inequality [Clauser et al., 1969], and their analysis shows that it achieves the best
possible rates under these assumptions.
Unfortunately, even though quite convenient for the analysis, the IID assump-
tion is a very strong one in the DI scenario. In particular, under such an as-
3From that point onward standard classical post-processing steps, e.g., error correction and
privacy amplification, suffice to prove the security of the protocol; recall Section 4.2.3.
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sumption the device cannot use any internal memory (i.e., its actions in one
round cannot depend on the previous rounds) or even display time-dependent
behaviour (due to inevitable imperfections for example). Without this assump-
tion, however, very little is known about the structure of the untrusted de-
vice and hence also about its output (as the device might correlate the differ-
ent rounds in an almost arbitrary way). As a consequence, DIQKD security
proofs [Reichardt et al., 2013, Vazirani and Vidick, 2014, Miller and Shi, 2014] that
estimated Hεmin(K|E) directly for the most general case had to use complicated
techniques and statistical analysis compared to the IID case. This led to security
statements which are of limited relevance for practical experimental implementations;
they are applicable only in an unrealistic regime of parameters, e.g., small amount
of tolerable noise and large number of signals.
To overcome the above difficulty we take the approach of reductions to IID in the
analysis presented in the following sections. In particular, we leverage the sequential
nature of our DIQKD protocol to prove its security by reducing the analysis of multi-
round sequential boxes to that of IID boxes as discussed in Chapter 9. Specifically,
we use the EAT presented in Section 9.2.3 to establish that entropy accumulates
additively throughout the multiple rounds of the protocol and use it to bound the
total amount of smooth min-entropy Hεmin(K|E).4
This results in a proof technique with several benefits. Firstly, since the analysis
of the IID case is rather simple and modular (as it builds mainly on the analysis of
a single-round box) a security proof via a reduction to IID ends up being simple
and modular by itself. For example, if one wishes to consider a DIQKD protocol
based on a game other than the CHSH game, the sole significant modification of
the security proof is the analysis of a single-round box (see Sections 5.2 and 11.2.2).
Secondly, due to the optimality of the EAT (at least to first order in n), we are
able to extend tight results known for, e.g., DIQKD, under the IID assumption, to
the most general setting. This yields the best rates known for any protocol for a
device-independent cryptographic task. Thirdly, performing a finite-size analysis
is no harder than performing the asymptotic one as all dependency on n is either
trivial or already incorporated in the EAT.
We are now ready to embark on the mission of proving the security of our DIQKD
protocol, described in Section 4.2.2 (see also Protocol 11.2 below).
11.2 Device-independent entropy accumulation
The current section is devoted to the analysis of the entropy accumulation protocol
presented as Protocol 11.1. The entropy accumulation protocol acts as the main
building block of many device-independent cryptographic protocols. It is used to
generate the raw data for Alice and Bob by playing a non-local game n times in
sequence using an untrusted device D. We remark that even though we call the
entropy accumulation protocol a “protocol”, one should see it more as a mathematical
4The security proof presented in [Miller and Shi, 2014] is similar in spirit (but technically very
different) to the one presented here. It bounds the total amount of smooth min-entropy generated
in the protocol in a round-by-round fashion but the entropy accumulated in a single round is not
the von Neumann entropy.
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Protocol 11.1 CHSH-based entropy accumulation protocol
Arguments:
D – untrusted device of two components that can play CHSH repeatedly
n ∈ N+ – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] – expected fraction of test rounds
ωexp – expected winning probability in an honest implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the confidence interval for parameter estimation
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-5:
2: Alice and Bob choose a random Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
3: If Ti = 0, Alice and Bob choose (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2) and otherwise Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1}
uniformly at random.
4: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and Bi
respectively.
5: If Ti = 0 then Bob updates Bi to Bi =⊥, and they set Wi =⊥. If Ti = 1 they
set Wi = w (Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi).
6: Alice and Bob abort if
∑
j:Tj=1
Wj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n .
tool which allows us to use the machinery of the EAT rather than an actual protocol
to be implemented.5 The relevance of the protocol stems from the fact that the
final state at the end of the protocol, on which a smooth min-entropy is evaluated,
is closely related to the final state in the actual protocol to be executed (e.g., our
DIQKD protocol).
Our primary task is to lower-bound the amount of smooth min-entropy generated
by playing the n games. This lower-bound can then be used as the starting point of
security proofs of device-independent cryptographic protocols, such as DIQKD. The
informal statement is given below (for the explicit formulation see Theorem 11.5):
Theorem 11.2 (Informal). Fix a choice of parameters for Protocol 11.1. Then
there exist constants c1, c2 > 0 such that the following holds. Let D be any device and
ρ|Ω the state generated using Protocol 11.1, conditioned on the protocol not aborting.
Then for any ε1, ε2 ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol aborts with probability greater than
1− ε1 or
Hε2min (AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω > c1n− c2
√
n log(1/ε1ε2) . (11.1)
The registers AB in Equation (11.1) contain the classical outputs generated by
the device during the protocol. The registers XY T hold the classical information
exchanged during the protocol, that may be leaked to the adversary. E is a quantum
register that describes the adversary’s quantum system. Thus, Equation (11.1) gives
a precise bound on the amount of the smooth min-entropy present in the users’
outputs at the end of the protocol, conditioned on all information available to the
adversary.
We give below explicit formulas for computing the constants c1 and c2 that appear
in Equation (11.1) as a function of the parameters of the protocol. Importantly, the
5In particular, in a setting with two distinct parties, Alice and Bob, communication is required
to actually implement Protocol 11.1. We ignore this as it is not relevant for the analysis.
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constant c1 that governs the leading-order term equals the optimal constant, i.e., the
same leading constant that would be obtained under the IID assumption, which by
the asymptotic equipartition property (Theorem 7.3) is the von Neumann entropy
accumulated in one round of the protocol. Furthermore, our analysis provides control
over the constant c2 in front of the second-order term. Such control is necessary for
any application where finite values of n need to be considered, such as in quantum
cryptography, where the values of n achieved in practice remain relatively small.6
As we show below, Theorem 11.2 can be proven by reducing the general sequential
scenario to the IID one using the EAT. To use the EAT, we first need to construct
the relevant objects, i.e., the EAT-channels and the min-tradeoff functions defined
in Section 9.2.2. This is done in the following two sections. A lower-bound on the
smooth min-entropy is then proven in Section 11.2.3.
11.2.1 EAT channels
Protocol 11.1 proceeds in rounds and can therefore be presented by an application
of a sequence of quantum channels (recall Section 9.1). In this section we define
the considered channels and prove that they are EAT-channels, according to Defini-
tion 9.1. Note that one has some freedom in choosing the channels to work with
(i.e., the channels are not completely defined by the protocol itself). We choose
our particular channels so that all the prerequisites of the EAT are fulfilled and, at
the same time, the final bound on the smooth min-entropy can be converted to a
bound on the smooth min-entropy in our DIQKD protocol (see Section 11.3.2, and
Lemma 11.8 in particular, for details).
Every EAT channelMi describes one round of the protocol, where one round
includes Steps 2-5 of Protocol 11.1. For every i ∈ {0} ∪ [n], the (unknown) quantum
state of the device D shared by Alice and Bob after round i of the protocol is
denoted by ρiQAQB . We denote the register holding this state by Ri. In particular,
R0 = QAQB at the start of the protocol. At Step 4 in Protocol 11.1, the quantum
state of the devices is changed from ρi−1QAQB in Ri−1 to ρ
i
QAQB
in Ri by the use
of the device. To be a bit more precise, the quantum state is changed in two
stages. First, the relevant measurement of Step 4 is done (where it is assumed
that the measurements of the different components are in tensor product). Then,
after Ai and Bi are recorded, the different components of the device are allowed to
communicate. Thus, some further changes can be made to the post-measurement
state even based on the memory of all components together (recall Section 6.2.2).
In the notation of Chapter 9, we make the following choices:
Oi = AiBi
Si = XiYiTi
Ci = Wi
Ri = Ri
E = E .
(11.2)
6See e.g. Figure 11.4, where one can see that finite-size effects can play an important role up
to even moderately large values of n ≈ 1010.
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Our EAT channels are then
Mi : Ri−1 → RiAiBiXiYiTiWi
defined by the CPTP map describing the i-th round of Protocol 11.1, as implemented
by the untrusted device D. That is, the channel describes the random choices of Ti,
Xi, and Yi, the quantum operations made by the device, and the production of Ai,
Bi, and Wi.
Since the operations of D are unknown, our EAT channels are not completely
explicit. The important thing is merely that we know that some quantum channels
describing the operation of the device exist. The lack of knowledge regarding the
channels does not raise any problems when applying the EAT but it does make
the task of deriving good min-tradeoff functions more challenging (compared to
the scenario of a characterised device). This difficulty, however, is inherent to
device-independent information processing tasks and has nothing to do with the
proof technique; see Section 11.2.2 below for further details.
We prove that the described channels can act as our EAT channels.
Lemma 11.3. The channels {Mi : Ri−1 → RiAiBiXiYiTiWi}i∈[n] defined by the
CPTP map describing the i-th round of Protocol 11.1, as implemented by the
untrusted device D are EAT channels according to Definition 9.1 and the identification
made in Equation (11.2).
Proof. To prove that the constructed channels {Mi}i∈[n] are EAT channels we need
to show that the three conditions stated in Definition 9.1 are fulfiled.
1. {Oi}i∈[n] = {AiBi}i∈[n], {Si}i∈[n] = {XiYiTi}i∈[n], and {Ci}i∈[n] = {Wi}i∈[n]
are all finite-dimensional classical systems. {Ri}i∈[n] are arbitrary quantum
systems. Finally, we have dO = dAi · dBi = 2 · 3 = 6.
2. For any i ∈ [n] and any input state σRi−1 , Wi is a function of the classical
values Ai, Bi, Xi, and Yi. Hence, the marginal σOiSi = σAiBiXiYiTi of the
output state is unchanged when deriving Wi from it. (In other words, we can
“measure” σAiBiXiYiTi to get the value of Wi repeatedly without disturbing
σAiBiXiYiTi).
3. For any initial state ρinR0E and the resulting final state ρOSCE = ρABXY TWE ,
the Markov-chain conditions
(AB)1, . . . , (AB)i−1 ↔ (XY T )1, . . . , (XY T )i−1, E ↔ (XY T )i
trivially hold for all i ∈ [n] since, according to Protocol 11.1, Xi, Yi, and Ti
are chosen independently from everything else.
When defining the EAT channels we identified Oi with AiBi. Looking ahead,
this means that we are about to derive a bound on Hεmin(AB|XY TE). For the
analysis of DIQKD, however, a bound on Hεmin(A|XY TE) is needed. Why not
set Oi = Ai instead of Oi = AiBi? The reason is that the definition of an EAT
channel requires that Ci can be derived from OiSi alone. Thus, choosing Oi = Ai,
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Si = XiYiTi, and Ci = Wi would render the above lemma wrong. The reader may
then ask – why not choose Oi = Ai and Si = BiXiYiTi? With this choice, however,
the required Markov-chain conditions read
A1, . . . , Ai−1 ↔ (BXY T )1, . . . , (BXY T )i−1, E ↔ (BXY T )i
and these do not hold for an arbitrary initial states since nothing restricts Bi from
being correlated to, e.g., Ai−1, when considering untrusted devices.7 Hence, the
lemma would not hold for this choice as well. We therefore stick with the choices
made in Equation (11.2) and relate Hεmin(AB|XY TE) to Hεmin(A|XY TE) in
Section 11.3.2.
Now that our EAT channels are defined, the next step is to construct a min-
tradeoff function for them. This is done in the next section.
11.2.2 Min-tradeoff function
When working with the EAT the most important task is to devise a good tradeoff
function, as defined in Definition 9.2. As mentioned in Section 9.2.3, this is where
the “physics kicks in”. We are aiming for a lower-bound on the smooth min-entropy
and hence in need of a min-tradeoff function fmin. That is, we need to construct a
convex differential function for which, for all i ∈ [n],
fmin(p) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :Mi(σ)Wi=p
H (AiBi|XiYiTiR′)Mi(σ) , (11.3)
where p is a probability distribution over W = {⊥, 0, 1} and {Mi}i∈[n] are the EAT
channels defined in the previous section.
To understand the task at hand, let us first focus on the set of states
Σ(p) =
{
σRi−1R′ :Mi(σ)Wi = p
}
.
on which the infimum is evaluated. First observe that, due to the structure of our
channels, the distributions over Xi, Yi, and Ti are fixed for any σ ∈ Σ(p). That is,
even though we take an infimum over many possible input states for the channels,
and even though the actions of the untrusted device are not characterised, the values
of Xi, Yi, and Ti are always chosen according to Protocol 11.1.8 This implies, in
7Consider for example a device in which the initial state ρQA1QB1QA2QB2 = |Φ〉 〈Φ|QA1QB2 ⊗
|Φ〉 〈Φ|QA2QB1 , i.e., the systems over QA1 and QB2 are entangled. Thus, A1 and B2 may be
correlated even given B1X1Y1T1. In this case the Markov-chain conditions do not hold since the
side-information B2 reveals information regarding the past output A1.
8A different model for the sequential process could have been one in which the initial quantum
state itself includes the registers X and Y and the channel is defined such that a measurement is
performed on those registers to get the inputs (and then use the device in the protocol). When
starting with maximally mixed states over XY the entire sequential process is exactly the same
as the one described by our EAT channels. However, when coming to construct a min-tradeoff
function with this (somewhat strange) alternative choice of channels, we see that the set Σ(p) can
include states in which, e.g., Xi = 0 with probability 1 (since we need to consider all possible input
states). In the context of Bell inequalities, this is similar to dropping the “free choice assumption”.
Clearly, if this had been the case, the only min-tradeoff function one could construct is the constant
function fmin(p) = 0 for all p, which is trivial and useless.
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particular, that for probability distributions p with p(⊥) 6= 1 − γ the set Σ(p) is
empty.
Given the above, for any p over {⊥, 0, 1}, the set Σ(p) includes only states σ for
which
Mi(σ)Wi =
p(⊥) 0 00 p(0) 0
0 0 p(1)
 =
1− γ 0 00 γ(1− ω) 0
0 0 γω
 , (11.4)
where we identify ω with the winning probability of the state σ in the CHSH game
(when using the measurements defining the channelMi). For this reason, we can,
slightly informally,9 see the function fmin as defined over a single variable ω ∈ [0, 1].
In total, we can understand the set Σ(p) = Σ(p(ω)) as the set including all
states σ that can be used to win the CHSH game with probability ω. It is this
information about the relevant input states σ that allows us to construct a min-
tradeoff function fulfilling Equation (11.3). In fact, given the above observation,
the main ingredient needed to construct a valid (and tight) min-tradeoff function is
Lemma 5.3, which was discussed in the context of single-round boxes (Chapter 5).
This clarifies why the presented proof technique can be seen as a reduction to IID.
We are ready to embark on the construction of the min-tradeoff function.
Lemma 11.4. Let10
g(p) =
1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p(1)γ
(
p(1)
γ − 1
)
+ 3
)
p(1)
γ ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
1 p(1)γ ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
,
and
fmin (p, pcut) =

g (p) p(1) ≤ pcut(1)
d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣
pcut
· p(1)
+ g(pcut)− d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣
pcut
· pcut(1)
p(1) > pcut(1) .
(11.5)
Then, for any probability distribution pcut over {⊥, 0, 1}, fmin (p, pcut) is a min-
tradeoff functions for the EAT channels from Lemma 11.3.
Before proving the lemma, let us parse the above lengthy equations. The
function g is basically the single-round bound presented in Lemma 5.3, where we
replace ω with p(1)γ and trivially extend the function to the regime of winning
probabilities above the optimal quantum winning probability 2+
√
2
4 . Notice that
for an arbitrary p, the correct relation between p and ω is given by ω = p(1)p(0)+p(1) .
9Formally, we will need to extend the function to all probability distributions p (even those
with p(⊥) 6= 1− γ). We can extended the function in any way we wish, while keeping it convex
and differentiable.
10We define the functions g and fmin only in the regime in which the protocol does not abort,
i.e., p(1)/γ ≥ 3/4.
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pcut(1)
0
1
p(1)
g(p)
Tangent line at pcut(1)
fmin (p, pcut)
Figure 11.1: The construction of the min-tradeoff function fmin appearing in Equa-
tion (11.10). The plot shows the values of the min-tradeoff function restricted to a
slice p(0) + p(1) = constant.
However, as explained above, due to the definition of the channelsMi, the set Σ(p)
is empty for p with p(0) + p(1) 6= γ. This implies that there are no constraints on
the value of the min-tradeoff function for such p’s and we are free to define it as
we wish in this regime. Thus, we are not going to run into problems even though
the value of the function g does not seem to have any “physical meaning” for p
with p(0) + p(1) 6= γ.11
The function fmin in Equation (11.10) is governed by g and can be understood
as follows. Fix a probability distribution pcut ∈ [0, 1]. For p with p(1) ≤ pcut(1),
fmin is identical to g. Otherwise, fmin is a linear function (when restricting ourselves
to a slice p(0) + p(1) = constant) defined via the value and the tangent of g at
the point pcut(1). That is, we “cut and glue” the function at point pcut. By doing
so, we make sure that fmin is a convex and differentiable function, as required by
Definition 9.2 while restraining its gradient, which will later affect the bound on the
smooth min-entropy (via Equation (9.14)). This construction of fmin is illustrated
in Figure 11.1.
Proof of Lemma 11.4. We start by using the chain rule of the von Neumann entropy,
H (AiBi|XiYiTiR′)Mi(σ) ≥ H (Ai|XiYiTiR′)Mi(σ) .
Due to the bipartite requirement on the untrusted device D used to implement
the protocol, the actions of Alice’s device are independent of Bob’s choice of Yi as
11Alternatively, one could replace p(1)/γ with p(1)/(p(0) + p(1)), which is more meaningful,
in the definition of the function g. However, since the dfmin/dp(1) will affect the final smooth
min-entropy bound, using p(1)/γ leads to better quantitive results.
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well as of and Ti.12 We thus have
H (Ai|XiYiTiR′)Mi(σ) = H (Ai|XiR′)Mi(σ) .
Combined with Lemma 5.3 we get that for any state σ with winning probability ω
in the CHSH game,
H (AiBi|XiYiTiR′) ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω (ω − 1) + 3
)
. (11.6)
For probability distributions p with p(0) + p(1) 6= γ, the set of states fulfilling
Mi(σ)Wi = p is empty and the condition on the min-tradeoff function given in
Equation 11.3 becomes trivial. Hence, for the construction of the min-tradeoff
function we can restrict our attention to p with p(0) + p(1) = γ. For such p’s one
can write ω = p(1)p(0)+p(1) =
p(1)
γ . All together we learn that for all p with
p(1)
γ ≥ 34 ,
inf
σRi−1R′ :Mi(σ)Wi=p
H (AiBi|XiYiTiR′)Mi(σ) ≥
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16
p(1)
γ
(
p(1)
γ
− 1
)
+ 3
)
.
(11.7)
Define a function g by
g(p) =
1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p(1)γ
(
p(1)
γ − 1
)
+ 3
)
p(1)
γ ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
1 p(1)γ ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
.
(11.8)
From Equation (11.7) it follows that any choice of fmin that is differentiable and
satisfies fmin(p) ≤ g(p) for all p will satisfy Equation (11.3).
For p(1)γ =
2+
√
2
4 the derivative of g is infinite. Looking ahead, for the final bound
on the smooth min-entropy derived using the EAT to be meaningful, fmin should be
chosen such that ‖Ofmin‖∞ is finite. To assure that this is the case we choose fmin
by “cutting” the function g and “gluing” it to a linear function at some point pcut,
while keeping the function differentiable. By doing this we ensure that the gradient
of fmin is bounded, at the cost of losing a bit of entropy for p with p(1) > pcut(1).13
Towards this, denote
a(pcut) =
d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣
pcut
and b(pcut) = g(pcut)− a(pcut) · pcut(1). (11.9)
We then make the following choice for the min-tradeoff function fmin (see Fig-
ure 11.1):
fmin (p, pcut) =
{
g (p) p(1) ≤ pcut(1)
a(pcut) · p(1) + b(pcut) p(1) > pcut(1)
(11.10)
12We assume that the value of Ti is exchanged over a classical authenticated channel to which
the device D does not have access. In particular, Alice’s part of the device is independent from the
value of Ti given Xi.
13The point pcut can later be chosen such that the derived smooth entropy bounds are optimised.
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From the definition of a and b in Equation (11.9), this function is convex, differ-
entiable, and fulfils the condition given in Equation (11.3). fmin can therefore be
rightfully called a min-tradeoff function. Furthermore, by definition, for any choice
of pcut it holds that ‖Ofmin(·, pcut)‖∞ ≤ a(pcut).
11.2.3 Smooth min-entropy rate
After constructing the EAT channels and min-tradeoff function in the previous
sections, we are ready to apply Theorem 9.3 to derive our lower-bound on the
conditional smooth min-entropy generated by the entropy accumulation protocol,
Protocol 11.1.
We use the following notation. The event of not aborting the protocol is given by
Ω =
{
w :
∑
j:Tj=1
wj ≥ (ωexpγ − δest) · n
}
. (11.11)
For any initial state ρinQAQBE , the final state in the end of the protocol is denoted
by ρ = ρABXYTWE and the final state conditioned on not aborting the entropy
accumulation protocol is ρ|Ω .
As shown in Theorem 11.5 below, The smooth min-entropy rate is governed by
the following functions, where h is the binary entropy and γ, p(1) ∈ (0, 1]:
g(p) =
1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p(1)γ
(
p(1)
γ − 1
)
+ 3
)
p(1)
γ ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
1 p(1)γ ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
,
fmin (p, pcut) =
{
g (p) p(1) ≤ pcut(1)
d
dp(1)g(p)
∣∣
pcut
· p(1) + g(pcut)− ddp(1)g(p)
∣∣
pcut
· pcut(1) p(1) > pcut(1) ,
µ(p, pcut, εs, εe) = fmin (p, pcut)
− 1√
n
2
(
log 13 +
d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣
pcut
)√
1− 2 log(εs · εe) ,
µopt(εs, εe) = max
3
4<
pcut(1)
γ <
2+
√
2
4
µ(ωexpγ − δest, pcut, εs, εe) . (11.12)
Theorem 11.5. Let D be any device, ρ the state generated by running Proto-
col 11.1, Ω the event that the protocol does not abort (as defined in Equation (11.11)),
and ρ|Ω the state conditioned on Ω. Then, for any εEA, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol
aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA or
Hεsmin (AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω > n · µopt(εs, εEA) , (11.13)
where µopt is defined in Equation (11.12).
Proof. We wish to apply the EAT, stated as Theorem 9.3. To this end, denote
by freqw(w˜) =
|{i|wi=w˜}|
n the frequency defined by the raw data w (recall Equa-
tion (9.11)) and observe the following:
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1. The EAT channels {Mi}i∈[n] constructed in Section 11.2.1 faithfully describe
the protocol and the device D, in the sense that the final state of the protocol, ρ,
can be written as
ρABXYTWE = (TrRn ◦Mn ◦ · · · ◦M1)⊗ IE ρinQAQBE . (11.14)
2. The set Ωˆ = {p : p(1) ≥ ωexpγ − δest} is convex and {freqw : w ∈ Ω} ⊆ Ωˆ
(recall Section 9.2.3).
3. According to Lemma 11.4, fmin (p, pcut) is a min-tradeoff function for the
considered EAT channels, for any pcut with 34 <
pcut(1)
γ <
2+
√
2
4 .
4. For any pcut with 34 <
pcut(1)
γ <
2+
√
2
4 , the value t = fmin (ωexpγ − δest, pcut)
satisfies fmin (freqw, pcut) ≥ t for any freqw ∈ Ωˆ.
5. dO = dAiBi = 6 and ‖Ofmin(·, pcut)‖∞ = a(pcut) for any pcut with 34 <
pcut(1)
γ <
2+
√
2
4 .
Using the EAT (Theorem 9.3) in combination with the above observations we
conclude that for any pcut with 34 <
pcut(1)
γ <
2+
√
2
4 , either the protocol aborts with
probability greater than 1− εEA, or
Hεsmin (AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω > nfmin (ωexpγ − δest, pcut)−
√
nζ(pcut) , (11.15)
for ζ(pcut, εs, εEA) = 2 (log 13 + a(pcut))
√
1− 2 log(εs · εEA). To obtain the optimal
rate we maximise Hεsmin (AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω over pcut. Denote µ(p, pcut, εs, εEA) =
fmin (p, pcut)− 1√nζ(pcut, εs, εEA) and let
µopt(εs, εEA) = max
3
4<
pcut(1)
γ <
2+
√
2
4
µ(ωexpγ − δest, pcut, εs, εEA) .
Plugging this into Equation (11.15) the theorem follows.
Importantly, the theorem tells us that the first order term of the smooth min-
entropy is linear in n. Moreover, asymptotically, the entropy rate is simply given by
the min-tradeoff function fmin (p, pcut). This is why it was crucial to construct an
optimal min-tradeoff function in Section 11.2.2.
The rate µopt is plotted in Figure 11.2 as a function of the expected winning
probability ωexp in the CHSH game for γ = 1 and several choices of values for
the parameters εEA, δest, and n (while optimising over all other parameters). For
comparison, we also plot in Figure 11.2 the asymptotic rate (n→∞) under the IID
assumption. In this case, the quantum asymptotic equipartition property implies
that the optimal rate is the Shannon entropy accumulated in one round of the
protocol (recall Section 7.2.2). This rate, appearing as the dashed line in Figure 11.2,
is an upper bound on the smooth min-entropy that can be accumulated. One can
see that as the number of rounds in the protocol increases the rate µopt approaches
this optimal rate.
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Figure 11.2: µopt(ωexp) for γ = 1 and several choices of n, εEA, and the smoothing
parameter εs. δest = 10−2 in the curve with n = 105 and δest = 10−3 in all other
curves. Note that for the errors of the protocols to be meaningful the number of
rounds n should be at least of order δ−2est . εEA and εs affect the soundness error in
the DIQKD protocol considered in Section 11.3 and therefore should be chosen to
be relatively small. The dashed line shows the optimal asymptotic (n→∞) rate
under the IID assumption.
11.3 Device-independent quantum key distribution
Our DIQKD protocol is stated as Protocol 11.2. In the first part of the protocol
Alice and Bob use their devices to produce the raw data, similarly to what is done in
the entropy accumulation protocol, Protocol 11.1, analysed in the previous section.
In the second part of the protocol Alice and Bob apply classical post-processing
steps to produce their final keys from the raw data. The classical post-processing
consists of error correction, parameter estimation, and privacy amplification; all
discussed in detail in Section 4.2.2.
Apart from the classical post-processing, the main difference between the entropy
accumulation protocol and the DIQKD protocol is the way we set Bob’s outputs.
In Protocol 11.1, Bob’s outputs are being set to ⊥ in all rounds for which Ti = 0,
i.e., in the generation rounds. In contrast, when dealing with QKD Bob needs to
keep the outputs produced in the generation rounds so that he could create a key
identical to Alice’s key. To make the distinction explicit we denote Bob’s outputs in
Protocol 11.2 with a tilde, B˜. We will get back to this point later and explain why
the distinction is relevant for our analysis.
Our main goal in the following sections is to prove the security (according to
Definition 4.5) of Protocol 11.2:
Theorem 11.6. For any choice of parameters, the DIQKD protocol given in
Protocol 11.2 is (εsQKD, ε
c
QKD, )-secure according to Definition 4.5, with ε
s
QKD ≤
156 11. Showcase: device-independent quantum cryptography
Protocol 11.2 CHSH-based DIQKD protocol
Arguments:
D – untrusted device of two components that can play CHSH repeatedly
n ∈ N+ – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] – expected fraction of test rounds
ωexp – expected winning probability in an honest implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the confidence interval for parameter estimation
EC – error correction protocol that leaks leakEC bits and has completeness
and soundness error probabilities εcEC and εEC respectively
PA – privacy amplification protocol with error probability εPA
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-4:
2: Alice and Bob choose a random Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
3: If Ti = 0, Alice and Bob choose (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2) and otherwise Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1}
uniformly at random.
4: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and B˜i
respectively.
5: Error correction: Alice and Bob apply the error correction protocol EC. If
EC aborts they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they obtain raw keys denoted by
KA and KB .
6: Parameter estimation: Using B˜ and KB, Bob sets Wi =
wCHSH
(
KBi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
for the test rounds and Wi =⊥ otherwise. He
aborts if
∑
j:Tj=1
Wj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n;.
7: Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob apply the privacy amplification protocol
PA on KA and KB to create their final keys K˜A and K˜B of length `.
2εEC + εPA + εs + εEA, εcQKD ≤ εcEC + εcEA + εEC, and for key length
` = n · µopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC
− 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
− γn
−√n2 log(7)
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC))− 2 log
(
ε−1PA
)
,
(11.16)
where µopt is specified in Equation (11.12).
The resulting key rates, `/n, are discussed and plotted in Section 11.3.3 for
different choices of parameters.
In the following sections we are set to prove Theorem 11.6. The theorem follows
from the completeness of the protocol, stated as Lemmas 11.7, and its soundness,
stated as Lemma 11.9.
11.3.1 Completeness
We seek to prove that Protocol 11.2 is complete, i.e., that there exists an honest
implementation of the device D that leads to a negligible probability of the protocol
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aborting. We remark that in order for the protocol to be relevant in practice,
completeness has to be proven with respect to a realistic honest implementation
that can be realised in experiments (or, at the least, believed to be feasible in the
future). The honest implementation that we consider is the standard one and is
described in Section 4.2.4. In short, the honest device makes IID measurements
on an IID quantum state ρ = σ⊗n. The state and measurements are such that the
winning probability achieved in the CHSH game in a single round is ωexp that can
be chosen freely.14
The following lemma gives the relation between the probability εcQKD that
the protocol aborts for an honest implementation of the device D and the other
parameters of the protocol.
Lemma 11.7. Protocol 11.2 is complete with completeness error
εcQKD ≤ εcEC + εEC + εcEA ,
where εcEA ≤ exp(−2nδ2est) and εcEC and εEC are two independent parameters of the
error correction protocol.
Proof. We wish to upper-bound the probability that Protocol 11.2 aborts when
running using the honest implementation. There are two steps in which Alice and
Bob can abort Protocol 11.2:
1. The protocol may abort after the error correction step (Step 5). This happens
with probability εcEC .
2. Assuming the protocol did not abort in Step 5, it may abort after the parameter
estimation step (Step 6). Recall that Bob performs parameter estimation using
KB and B˜, i.e., he checks whether sufficiently many games were won when
looking at his data KB and B˜. There are two scenarios which lead to the
protocol aborting after parameter estimation:
(a) Error correction was successful, i.e., KB = KA, but not sufficiently many
games were won when comparing KA and B˜. When utilising the honest
implementation, Wi are IID RVs with E [Wi] = ωexpγ. Therefore, we can
use Hoeffding’s inequality to bound the probability of such an event:
εcEA = Pr
 ∑
j:Tj 6=⊥
Wj ≤ (ωexpγ − δest) · n
 ≤ exp(−2nδ2est) . (11.17)
(b) Error correction was not successful, i.e., KB 6= KA (but EC did not abort)
and not sufficiently many games were won when comparing at KB and B˜.
This happens with probability at most εEC .
The lemma follows by using the above in combination with the union bound.
14For any ωexp there are many devices that fit this description; an explicit example can be found
in Section 4.2.4.
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11.3.2 Soundness
To establish soundness first note that, by definition, as long as Protocol 11.2 does not
abort it produces a key of length `. Therefore it remains to verify correctness (Defi-
nition 4.3), which depends on the error correction step, and security (Definition 4.4),
which is based on the privacy amplification step.
To prove security we start by assuming that the error correction step is successful
and lower-bound the smooth min-entropy of the quantum state shared between Alice
and Bob right before the privacy amplification step. The main ingredient in the
proof is the lower-bound on the smooth min-entropy established in Theorem 11.5.
Most effort in proving security is devoted to relating the state considered in the
entropy accumulation protocol (to which Theorem 11.5 refers) and the state in the
end of the DIQKD protocol.
To be more precise, let
≈
Ω denote the event of Protocol 11.2 not aborting and
the EC protocol being successful, and let ρ˜
AB˜XY TOE|
≈
Ω
be the state at the end
of the protocol,15 conditioned on this event. Success of the privacy amplification
step relies on the smooth min-entropy Hεsmin(A|XY TOE)ρ˜|≈Ω being sufficiently large.
Lemma 11.8 connects this quantity to H
εs
4
min(AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω , on which a lower
bound is provided by Theorem 11.5.
Lemma 11.8. For any device D, let ρ˜ be the state generated in Protocol 11.2 right
before the privacy amplification step, Step 7. Let ρ˜
|
≈
Ω
be the state conditioned on not
aborting the protocol and success of the EC protocol. Then, for any εEA, εEC, εs ∈
(0, 1), either the protocol aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC or
Hεsmin (A|XY TOE)ρ˜
|
≈
Ω
≥ n · µopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC
−3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
− γn
−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) .
(11.18)
Proof. Consider the following events:
1. Ω: the event of not aborting in the entropy accumulation protocol, Proto-
col 11.1. This happens when the Bell violation, calculated using Alice and
Bob’s outputs and inputs, is sufficiently high.
2. Ω˜: Suppose Alice and Bob run Protocol 11.1, and then execute the EC protocol.
The event Ω˜ is defined by Ω and KB = A.
3.
≈
Ω: the event of not aborting the DIQKD protocol, Protocol 11.2, and KB = A.
The state ρ|Ω˜ then denotes the state at the end of Protocol 11.1 conditioned on Ω˜.
As we are only interested in the case where the EC protocol outputs the correct
guess of Alice’s bits, that is KB = A (which happens with probability 1− εEC), we
15O denotes the classical information sent from Alice to Bob during error correction; see
Section 4.2.2.
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have ρ˜
AXY TE|
≈
Ω
= ρAXY TE|Ω˜ (note that B˜ and B were traced out from ρ˜ and ρ
respectively). Hence,
Hεsmin (A|XY TE)ρ˜
|
≈
Ω
= Hεsmin (A|XY TE)ρ|Ω˜ . (11.19)
Using the chain rule given in [Tomamichel, 2015, Lemma 6.8] together with
Equation (11.19) we get that
Hεsmin (A|XY TOE)ρ˜
|
≈
Ω
≥ Hεsmin (A|XY TE)ρ˜
|
≈
Ω
− leakEC
= Hεsmin (A|XY TE)ρ|Ω˜ − leakEC , (11.20)
where leakEC denotes the amount of information leaked during error correction.
To apply Theorem 11.5 it remains to relate Hεsmin (A|XY TE)ρ|Ω˜ to
H
ε′s
min (AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω˜ for some ε
′
s. For this we first write
Hεsmin (A|XY TE)ρ|Ω˜ ≥ H
εs
4
min (AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω˜ −H
εs
4
max (B|AXY TE)ρ|Ω˜
− 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
≥ H
εs
4
min (AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω˜ −H
εs
4
max (B|TE)ρ|Ω˜
− 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
,
where the first inequality is due to the chain rule [Tomamichel, 2015, Equation (6.57)]
and the second is due to strong sub-additivity of the smooth max-entropy.
One can now apply the EAT to upper bound H
εs
4
max (B|TE)ρ|Ω˜ in the following
way. We use Theorem 9.3 with the replacements O → B, S → T , E → E. The
Markov conditions B1,...,i−1 ↔ T1,...,i−1E ↔ Ti then trivially hold and the condition
on the max-tradeoff function reads
fmax(p) ≥ sup
σRi−1R′ :Mi(σ)Wi=p
H (Bi|TiR′)Mi(σ) .
By the definition of the EAT channels {Mi}i∈[n], Bi 6=⊥ only for Ti = 1, which
happens with probability γ.16 Hence, for any state σRi−1R′ we have,
H (Bi|TiR′)Mi(σ) ≤ H (Bi|Ti)Mi(σ) ≤ γ
and the max-tradeoff function is simply fmax(p) = γ for any p (and thus ‖Ofmax‖∞ =
0). Applying17 Theorem 9.3 with this choice of fmax we get
H
εs
4
max (B|TE)ρ|Ω˜ < γn+
√
n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) . (11.21)
16This is why we made the distinction between Bi in the entropy accumulation protocol and B˜i
in the DIQKD protocol.
17Here a slightly more general version of the EAT than the one given in Section 9.2.3 is needed,
in which the event Ω can be defined via A,B,X, Y and not only C; see [Dupuis et al., 2016] for
the details.
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Combing the equations above we get that
Hεsmin (A|XY TOE)ρ˜
|
≈
Ω
≥ H
εs
4
min (AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω˜ − leakEC
−3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
− γn
−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) .
Finally, note that by applying the EAT on ρ|Ω˜, as in Theorem 11.5, we have
that either 1− Pr(Ω˜) ≥ 1− εEA − εEC, or
H
εs
4
min(AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω˜ > n · µopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC) .
The last two equations together give us the desired bound on
Hεsmin (A|XY TOE)ρ˜
|
≈
Ω
: either the protocol aborts with probability greater
than 1− εEA − εEC or
Hεsmin (A|XY TOE)ρ˜
|
≈
Ω
≥ n · µopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC
−3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
− γn
−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) .
Using Lemma 11.8, we prove that Protocol 11.2 is sound.
Lemma 11.9. For any device D let ρ˜ be the state generated using Protocol 11.2.
Then either the protocol aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC or it is
(εEC + εPA + εs)-correct-and-secret while producing keys of length `, as defined in
Equation (11.16).
Proof. Denote all the classical public communication during the protocol by J =
XY TOS where S is the seed used in the privacy amplification protocol PA. Denote
the final state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of Protocol 11.2, conditioned on
not aborting, by ρ˜K˜AK˜BJE|Ω˙ .
We consider two cases. First assume that the EC protocol was not successful
(but did not abort). Then Alice and Bob’s final keys might not be identical. This
happens with probability at most εEC.
Otherwise, assume the EC protocol was successful, i.e., KB = A. In that case,
Alice and Bob’s keys must be identical also after the final privacy amplification step.
That is, conditioned on KB = A, K˜A = K˜B .
We continue to show that in this case the key is also secret. The secrecy depends
only on the privacy amplification step, and for universal hashing a secure key is
produced as long as
` = Hεsmin(A|XY TOE)− 2 log
1
εPA
holds (recall Section 4.2.2). Hence, a uniform and independent key of length `
as in Equation (11.16) is produced by the privacy amplification step unless the
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smooth min-entropy is not high enough (i.e., the bound in Equation (11.18) does
not hold) or the privacy amplification protocol was not successful, which happens
with probability at most εPA + εs.
According to Lemma 11.8, either the protocol aborts with probability greater than
1− εEA− εEC, or the entropy is sufficiently high for us to have (recall Definition 4.6)
‖ρ˜K˜AJE|Ω˙ − ρUl ⊗ ρ˜JE‖1 ≤ εPA + εs .
Combining both cases above the lemma follows.
11.3.3 Key rate analysis
Theorem 11.6 establishes a relation between the length ` of the secure key pro-
duced by our protocol and the different error terms. As this relation, given
in Equation (11.16), is somewhat hard to visualise, we analyse the key rate
r = `/n for some specific choices of parameters and compare it to the key rates
achieved in device-dependent QKD with finite resources [Scarani and Renner, 2008a,
Scarani and Renner, 2008b] and DIQKD with infinite resources and a restricted set
of attacks [Pironio et al., 2009].
The key rate depends on the amount of leakage of information due to the
error correction step, which in turn depends on the honest implementation of the
protocol (recall Section 4.2.2). We use the honest IID implementation described in
Section 4.2.4 and choose the honest state of each round to be the two-qubit Werner
state ρQAQB = (1− ν) |φ+〉 〈φ+|+ νI/4 (and the measurements are as described in
Section 4.2.4). The quantum bit error rate is then Q = ν2 and the expected winning
probability is ωexp =
2+
√
2(1−2Q)
4 .
We emphasise that this is only a choice of the honest implementation and it does
not in any way restrict the actions of the adversary (and, in particular, the types of
imperfections in the device). Furthermore, the analysis done below can be adapted
to any other honest implementation of interest.
Leakage due to error correction
To calculate the rates we first need to explicitly upper bound the leakage of informa-
tion due to the error correction protocol, leakEC . As shown in Equation (4.2), this
can be done by evaluating Hε
′
EC
0 (A|B˜XY T ) on Alice and Bob’s state in an honest
IID implementation of the protocol, described in Section 4.2.4.
For this we first use the following relation between Hε0 and
Hε
′
max [Tomamichel et al., 2011, Lemma 18]:
H
ε′EC
0 (A|B˜XY T ) ≤ H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XY T
)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
.
The quantum asymptotic equipartition property, given as Theorem 7.3, tells us
that
H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XY T
)
≤ nH(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) +
√
nδ(ε′EC, τ) ,
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for τ = 2
√
2Hmax(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) + 1 and δ(ε′EC, τ) = 4 log τ
√
2 log
(
8/ε′2EC
)
.
For the honest implementation of Protocol 11.2 Hmax(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) = 1 and
H(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) = Pr(Ti = 0) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 0)+
Pr(Ti = 1) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 1)
= (1− γ) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 0)+
γ ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 1)
= (1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp) ,
where the first equality follows from the definition of conditional entropy and the
second from the way Ti is chosen in Protocol 11.2. The last equality holds since for
the generation rounds the error rate (i.e., the probability that Ai and B˜i differ) in
the honest case is Q and for the test rounds Bob can guess Ai with probability ωexp
given B˜i, Xi, and Yi.
We thus have
H
ε′EC
0
(
A|B˜XY T
)
≤ n [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)]
+
√
n4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
2 log
(
8/ε′2EC
)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
.
Plugging this into Equation (4.2) we get
leakEC ≤ n [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)]
+
√
n4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
2 log
(
8/ε′2EC
)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
+ log
(
1
εEC
)
.
(11.22)
Key rate curves
In Appendix C.2 a slightly modified protocol is considered in which, instead of
fixing the number of rounds in the protocol, only the expected number of rounds is
fixed. The completeness and soundness proofs follow the same lines as the proofs
above, as detailed in Appendix C.2 and do not include additional crucial insights.
The modification of the protocol improves the dependency of the key rate on the
probability of a test round γ18 The analysis presented in the appendix leads to the
key rates for the modified protocol and these are the rates presented here. Putting
the technical details aside, the reader may simply think of n¯ below as taking the
place of the number of rounds n used so far.
18The second order term of the smooth min-entropy rate given in Lemma 11.8 scales with γ,
roughly, as 1/γ, while in Appendix C.2 the dependency is roughly 1/√γ. The modified analysis can
be seen as a “patch” used to overcome the non-optimal dependency of the EAT given in Theorem 9.3
on the testing probability in the considered protocols. This issue was overcome in a more recent
version of the EAT [Dupuis and Fawzi, 2018].
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Figure 11.3: The expected key rate r = `/n¯ as a function of the quantum bit error
rate Q for several values of the expected number of rounds n¯ (see the main text and
Appendix C.2). For n¯ = 1015 the curve essentially coincides with the curve for the
IID asymptotic case [Pironio et al., 2009, Equation (12)]. The following values for
the error terms were chosen: εEC = 10−10, εsQKD = 10
−5 and εcQKD = 10
−2.
In an asymptotic analysis (n¯→∞) it is well understood that the soundness and
completeness errors εsQKD, ε
c
QKD should tend to zero as n¯ increases. However, in the
non-asymptotic scenario considered here these errors are always finite. We therefore
fix some values for them which are considered to be realistic and relevant for actual
applications. We choose the parameters such that the security parameters are at
least as good (and in general even better) as in [Scarani and Renner, 2008a], such
that a fair comparison can be made. All other parameters are chosen in a consistent
way while (roughly) optimising the key rate.
In Figure 11.3 the expected key rate r = `/n¯ is plotted as a function of the
quantum bit error rate Q for several values of the expected number of rounds
n¯. For n¯ = 1015 the curve essentially coincides with the rate achieved in the
asymptotic IID case [Pironio et al., 2009]. Since the latter was shown to be opti-
mal [Pironio et al., 2009] it provides an upper bound on the key rate and the amount
of tolerable noise. Hence, for large enough n¯ our rates become optimal and the
protocol can tolerate up to the maximal error rate Q = 7.1%. For comparison, the
previously established explicit rates [Vazirani and Vidick, 2014] are well below the
lowest curve presented in Figure 11.3, even when the number of signals goes to
infinity, with a maximal noise tolerance of 1.6%.
In Figure 11.4, r is plotted as a function of n¯ for several values of Q. As can be
seen from the figure, the achieved rates are significantly higher than those achieved in
previous works. Moreover, they are practically comparable to the key rates achieved
in device-dependent QKD (see Figure 1 in [Scarani and Renner, 2008a]). The main
difference between the curves for the device-dependent case and the independent
one is the minimal value of n¯ which is required for a positive key rate. (That is, for
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Figure 11.4: The expected key rate r = `/n¯ as a function of the expected number of
rounds n¯ (see the main text and Appendix C.2) for several values of the quantum bit
error rate Q. For Q = 0.5%, 2.5%, and 5% the achieved key rates are approximatly
r = 87%, 53%, and 22% respectively. The following values for the error terms were
chosen: εEC = 10−10, εsQKD = 10
−5 and εcQKD = 10
−2.
the protocols considered in [Scarani and Renner, 2008a] one can get a positive key
rate with less rounds.)
11.4 Open questions
To end the chapter, we list some future work directions and open questions specific
for the showcase of quantum cryptography.
Experimental realistions
The results presented in this chapter provide the theoretical groundwork for ex-
perimental implementations of device-independent cryptographic protocols. The
quantitive results imply that the first proof of principle experiments, with small
distances and small rates, are within reach with today’s state-of-the-art technol-
ogy, which recently enabled the violation of Bell inequalities in a loophole-free
way [Hensen et al., 2015, Shalm et al., 2015, Giustina et al., 2015] (a necessity for
device-independent cryptography). Indeed, Theorem 11.5 has already been applied
to the analysis of the first experimental implementation of a protocol for random-
ness generation in the fully device-independent framework [Liu et al., 2017]. The
next major challenge in experimental implementations is a field demonstration of a
DIQKD protocol. This would provide the strongest cryptographic experiment ever
realised.
As can be seen from Figures 11.2, 11.3, and 11.4, implementing a DIQKD protocol
is more challenging than implementing a randomness generation protocol — positive
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key rates require higher number of signals and lower noise levels. It therefore becomes
increasingly relevant to achieve the best possible dependence of the rate curves on
the number of rounds n¯, even for very small values of n¯. As can be seen from the
figures our rate curves approach (and essentially coincide) with the optimal curves
as the number of rounds increases. This is the case since our first-order term of the
key rate is tight.
However, one thing that can perhaps still be further optimised is the dependency
on the number of rounds, or in other words, how fast the curves approach the optimal
curve. Although this seems like a minor issue, it can make actual implementations
more feasible. The explicit dependency on n¯ given in Equation (11.16) is already
close to optimal. Still:
1. The numerical analysis used to plot the curves can be made somewhat better
for the range of n¯ = 104 − 106.
2. Throughout the proof we made certain non-optimal choices that almost surely
effect the second order term. For example, the use of the chain rules for the
smooth entropies can be done in a tighter way (compare the general form of the
chain rules [Tomamichel, 2015, Equation (6.57)] to the way it was applied here).
A tighter analysis of similar steps was used in [Tomamichel and Leverrier, 2017]
for the case of device-dependent QKD protocols and may be of use here as
well.
Possible extensions
The optimality of our key rates is only with respect to the structure of the considered
protocol, which is the standard (and only, as far as we are aware) DIQKD protocol
studied in the literature. It is interesting to come up with new DIQKD protocols and
see if they lead to key rates with higher first-order terms. Apart from the theoretical
curiosity, protocols with better asymptotic key rates can, of course, help us reach an
experimental implementation.
Due to the modularity of our analysis, it can at large be directly applied to
the analysis of other protocols. The main challenge is to come up with interesting
protocols. We discuss two possible directions to consider.
On the “quantum side” of the protocol, one may modify the protocol by consider-
ing different Bell inequalities. Even more, one can construct protocols in which more
information than the violation of a single inequality is used: Alice and Bob may use
the collected statistics to evaluate several quantities and decide accordingly whether
to abort or not; see for example the related work [Nieto-Silleras et al., 2018]. To
apply our proof to other Bell inequalities and additional statistical information one
should find a good bound on the min-tradeoff function, as done in Equation (11.7)
for the CHSH inequality. For many Bell inequalities such bounds are known, but
for the min-entropy instead of the von Neumann entropy. In most cases using a
bound on the min-entropy will result in far from optimal rate curves. Therefore, to
adapt our protocol in this direction one should probably first bound the min-tradeoff
function using the von Neumann entropy directly.19
19This should not be dismissed as can be seen from the following state of affairs.
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On the “classical side” of the protocol, different classical post-processing steps
can be considered. It is known that, asymptotically, considering protocols with
other one-way classical post-processing cannot lead to an improvement over our
protocol [Devetak and Winter, 2005]. Hence, the interesting to check is whether
there are protocols with two-way classical post-processing protocols that lead to an
improvement of the first-order term of the key rates.
Bounding the von Neumann entropy
As mentioned above, the main task to perform when modifying the protocol and the
analysis is to lower-bound the min-tradeoff function. Getting a tight bound on the
von Neumann entropy, and hence on the min-tradeoff function, does not seem to be
an easy task. Is there a numerical technique that allows one to get good bounds on
the von Neumann entropy for general Bell inequalities?
Interestingly, as it turns out, good numerical tools are known for a couple of
similar quantities:
1. When considering the min-entropy instead of the von Neumann en-
tropy one can use SDP hierarchies to get (not necessarily tight) lower-
bounds [Navascués et al., 2008].
2. In the device-dependent case, a recent development [Winick et al., 2017]
presents a numerical technique to lower-bound the von Neumann entropy
and by this derive better key rates for QKD.
We hope that it is possible to devise a general technique (numerical or analytical)
to calculate good lower bounds on the von Neumann entropy relevant for our case.
Such a technique, in combination with our work, will allow us to “enumerate” over all
possible protocols and calculate their key rates when looking for better protocols. If
it is not possible to devise a general tool, it will at least be interesting to understand
why this is the case. Is there a fundamental mathematical reason behind the
complexity of the problem?
[Nieto-Silleras et al., 2018] reports an advantage in terms of the min-entropy when considering the
full statistics instead of merely the violation if the CHSH inequality. Comparing the bound on the
min-entropy from the full statistics to the bound on the von Neumann entropy from the violation
alone, both evaluated on the quantum states produced by the honest implementations, we find that
it is still better to use the bound on the von Neumann entropy as we do here. Thus, to truly see if
an advantage can be gained by considering the full statistics, one should aim to a direct bound on
the von Neumann entropy.
Chapter 12
Outlook
The development and application of the concept of reductions to IID, taking the form
of de Finetti theorems, flourished in “standard” quantum information processing in
the last decade and more. The tools used, unfortunately, were not applicable when
considering device-independent information processing tasks, where the devices being
analysed are uncharacterised. The reductions presented in the thesis, namely the de
Finetti reduction (Chapter 8) and the entropy accumulation theorem (Chapter 9),
are the first to be applicable in the device-independent setting. As such, they
have opened the possibility of a significantly simpler analysis of device-independent
information processing tasks.
Among the advantages of applying the approach of reductions to IID in the
device-independent setting, compared to directly analysing the most general case,
are tighter quantitive results and modular proofs. The thesis’ showcases, used to
exemplify the usage of the reductions, indeed report such benefits. Our proof of
non-signalling parallel repetition (Chapter 10) is automatically valid for any complete-
support game with any number of players and achieves an exponential decrease that
matches that of IID strategies. Our security proof for device-independent quantum
key distribution (Chapter 11) achieves tight key rates, as under the IID assumption,
that are significantly better than all prior results and can be easily adapted to other
related protocols.
With this in mind, it is interesting to investigate how the presented reductions or
variants thereof can be used in the analysis of other tasks. Let us discuss a partial
list of questions and possible future work that we find intriguing.1
Two-party device-independent quantum cryptography
In the cryptographic protocols discussed in the thesis we considered two honest and
cooperating parties, Alice and Bob. Two-party cryptography, on the other hand,
refers to cryptographic protocols in which Alice and Bob do not trust each other.
1We list here questions that are not directly related to the showcases considered in the thesis.
For concrete open questions regarding parallel repetition (e.g., extensions of the results) and
device-independent quantum key distribution (such as possible improvements and experimental
implementations) see Sections 10.4 and 11.4, respectively.
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When considering device-independent two-party cryptography the dishonest party
(which can be either Alice or Bob) takes the role of the adversary and hence is
allowed to prepare the device used to implement the protocol. [Fu and Miller, 2018]
and [Ribeiro et al., 2018] present examples for such protocols.
The above mentioned works study the security of the protocols under the IID
assumption (or a closely related assumption). Clearly, it is interesting to see if the
analysis can be extended to capture the most general adversarial scenario, which,
in the case of these protocols, includes the use of sequential boxes. Applying a
reduction to IID can be beneficial here. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the
entropy accumulation theorem, in its current form, can be of use in such protocols.
The reason is that the Markov-chain conditions stated in Equation (9.4) do not hold,
at least when considering the most obvious choices of random variables.2
In some cases, one can overcome the problem by considering “imaginary” protocols,
closely related to the “real” protocol, in which the Markov-chain conditions do hold.
The idea is then to reduce the problem of proving the security of the real protocol
to that of the imaginary one and perform the analysis of the imaginary protocol
using the entropy accumulation theorem.
Such a proof technique is used in [Arnon-Friedman and Bancal, 2017]. There,
the protocol of interest is a device-independent entanglement certification protocol
and its analysis requires an upper bound on the smooth max-entropy, rather than
a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy as in cryptographic scenarios.3 Thus,
the steps used in [Arnon-Friedman and Bancal, 2017] are not directly applicable to
two-party device-independent cryptography. It is interesting to see if similar ideas
can be useful in cryptographic scenarios as well.
Alternatively, one could also try to prove a different variant of the entropy accu-
mulation theorem in which the Markov-chain conditions are replaced by some other
restrictions on the sequential process, which are fulfilled by two-party cryptographic
protocols. (Finding such conditions is interesting by itself). As discussed in Sec-
tion 9.2.1, some conditions on the process must appear in the theorem, since entropy
does not accumulate in any sequential process. While the Markov-chain conditions
are sufficient, we currently have no reason to believe that they are necessary; it
might as well be that some weaker or incomparable conditions also suffice.
Parallel device-independent quantum cryptography
Another type of cryptographic protocols to which the presented reductions to IID are
not applicable in a trivial manner are ones in which the most general analysis should
be done with quantum parallel boxes. An example is the parallel device-independent
quantum key distribution protocol of [Jain et al., 2017], in which all the non-local
games are played in parallel with the device (as in the parallel repetition question).
While [Jain et al., 2017] includes a security proof that goes beyond the IID scenario,
2In the case of two-party cryptography, the natural choice to make when trying to use the
entropy accumulation theorem is one in which the O systems belong to the honest party and the S
systems to the dishonest party. One can easily come up with boxes that do not fulfil Equation (9.4)
with these choices.
3In the considered scenarios the two quantities are not dual to one another;
see [Arnon-Friedman and Bancal, 2017] for the details.
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it achieves quantitively weak results. This raises the fundamental question of whether
parallel adversaries, i.e., adversaries that can create parallel boxes, are stronger than
sequential and IID adversaries (which are proven to have the same strength by our
work). To learn the answer to this question there is a need to supply tight key rates
for parallel device-independent quantum key distribution protocols.
Utilising a reduction to IID instead of analysing the general case directly, as
in [Jain et al., 2017], will almost surely lead to stronger, perhaps even tight, results.
Alas, the known reductions are not directly applicable here. The entropy accumula-
tion theorem is not useful in this case since it is restricted to sequential boxes and
here one ought to analyse parallel boxes. The de Finetti reduction, while suitable for
parallel boxes, is a priori not applicable here since the de Finetti box does not include
the adversary and is not a quantum box; see Section 8.4. It is therefore interesting
to investigate whether the analysis can somehow be manipulated so that the known
techniques can be utilised to prove security of parallel device-independent quantum
cryptography or, otherwise, whether other types of reductions, more adequate for
such scenarios, can be developed.
Device-independent tomography
One of the applications of the “original” quantum de Finetti reduction (also called
the post-selection technique) [Christandl et al., 2009] is a technique for a reliable
quantum state tomography [Christandl and Renner, 2012]. The technique is said
to be reliable since it reports not just an estimation of the quantum state but also
a confidence region around the estimated state, which acts as a meaningful “error
bar”. This is of crucial importance as the other more standard approaches, such as
the maximum-likelihood optimisation and least-square-error estimation, suffer from
systematic errors [Schwemmer et al., 2015].
Recently, the device-independent equivalents of the maximum-likelihood optimi-
sation and least-square-error estimation were considered in [Lin et al., 2018]. The
goal of such device-independent tomographic techniques is to report an estimated
quantum box from the observed finite statistics. Apart from systematic errors,
device-independent tomographic procedures as above are also at risk of providing a
non-quantum box, since up to date it is unknown how to perform optimisation prob-
lems over the set of quantum boxes. In analogy to [Christandl and Renner, 2012],
applying our de Finetti reductions to achieve reliable device-independent tomography
can therefore be of interest.
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Appendix A
Additional proofs: de Finetti
reductions
A.1 Bounding the de Finetti box
We use the notation used in Section 8.2:
1. |X ||Y| = l and we identify each pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y with a label j ∈ [l] by
writing (x, y) = j.
2. |A||B| = m and we identify each pair (a, b) ∈ A × B with a label k ∈ [m] by
writing (a, b) = k.
3. For all j ∈ [l] and k ∈ [m], pjk ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
k p
j
k = 1 for all j.
4. For all j ∈ [l] and k ∈ [m], cjk = 1−
∑
t<k p
j
t .
5. For all x, y, and j ∈ [l], nj = | {i : (xi, yi) = j} |, i.e., nj denotes the number
of indices of (x,y) in which the type of inputs is (x, y) = j.
6. For all x, y, a, b, j ∈ [l], and k ∈ [m], njk = | {i : (xi, yi) = j ∧ (ai, bi) = k} |,
i.e., njk denotes the number of indices of (x,y,a, b) in which the type of inputs
is (x, y) = j and the type of outputs is (a, b) = k.
and notice that:
1. For all j ∈ [l] and k ∈ [m− 1], pjk ∈ [0, cjk] and pjm = cjm.
2. For all j ∈ [l] and k ∈ [m], cjk = cjk−1 − pjk−1.
3. For all j ∈ [l], njm = nj −
∑m−1
k=1 n
j
k.
Lemma 8.4. For all a, b, x, and y,
τAB|XY (ab|xy) ≥
l∏
j=1
(
nj
nj1, . . . , n
j
m
)−1
1
(nj + 1)m−1
,
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where τAB|XY is the de Finetti box defined by
τAB|XY (a, b|x,y) =
∫
O⊗nAB|XY dOAB|XY
=
l∏
j=1
[∫ cj1
0
dpj1
cj1
(
pj1
)nj1]
. . .
[∫ cjm−1
0
dpjm−1
cjm−1
(
pjm−1
)njm−1] · (pjm)nj−∑m−1k=1 njk .
In the proof of the lemma we use the following formula:
∀c > 0 ∀n, n′ ∈ N, n′ ≤ n∫ c
0
dp
c
pn
′
(c− p)n−n′ = cn
∫ 1
0
qn
′
(1− q)(n−n′)dq
= cnB(n− n′ + 1, n′ + 1)
= cn
(
n
n′
)−1
1
n+ 1
(A.1)
where B is the Beta function. We also need the following identity:(
n−∑st=1 nt
ns+1
)
·
(
n
n1, . . . , ns, n−
∑s
t=1 nt
)
=
(
n
n1, . . . , ns+1, n−
∑s+1
t=1 nt
)
(A.2)
Proof. Abusing notation we denote below, for t ∈ [2,m− 1],1[∫ cj1
0
dpj1
cj1
(
pj1
)nj1]
. . .
[∫ cjt
0
dpjm−1
cjt
(
pjt
)njt]
=
t∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk]
.
We start by proving the following, for all j ∈ [l], by induction:
m−1∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk](
cjm−1 − pjm−1
)nj−∑m−1k=1 njk ≥
(
nj
nj1, . . . n
j
m−1, nj −
∑m−1
k=1 n
j
k
)−1
1
(nj + 1)m−1
(A.3)
Base case, m = 2:∫ cj1
0
dpj1
cj1
(
pj1
)nj1 [
(cj1 − pj1)
]nj−nj1
=
(
nj
nj1
)−1
1
nj + 1
This follows from Equation (A.1) while noting that for the first index we have cj1 = 1
by definition.
1This is just a notation and
∏t
k=1 should not be understood as the product operation. In
particular, the order of terms is relevant since the different parameters are not independent of one
another.
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Induction hypothesis for m− 2:
m−2∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk](
cjm−2 − pjm−2
)nj−∑m−2k=1 njk ≥
(
nj
nj1, . . . n
j
m−2, nj −
∑m−2
k=1 n
j
k
)−1
1
(nj + 1)m−2
(A.4)
Inductive step:
m−1∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk](
cjm−1 − pjm−1
)nj−∑m−1k=1 njk
=
m−2∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk]∫ cjm−1
0
dpjm−1
cjm−1
(
pjm−1
)njm−1 (
cjm−1 − pjm−1
)nj−∑m−2k=1 njk−njm−1
=
(A.5)
m−2∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk]×
×
(
cjm−1
)nj−∑m−2k=1 njk (nj −∑m−2k=1 njk
njm−1
)−1
1
nj −∑m−2k=1 njk + 1 =
(A.6)(
nj −∑m−2k=1 njk
njm−1
)−1
1
nj −∑m−2k=1 njk + 1×
×
m−2∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk](
cjm−2 − pjm−2
)nj−∑m−2k=1 njk ≥ (A.7)
(
nj −∑m−2k=1 njk
njm−1
)−1
1
nj −∑m−2k=1 njk + 1×
×
(
nj
nj1, . . . n
j
m−2, nj −
∑m−2
k=1 n
j
k
)−1
1
(nj + 1)m−2
≥
(A.8)
(
nj
nj1, . . . n
j
m
)−1
1
(nj + 1)m−1
.
where we used Equation (A.1) to get from (A.5) to (A.6), cjm−1 = c
j
m−2 − pjm−2 to
get from (A.6) to (A.7), the induction hypothesis (A.4) to get from (A.7) to (A.8)
and Equation (A.2) as well as nj −∑k = 1m−2 + 1 ≥ nj + 1 in the last line.
Finally, for any a, b, x, and y,
τAB|XY (ab|xy) =
l∏
j=1
m−1∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk] (
pjm
)nj−∑m−1k=1 njk =
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l∏
j=1
m−1∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk] (
cjm
)nj−∑m−1k=1 njk =
l∏
j=1
m−1∏
k=1
[∫ cjk
0
dpjk
cjk
(
pjk
)njk](
cjm−1 − pjm−1
)nj−∑m−1k=1 njk ≥
l∏
j=1
(
nj
nj1, . . . n
j
m
)−1
1
(nj + 1)m−1
where we used Equation (A.3) it the last step.
A.2 Diamond norm reduction
We prove Lemma 8.16
Lemma 8.16. For every two permutation invariant channels E ,F : P → K where PK
is a probability distribution over k ∈ {0, 1}t for some t > 0, and all PABC|XY Z ,
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(PABC|XY Z)‖1 ≤ (n+ 1)l(m−1)‖ (E − F)⊗ I(τPABC|XY ZABC|XY Z )‖1
where τPABC|XY ZABC|XY Z is a non-signalling extension of τAB|XY which depends on the
specific box PABC|XY Z .
Proof. First, as in the proof of Theorem 8.11, since the channels are permutation
invariant it is sufficient to consider boxes PAB|XY which are permutation invariant.
Given a specific box PABC|XY Z we can see this extension as a set of convex
decompositions of PAB|XY , according to Lemma 8.9. That is, every possible input
z induces a specific decomposition {(pcz ,PczAB|XY )}cz such that pcz = PC|Z(cz|z)
and PczAB|XY (a, b|x,y) = PABC|XY Z(a, b, cz|x,y, z). Since this is a convex decom-
position of PAB|XY we also have
∀z
∑
c
pc · PcAB|XY = PAB|XY . (A.9)
We now use the set of decompositions of PAB|XY to construct a set of decompositions
of the de Finetti box τAB|XY . Combining Lemmas 8.6, 8.8 and 8.9 together, we
know that there exists a non-signalling box RAB|XY such that
τAB|XY =
1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
PAB|XY +
(
1− 1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
)
RAB|XY
=
1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
∑
c
pc · PcAB|XY +
(
1− 1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
)
RAB|XY ,
where the second equality is due to Equation (A.9). For every z this defines a decom-
position {( 1
(n+1)l(m−1) · pcz ,PczAB|XY )}cz ∪ {(1− 1(n+1)l(m−1) ,RAB|XY )} of τAB|XY .
That is, this defines an extension τPABC|XY ZABC′|XY Z of τAB|XY where C
′ = C ∪ {c′}.
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This connection between the extensions PABC|XY Z and τ
PABC|XY Z
ABC′|XY Z allow us to
get the following bound on the trace distance, from which the lemma follows:
‖ (E − F)⊗I(τPABC|XY ZABC′|XY Z)‖1 ≥
1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
‖ (E − F)⊗I(PABC|XY Z)‖1 . (A.10)
Equation (A.10) can be proven using the following sequence of steps. First, the
diamond norm can be written in the following way.
‖E − F‖ = max
PABC|XY Z
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(PABC|XY Z)‖1
= max
PABC|XY Z
‖EK|C · PC|Z − FK|C · PC|Z‖1
= max
PABC|XY Z
1
2
∑
k
max
z
∑
c
PC|Z(c|z)
∣∣∣EK|C(k|c)− FK|C(k|c)∣∣∣
= max
PABC|XY Z
1
2
∑
k
max
z
∑
c
PC|Z(c|z)×
×
∣∣∣∑
x,y
PrE(x,y)
∑
a,b:
E(a,b,x,y)=k
PAB|XY C(a, b|x,y, c)−
∑
x,y
PrF (x,y)
∑
a,b:
F(a,b,x,y)=k
PAB|XY C(a, b|x,y, c)
∣∣∣
where the third equality is due to the explicit form of the trace distance previously
given in [Masanes, 2009, Hänggi et al., 2010b].
This can then be used to write
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(τPABC|XY ZABC′|XY Z)‖1
=
1
2
∑
k
max
z
∑
c∈C′
τ
PABC|XY Z
C′|Z (c|z)
∣∣∣∑
x,y
PrE(x,y)
∑
a,b:
E(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
AB|XY C′ (ab|xyc)
−
∑
x,y
PrF (x,y)
∑
a,b:
F(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
AB|XY C′ (ab|xyc)
∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
k
max
z
[∑
c∈C
τ
PABC|XY Z
C′|Z (c|z)
∣∣∣∑
x,y
PrE(x,y)
∑
a,b:
E(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
AB|XY C′ (ab|xyc)
−
∑
x,y
PrF (x,y)
∑
a,b:
F(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
AB|XY C′ (ab|xyc)
∣∣∣
+
(
1− 1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
) ∣∣∣∑
x,y
PrE(x,y)
∑
a,b:
E(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
AB|XY C′ (ab|xyc′)
−
∑
x,y
PrF (x,y)
∑
a,b:
F(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
AB|XY C′ (ab|xyc′)
∣∣∣]
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≥ 1
2
∑
k
max
z
∑
c∈C
τ
PABC|XY Z
C′|Z (c|z)
∣∣∣∑
x,y
PrE(x,y)
∑
a,b:
E(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
AB|XY C′ (ab|xyc)
−
∑
x,y
PrF (x,y)
∑
a,b:
F(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
AB|XY C′ (ab|xyc)
∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
k
max
z
∑
c∈C
1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
· PC|Z(c|z)
·
∣∣∣∑
x,y
PrE(x,y)
∑
a,b:
E(a,b,x,y)=k
PAB|XY C(ab|xyc)
−
∑
x,y
PrF (x,y)
∑
a,b:
F(a,b,x,y)=k
PAB|XY C(ab|xyc)
∣∣∣
=
1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
‖ (E − F)⊗ I(PABC|XY Z)‖1 .
where in order to get the second equality we divide the sum over C ′ = C ∪ {c′} to
the sum over C and then additional part of the partition c′. The next inequality is
then correct since(
1− 1
(n+ 1)l(m−1)
)∣∣∣∑
x,y
PrE(x,y)
∑
a,b:
E(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
A|XC (ab|xyc′)−
∑
x,y
PrF (x,y)
∑
a,b:
F(a,b,x,y)=k
τ
PABC|XY Z
A|XC (ab|xyc′)
∣∣∣ ≥ 0 ,
and the two last equalities are due to the specific decomposition of τAB|XY that we
defined and the definition of the trace distance. This proves the lemma.
Appendix B
Additional proofs:
non-signalling parallel
repetition
B.1 Signalling measure and test
We present here proofs of lemmas relevant to Section 10.2. The proofs previously
appeared in [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016b].
Lemma 10.5. Let O1AB|XY and O
2
AB|XY be two single-round boxes such that∣∣O1AB|XY −O2AB|XY ∣∣1 ≤  .
Then, for all a, b, x, and y,∣∣Sig(A→B,x,y,b)(O1AB|XY )− Sig(A→B,x,y,b)(O2AB|XY )∣∣ ≤ 2ε
Proof. We prove a stronger result from which the lemma follows. We prove∑
b,x,y
∣∣Sig(A→B,x,y,b) (O1AB|XY )− Sig(A→B,x,y,b) (O2AB|XY ) ∣∣ ≤ 2 .
To do so first note the following,∣∣O1AB|XY −O2AB|XY ∣∣1 = Ex,y∑
a,b
∣∣O1AB|XY (a, b|x, y)−O2AB|XY (a, b|x, y)∣∣
≥ Ex,y
∑
b
∣∣∣∑
a
(
O1AB|XY (a, b|x, y)−O2AB|XY (a, b|x, y)
) ∣∣∣
= Ex,y
∑
b
∣∣O1B|XY (b|x, y)−O2B|XY (b|x, y)∣∣
=
∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣O1B|XY (b|x, y)−O2B|XY (b|x, y)∣∣ ,
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therefore if
∣∣O1AB|XY −O2AB|XY ∣∣1 ≤  then∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣O1B|XY (b|x, y)−O2B|XY (b|x, y)∣∣ ≤  . (B.1)
Next, using Definition 10.3 and the discussion following it,∑
b,x,y
∣∣Sig(A→B,x,y,b) (O1AB|XY )− Sig(A→B,x,y,b) (O2AB|XY ) ∣∣
=
∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣∣O1B|XY (b|x, y)−∑
x˜
QX|Y (x˜|y)O1B|XY (b|x˜, y)
−O2B|XY (b|x, y) +
∑
x˜
QX|Y (x˜|y)O2B|XY (b|x˜, y)
∣∣∣
=
∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣∣O1B|XY (b|x, y)−O2B|XY (b|x, y)
+
∑
x˜
QX|Y (x˜|y)
(
O2B|XY (b|x˜, y)−O1B|XY (b|x˜, y)
) ∣∣∣
≤
∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣∣O1B|XY (b|x, y)−O2B|XY (b|x, y)∣∣∣
+
∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣∣∑
x˜
QX|Y (x˜|y)
(
O2B|XY (b|x˜, y)−O1B|XY (b|x˜, y)
) ∣∣∣
≤
∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣∣O1B|XY (b|x, y)−O2B|XY (b|x, y)∣∣∣
+
∑
b,x,y
∑
x˜
QX|Y (x˜|y)QXY (x, y)
∣∣∣O2B|XY (b|x˜, y)−O1B|XY (b|x˜, y)∣∣∣
=
∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣∣O1B|XY (b|x, y)−O2B|XY (b|x, y)∣∣∣
+
∑
b,y
∑
x˜
QX|Y (x˜|y)QY (y)
∣∣∣O2B|XY (b|x˜, y)−O1B|XY (b|x˜, y)∣∣∣
=
∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣∣O1B|XY (b|x, y)−O2B|XY (b|x, y)∣∣∣
+
∑
b,x,y
QXY (x, y)
∣∣∣O2B|XY (b|x, y)−O1B|XY (b|x, y)∣∣∣
≤ 2
where the last inequality follows from Equation (B.1).
Lemma B.1. Let ν > 0 be any parameter such that ν < ζ − 6. Then for every x,
y, and b,
∀OAB|XY ∈ Σ(A→B,x,y,b), Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
)
> ν .
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists OAB|XY ∈ Σ(A→B,x,y,b) such that
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
) ≤ ν. Since OAB|XY ∈ Σ(A→B,x,y,b) there exists O¯AB|XY
such that |OAB|XY − O¯AB|XY |1 ≤  and
Prdata∼O¯⊗n
AB|XY
[T ] > δ . (B.2)
Using Lemma 10.5 we get Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O¯AB|XY
) ≤ ν + 2. From Lemma
2.2 we know that Prdata∼O¯⊗n
AB|XY
[
|O¯freq(data2)AB|XY − O¯AB|XY |1 > 
]
≤ δ and therefore,
using Lemma 10.5 again,
Prdata∼O¯⊗n
AB|XY
[
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O¯
freq(data2)
AB|XY
)
> ν + 4
]
≤ δ .
Since ν < ζ − 6 this implies
Prdata∼O¯⊗n
AB|XY
[
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O¯
freq(data2)
AB|XY
)
> ζ − 2
]
≤ δ
and therefore, according to the definition of the test,
Prdata∼O¯⊗n
AB|XY
[T ] ≤ δ ,
which contradicts Equation (B.2).
Next we would like to prove Lemma 10.7. To do so, we first prove the same
statement but for IID boxes:
Lemma B.2. Assume the players share an IID box O⊗nAB|XY and let ζ,  > 0 be the
the parameters defined as in Equation (10.7). For every T (A→B,x,y,b),
1. If Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
) ≥ ζ then
Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[T ] > 1− δ (B.3)
2. If Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
)
= 0 then
Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[¬T ] > 1− δ (B.4)
where δ = δ
(
n
2 , 
)
=
(
n
2 + 1
)|A|·|Q|−1
e−n
2/4.
Proof. For the first part of the lemma assume that Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
) ≥ ζ.
Then
Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[¬T ] = Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
O
freq(data2)
AB|XY
)
< ζ − 2
]
≤ Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[
|Ofreq(data2)AB|XY −OAB|XY |1 > 
]
≤ δ
where the first inequality is due to Lemma 10.5 and the second due to Lemma 2.2.
This implies Equation (B.3). Equation (B.4) can be proven in an analogous way.
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Lemma 10.7. Let τABXY = Q⊗nXY τAB|XY , where τAB|XY is a de Finetti box. For
every T (A→B,x,y,b)
1. Prdata∼τABXY
[¬inΣ ∧ T ] ≤ δ
2. Prdata∼τABXY [inσ ∧ ¬T ] ≤ δ,
where δ = δ
(
n
2 , 
)
=
(
n
2 + 1
)|A||B||X ||Y|−1
e−n
2/4.
Proof. Since a de Finetti box is a convex combination of IID boxes, it is sufficient
to prove this for IID boxes O⊗nAB|XY and the lemma will follow. We start by proving
the first part of the lemma.
If Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[T ] ≤ δ then we are done. Consider therefore single-round
boxes OAB|XY such that
Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[T ] > δ .
For such boxes
Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[¬inΣ] ≤ Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[
|Ofreq(data1)AB|XY −OAB|XY |1 > 
]
≤ δ
where the first inequality follows from the definition of Σ(A→B,x,y,b) and the second
from Lemma 2.2. All together we get Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[¬inΣ ∧ T ] ≤ δ as required for
the first part of the lemma.
We now proceed to the second part of the lemma. If Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[inσ] ≤ δ
then we are done. Consider therefore boxes OAB|XY such that
Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[inσ] > δ .
Using Lemma 2.2 we know that there exists a state Ofreq(data1)AB|XY ∈ Σ(A→B,x,y,b) such
that |Ofreq(data1)AB|XY −OAB|XY |1 ≤  and according to the definition of Σ(A→B,x,y,b) this
implies that OAB|XY is ζ signalling or more. Therefore, according to Lemma B.2,
Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[¬T ] ≤ δ. All together we get
Prdata∼O⊗n
AB|XY
[inσ ∧ ¬T ] ≤ δ .
B.2 Sensitivity analysis
Linear programs (see, e.g., [Schrijver, 1998]) are a useful tool when considering
non-signalling games, as the non-signalling constraints are linear. The following
general results regarding the sensitivity of linear programs will be of use for us.
Lemma B.3 (Sensitivity analysis of linear programs, [Schrijver, 1998] Section 10.4).
Let max{cTx|Ax ≤ b} be a primal linear program and min{bT y|AT y = c, y ≥ 0} its
dual. Denote the optimal value of the programs by w and the optimal dual solution
by y?. Then the optimal value of the perturbed program we = max{cTx|Ax ≤ b+ e}
for some perturbation e is bounded by we ≤ w + eT y?.
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Lemma B.4 (Dual optimal solution bound, [Schrijver, 1998] Section 10.4). Let A
be an r1 × r2-matrix and let ∆ be such that for each non-singular sub-matrix B
of A all entries of B−1 are at most ∆ in absolute value. Let c be a row vector of
dimension r2 and let y? be the optimal dual solution of min{bT y|AT y = c, y ≥ 0}.
Then
κ =
r1∑
j=1
|y?j | ≤ r2∆
r2∑
j=1
|cj | .
We start with the following program from Section 10.3.1:
max
∑
a,b,x,y
QXY (xy)R(a, b, x, y)OAB|XY (ab|xy)
s.t. Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY (ab|xy)
)
= 0 ∀x, y, b (B.5a)
Sig(B→A,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY (ab|xy)
)
= 0 ∀x, y, a (B.5b)∑
a,b
OAB|XY (ab|xy) = 1 ∀x, y
OAB|XY (ab|xy) ≥ 0 ∀a, b, x, y
To apply Lemma B.3 we first need to write the program in the form
max{cTx|Ax ≤ b}. For this purpose, one can relax the linear program (B.5) to the
following:
max
∑
a,b,x,y
QXY (xy)R(a, b, x, y)OAB|XY (ab|xy)
s.t. Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY (ab|xy)
) ≤ 0 ∀x, y, b (B.6a)
Sig(B→A,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY (ab|xy)
) ≤ 0 ∀x, y, a (B.6b)∑
a,b
OAB|XY (ab|xy) = 1 ∀x, y
OAB|XY (ab|xy) ≥ 0 ∀a, b, x, y
To see that the relaxation of the non-signalling constraints (B.5a) and (B.5b)
to the constraints (B.6a) and (B.6b) does not change the program, i.e., does not
change the value of the optimal solution, recall Equation (10.6) and assume there
exists x, y, b for which
QXY (x, y)
[
OB|XY (b|x, y)−
∑
x˜
QX|Y (x˜|y)OB|XY (b|x˜, y)
]
< 0 .
That is, OB|XY (b|x, y) is smaller than the average
∑
x˜ QX|Y (x˜|y)OB|XY (b|x˜, y), and
therefore there must be some x′ for which OB|XY (b|x′, y) is larger than the average,
meaning,
QXY (x
′, y)
[
OB|XY (b|x′, y)−
∑
x˜
QX|Y (x˜|y)OB|XY (b|x˜, y)
]
> 0 ,
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but this contradicts the constraints (B.6a) and (B.6b).
The dual program of the primal (B.6) is given below.
min
∑
x,y
z(x, y)
s.t. z(x, y) + yA(x, y, b)QXY (x, y) + yB(x, y, a)QXY (x, y)
−
∑
x˜
yA(x˜, y, b)QXY (x˜, y)QX|Y (x|y)
−
∑
y˜
yB(x, y˜, a)QXY (x, y˜)QY |X(y|x)
≥ QXY (x, y)R(a, b, x, y) ∀a, b, x, y (B.7a)
yA(x, y, b) ≥ 0 ∀x, y, b
yB(x, y, a) ≥ 0 ∀x, y, a
Lemma B.5. Let κ =
∑d
j=1 |y?j | where d is the number of signalling tests and y? is
an optimal solution of the dual program (B.7). Let OAB|XY be a strategy such that
the following holds for all a, b, x, y
Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY
) ≤ ζ + 2
Sig(B→A,x,y,a)
(
OAB|XY
) ≤ ζ + 2 . (B.8)
Then w
(
OAB|XY
) ≤ 1− α+ (ζ + 2) d.
Proof. The fact that OAB|XY is not “too signalling” in any direction can be used to
bound its winning probability in the game G.
The following linear program describes the optimal winning probability of a
strategy OAB|XY which fulfils Equation (B.8):
max
∑
a,b,x,y
QXY (xy)R(a, b, x, y)OAB|XY (ab|xy)
s.t. Sig(A→B,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY (ab|xy)
) ≤ ζ + 2 ∀x, y, b
Sig(B→A,x,y,b)
(
OAB|XY (ab|xy)
) ≤ ζ + 2 ∀x, y, a∑
a
OAB|XY (ab|xy) = 1 ∀x, y
OAB|XY (ab|xy) ≥ 0 ∀a, b, x, y
(B.9)
Program (B.9) can be seen as a perturbation of the linear program (B.6), we can
therefore bound its optimal value by using known tools for sensitivity analysis of
linear programs, stated in Lemmas B.3 and B.4.
Denote by y? an optimal solution of the dual program1 (B.7) and let κ =∑d
j=1 |y?j | where d is the number of signalling tests. That is, κ is the sum of all the
dual variables which are associated to the non-signalling constraints.
1We are only interested in the value of y? as z? will not affect the bound.
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According to Lemma B.3 the perturbed winning probability is then bounded by
we ≤ 1− α+ (ζ + 2)κ.
In the case of a game with two players, using [Ito, 2010, Section 4], one can show
that κ ≤ d where d is the number of different signalling tests, i.e., d = |X ||Y|(|A|+
|B|)).
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Appendix C
Additional proofs:
device-independent quantum
cryptography
This appendix is devoted to presenting the technical proofs of the statements made
in this thesis related to the device-independent cryptography. The proofs previously
appeared in [Arnon-Friedman et al., 2016c].
C.1 Single-round statement
As mentioned in Section 5.2, Lemma 5.3 (restated below) follows, almost directly,
from [Pironio et al., 2010, Acín et al., 2012]. We show here how the bound derived
in these works can be manipulated in a simple way to get the bound used in this
thesis.
Lemma 5.3. For any quantum single-round box PAB|XY with winning probability
ω ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
in the CHSH game,
H(A|XY E) ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω (ω − 1) + 3
)
,
where E denotes the quantum side-information belonging to the adversary and h(·)
is the binary entropy function.
Proof. Our starting point is the result of [Pironio et al., 2009]. There, a quantum
single-round box PAˆBˆ|XY with symmetric marginals on Aˆ and Bˆ was considered
(i.e., Aˆ and Bˆ are uniformly distributed). To derive a bound which holds for any
PAB|XY we do the following:
1. Symmetrisation of PAB|XY – Alice chooses a bit F uniformly at random and
communicates it to Bob. They then symmetrise their marginals by setting
Aˆ = A⊕ F and Bˆ = B ⊕ F .
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2. Use [Pironio et al., 2009] to lower-bound H
(
Aˆ|XY FE
)
.
3. Derive a bound on H (A|XY E) from H
(
Aˆ|XY FE
)
.
Let us follow the above steps. After applying Aˆ = A⊕F and Bˆ = B⊕F , with F
uniformly distributed, A and B are unbiased. In our notation, [Pironio et al., 2009]
considered the following Holevo quantity
χ
(
Aˆ : FE|X = 0
)
= H (FE|X = 0)−H
(
FE|Aˆ,X = 0
)
.
and showed that for states leading to a CHSH violation of β ∈ [2, 2√2], re-
lated to the winning probability via ω = 1/2 + β/8, the following tight bound
holds [Pironio et al., 2009, Section 2.3]:
χ
(
Aˆ : FE|X = 0
)
≤ h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
β2
4
− 1
)
.
Rewriting the bound in terms of the winning probability ω one gets that for all
ω ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
(i.e. a winning probability in the quantum regime)
χ
(
Aˆ : FE|X = 0
)
≤ h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω (ω − 1) + 3
)
. (C.1)
We now wish to related the above Holevo quantities to our von Neumann
entropy. Using the definition of the conditional von Neumann entropy one can
rewrite H (A|FE,X = 0) (σ) as follows:
H
(
Aˆ|FE,X = 0
)
= H
(
AˆFE|X = 0
)
−H (FE|X = 0)
= H
(
Aˆ|X = 0
)
+H
(
FE|Aˆ,X = 0
)
−H (FE|X = 0)
= H
(
Aˆ|X = 0
)
− χ
(
Aˆ : FE|X = 0
)
= 1− χ
(
Aˆ : FE|X = 0
)
, (C.2)
where the last equality holds since A is uniformly random due to the symmetrisation
step (note that we do not condition on F in H (A|X = 0)). Furthermore,
H
(
Aˆ|XY FE
)
Mi(σ)
= Pr [Xi = 0] ·H
(
Aˆ|Y FE,Xi = 0
)
Mi(σ)
+ Pr [Xi = 1] ·H
(
Aˆ|Y FE,Xi = 1
)
Mi(σ)
.
(C.3)
Combining Equations (C.1) and (C.2) while noting that, due to the symmetry
between the cases X = 0 and X = 1, the same relations can be written for X = 1
and plugging the bounds in Equation (C.3) we get
H
(
Aˆ|XY FE
)
≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω (ω − 1) + 3
)
. (C.4)
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The only think left to do is to use the above to get our bound for the original
box PAB|XY . For this simply observe that
H
(
Aˆ|XY FE
)
= H (A|XY FE) = H (A|XY E) ,
where the first equality holds since Aˆ = A ⊕ F and the second follows since F is
independent of A, X, Y , and E. The lemma therefore follows.
C.2 An improved dependency on the test probabil-
ity
In this section we show how the EAT can be used in a slightly different way than
what was done in the main text. This results in an entropy rate which has a better
dependency on the probability of a test round γ, compared to the entropy rate given
in Equation (11.12). The improved entropy rate derived here is the one used for
calculating the key rates of the DIQKD protocol is Section 11.3.3.
C.2.1 Modified entropy accumulation protocol
We use a different entropy accumulation protocol, given as Protocol C.1. In this
modified protocol instead of considering each round separately we consider blocks
of rounds. A block is defined by a sequence of rounds: in each round a test is
carried out with probability γ (and otherwise the round is a generation round). The
block ends when a test round is being performed and then the next block begins.
If for smax rounds there was no test, the block ends without performing a test and
the next begins. Thus, the blocks can be of different length, but they all consist at
most smax rounds.
In this setting, instead of fixing the number of rounds n in the beginning of the
protocol, we fix the number of blocks m. The expected length of block is
s¯ =
∑
s∈[smax]
[
s(1− γ)(s−1)γ
]
+ smax(1− γ)smax = 1− (1− γ)
smax
γ
=
∑
s∈[smax]
[
(1− γ)(s−1)
]
. (C.5)
The expected number of rounds is denoted by n¯ = m · s¯.
Compared to the main text, we now have a RV W˜j ∈ {0, 1,⊥} for each block,
instead of each round. Alice and Bob set W˜j to be 0 or 1 depending on the result of
the game in the block’s test round (i.e., the last round of the block), or W˜j =⊥ if a
test round was not carried out in the block. By the definition of the blocks we have
Pr[W˜j =⊥] = (1− γ)smax .
C.2.2 Modified min-tradeoff function
Below, we apply the EAT on blocks of outputs instead of single rounds directly. Let
Mj denote the EAT channels defined by the actions of Steps 2-9 in Protocol C.1
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Protocol C.1 Modified entropy accumulation protocol
Arguments:
G – two-player non-local game
Xg,Xt ⊂ X – generation and test inputs for Alice
Yg,Yt ⊂ Y – generation and test inputs for Bob
D – untrusted device of (at least) two components that can play G repeatedly
m ∈ N+ – number of blocks
smax ∈ N+ –maximal length of a block
γ ∈ (0, 1] – probability of a test round
ωexp – expected winning probability in G for an honest (perhaps noisy)
implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation
test
1: For every block j ∈ [m] do Steps 2-9:
2: Set i = 0 and Wj =⊥.
3: If i ≤ smax:
4: Set i = i+ 1.
5: Alice and Bob choose Ti ∈ {0, 1} at random such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
6: If Ti = 0 Alice and Bob choose inputs Xi ∈ Xg and Yi ∈ Yg respectively. If
Ti = 1 they choose inputs Xi ∈ Xt and Yi ∈ Yt.
7: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and Bi
respectively.
8: If Ti = 0 Bob updates Bi to Bi =⊥.
9: If Ti = 1 they set W˜j = w (Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi) and i = smax + 1.
10: Alice and Bob abort if
∑
j∈[m] W˜j < [ωexp (1− (1− γ)smax)− δest] ·m.
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together with the behaviour of the device. It is easy to verify that Mj fulfil the
necessary conditions given in Definition 9.1.
We now construct a min-tradeoff function for Mj . Let p˜ be a probability
distribution over {0, 1,⊥}. Our goal is to find Fmin such that
∀j ∈ [m] Fmin(p˜) ≤ inf
σRj−1R′ :Mj(σ)W˜j=p˜
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
Mj(σ)
, (C.6)
where ~Aj is a vector of varying length (but at most smax). We use Aj,i to denote the
i’th entry of ~Aj and A
j,i−1
j,1 = Aj,1 . . . Aj,i−1. Since we will only be interested in the
entropy of ~Aj we can also describe it as a vector of length smax which is initialised
to be all ⊥. For every actual round being performed in the block the value of Aj,i
is updated. Thus, the entries of ~Aj which correspond to rounds which were not
performed do not contribute to the entropy. We use similar notation for the other
vectors of RVs.
To lower-bound the right-hand side of Equation (C.6) we first use the chain rule
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
=
∑
i∈[smax]
H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 ) . (C.7)
Next, for every i ∈ [smax],
H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 ) =
Pr[T j,i−1j,1 = ~0]H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 = ~0)
+ Pr[T j,i−1j,1 6= ~0]H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 6= ~0)
= (1− γ)(i−1)H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 = ~0)
since the entropy is not zero only if the i’th round is being performed in the block,
i.e., if a test was not performed before that round. Plugging this into Eq. (C.7) we
get
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
=
∑
i∈[smax]
(1− γ)(i−1)H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 = ~0) .
Each term in the sum can now be identified as the entropy of a single round. We
can therefore use the bound derived in the main text, as given in Equation (11.6).
For this we denote by ωi the winning probability in the i’th round (given that a test
was not performed before). Then it holds that
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
≥
∑
i∈[smax]
(1− γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)]
,
(C.8)
where, by the actions of the EAT channelMj , the ωi’s must fulfil the constraint
p˜(1) =
∑
i∈[smax]
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ωi . (C.9)
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Note that, similarly to what was done in the main text, we only need to consider p˜
for which p˜(1) + p˜(0) = 1− (1− γ)smax (otherwise the condition on the min-tradeoff
function is trivial, as the infimum is over an empty set).
To find the min-tradeoff function Fmin(p˜) we therefore need to minimise Equa-
tion (C.8) under the constraint of Equation (C.9). The following lemma shows that
the minimum is achieved when all ωi are equal.
Lemma C.1. The minimum of the function given on the righthand-side of Equa-
tion (C.8) over ωi constrained by Equation (C.9) is achieved for ω∗i =
p˜(1)
1−(1−γ)smax
for all i ∈ [smax].
Proof. Let ~ω = ω1, . . . , ωsmax and
f(~ω) ≡
∑
i∈[smax]
(1− γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)]
;
g(~ω) ≡
∑
i∈[smax]
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ωi − p˜(1) .
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, we should look for ~ω∗ such that g(~ω∗) = 0
and ∇f(~ω∗) = −λ∇g(~ω∗) for some constant λ. ∇f(~ω∗) = −λ∇g(~ω∗) implies that
for any i,
(1− γ)(i−1) d
dωi
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)] ∣∣∣
ω∗i
= −λγ(1− γ)(i−1)
and therefore
d
dωi
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)] ∣∣∣
ω∗i
= −λγ .
The function on the left-hand side of the above equation is strictly increasing. Hence,
it must be that all ω∗i are equal to some constant ω∗.
Lastly, we must have g(~ω∗) = 0. Thus,∑
i∈[smax]
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ω∗ − p˜(1) = 0
which means
ω∗ =
p˜(1)∑
i∈[smax] γ(1− γ)(i−1)
=
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax .
Plugging the minimal values of ωi into Equation (C.8) we get that
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
≥
∑
i∈[smax]
(1− γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax
(
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
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= s¯
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax
(
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
,
where we used Equation (C.5) to get the last equality.
From this point we can follow the same steps as in Section 11.2.2 (cutting and
gluing the function etc.). The resulting min-tradeoff function is given by
g(p˜) = (C.10)s¯
[
1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p˜(1)1−(1−γ)smax
(
p˜(1)
1−(1−γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
p˜(1)
1−(1−γ)smax ∈
[
0, 2+
√
2
4
]
s¯ p˜(1)1−(1−γ)smax ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
,
Fmin (p˜, p˜t) =
{
g (p˜) p˜(1) ≤ p˜t(1)
d
dp˜(1)g(p˜)
∣∣
p˜t
· p˜(1) +
(
g(p˜t)− ddp˜(1)g(p˜)
∣∣
p˜t
· p˜t(1)
)
p˜(1) > p˜t(1) .
The min-tradeoff function given above is effectively identical to the one derived in
the main text; although it gives us a bound on the von Neumann entropy in a block,
instead of a single round, this bound is exactly the expected length of a block, s¯,
times the entropy in one round. For smax = 1 the min-tradeoff function constructed
in the main text is retrieved.
C.2.3 Modified entropy rate
Since we apply the EAT on the blocks, the entropy rate is now defined to be the
entropy per block. We therefore get
µ(p˜, p˜t, εs, εe) =Fmin (p˜, p˜t)
− 1√
m
2
(
log(1 + 2 · 2smax3smax) + ‖ d
dp˜(1)
g(p˜)‖∞
)√
1− 2 log(εs · εe) ,
µopt(εs, εe) = max
3
4<p˜t(1)<
2+
√
2
4
µ(ωexp [1− (1− γ)smax ]− δest, p˜t, εs, εe) ,
and the total amount of entropy is given by
Hεsmin (AB|XY TE)ρ|Ω > m · µopt(εs, εEA) =
n¯
s¯
· µopt(εs, εEA) . (C.11)
By choosing smax = d 1γ e the scaling of the entropy rate with γ is better than
the rate derived in the main text. In particular, a short calculation reveals that the
second order term scales, roughly, as
√
n¯/γ instead of
√
n/γ.
C.2.4 Modified key rate
To get the final key rate we need to repeat the same steps from the main text, but
this time applied to random variables of varying length.
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For this we first observe that, with high probability, the actual number of rounds,
n, cannot be much larger than the expected number of rounds n¯. Let Si be the
RV describing the length of block i, for i ∈ [m], and N the RV describing the total
number of rounds. Then N = S1 + · · · + Sm. Since all the Si are independent,
identical, and have values in
[
1, 1γ
]
we have
Pr[N ≥ n¯+ t] ≤ exp
[
− 2t
2γ2
m(1− γ)2
]
.
Let εt = exp
[
− 2t2γ2m(1−γ)2
]
then
t =
√
−m(1− γ)
2 log εt
2γ2
.
The first step in the derivation of the key rate which needs to be changed is the
one given in Equation (11.21). The quantity that needs to be upper bounded is
H
εs
4
max (B|TEN)ρ|Ωˆ ; N can be included in the entropy since its value is fixed by T.
By the definition of the smooth max-entropy we have
H
εs
4
max (B|TEN) ≤ H
εs
4 −
√
εt
max (B|TEN,N ≤ n¯+ t) .
Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 11.8 we have
H
εs
4 −
√
εt
max (B|TEN,N ≤ n¯+ t)ρ|Ωˆ <
γ(n¯+ t) +
√
n¯+ t2 log 7
√
1− 2 log ((εs/4−√εt) · (εEA + εEC)) .
With this modification and the modified entropy rate given in Equation (C.11)
we get
Hεsmin (A|XY TOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥
n¯
s¯
· µopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC
− 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
− γ(n¯+ t)
−√n¯+ t2 log 7
√
1− 2 log ((εs/4−√εt) · (εEA + εEC)) .
Similarly, the amount of leakage due to the error correction step leakEC should
be modified as well. Following the steps in Section 11.3.3, the quantity to be upper
bounded is H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XY TN
)
. Here as well we have
H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XY TN
)
≤ H
ε′EC
2 −
√
εt
max
(
A|B˜XY TN,N ≤ n¯+ t
)
.
The asymptotic equipartition property can be used with the maximal length n¯+ t
to get
H
ε′EC
2 −
√
εt
max
(
A|B˜XY TN,N ≤ n¯+ t
)
≤ (n¯+ t) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) +
√
n¯+ t δ(ε′EC − 2
√
εt, τ) ,
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for
τ = 2
√
2Hmax(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) + 1
δ(ε′EC − 2
√
εt, τ) = 4 log τ
√
2 log (8/(ε′EC − 2
√
εt)2) .
Continuing exactly as in Section 11.3.3 we get
leakEC ≤ (n¯+ t) · [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)]
+
√
n¯+ t 4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
2 log (8/(ε′EC − 2
√
εt)2)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
+ log
(
1
εEC
)
.
The parameter εt should be chosen such that the key rate is optimised. The
resulting key rates are shown in Figures 11.3 and 11.4 in the main text.
C.3 Summary of parameters and variables
Symbol Meaning
n ∈ N+ Number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] Expected fraction of Bell violation estimation rounds
ωexp ∈ [0, 1] Expected winning probability in an honest (perhapsnoisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) Width of the statistical confidence intervalfor the Bell violation estimation test
εs Smoothing parameter
εcEA Completeness error of the entropy accumulation protocol
εEA The error probability of the entropy accumulation protocol
leakEC The leakage of the error correction protocol
εEC, ε
′
EC Error probabilities of the error correction protocol
εcEC Completeness error of the error correction protocol
εcPE Completeness error of the parameter estimation step
εPA Error probability of the privacy amplification protocol
` Final key length in the DIQKD protocol
εcQKD Completeness error of the DIQKD protocol
εsQKD Soundness error of the DIQKD protocol
Table C.1: Parameters used in Chapter 11
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Random variables and systems Meaning
Xi ∈ {0, 1} Alice’s input in round i ∈ [n]
Yi ∈ {0, 1} Bob’s input in round i ∈ [n]
Ai ∈ {0, 1} Alice’s output in round i ∈ [n]
Bi ∈ {0, 1,⊥}, B˜i ∈ {0, 1} Bob’s output in round i ∈ [n]
Ti ∈ {0, 1}
Indicator of the estimation test in round i:
Ti =
{
0 i’th round is not a test round
1 i’th round is a test round
Wi ∈ {⊥, 0, 1}
Indicator of the correlation in the test rounds:
Wi =

⊥ Ti = 0
0 Ti = 1 and the test fails
1 Ti = 1 and the test succeeds .
E Register of Eve’s quantum state
Ri
Register of the (unknown) quantum state ρiQAQB
of Alice and Bob’s devices after step i
of the protocol, for i ∈ {0} ∪ [n].
Table C.2: Random variables and quantum systems used in Chapter 11
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